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United States v. Virginia: Reinforcing Archaic
Stereotypes About Women in the Military Under
the Flawed Guise of Educational Diversity
Lucille M Ponte*
"[T]here is no defonnity of human character from which we tum with
deeper loathing than from a woman forgetful of her nature, and clamorous
for the vocation and rights of men."l

Introduction
This spring, the Supreme Court will be considering whether the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) may continue to admit only males and
require women to attend a separate leadership program at a private, allwomen's college. 2 Proponents of the male-only military system state that
the case is a battle over public education policy and the validity of separate
but equal in gender-segregated education. However, the real heart of the
dispute focuses on whether public education can be used to maintain
stereotypical views about the role of women in the military and to continue
to keep women out of positions of power in the greater society.

* The author is an Assistant Professor of Law at Bentley College in Weltham,
Massachusetts. She earned her B.A. from the University of Massachusetts and her J.D.
from the New England School of Law. She has written and lectured extensively on legal
issues concerning women in the military.
1. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1074 (1962) (quoting ALBERT T.
BLEDSOE, AN ESSAY ON LIBERTY AND SLAVERY 223-25 (1857». Myrdal's piece is
considered a seminal work on the history and sociological implications of white and
African-American racial segregation and strife in the United States. The author also draws
clear comparisons between the historic social and legal status of women and those of
African-Americans. See MYRDAL, supra, at 1072-77.
2. The Department of Justice filed a 29-page appeal with the Supreme Court to open
VMI to women, asserting that separate programs reinforce harmful gender stereotypes and
an improper return to separate but equal education. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in United States v. Virginia, Nos. 94-1941 and 94-2107 on October 5, 1995. On January
17, 1996 the justices heard oral argument on the case and have not yet issued their opinion
on the hotly debated issue. Kathryn R. Urbonya, Separate but Equal Revisited, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1996, at 44.
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For more than a century and a half, the Virginia Military Institute has
promoted its mission as the education and development of men for
leadership roles as "citizen-soldiers" through a rigorous military environment. 3 VMI's intertwining of the terms "citizen" and "soldier" is not an
accidental connection. Historically, the obligation of military service was
considered a hallmark of manhood giving rise to the rights and status of
full citizenship in our society.4 Throughout our history, women and other

3. VMI's stated mission is "to produce educated and honorable men, prepared for the
varied work of civil life ... and ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their country in time of
national peril." United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1425
(W.D. Va. 1991) (upholding all-male admissions to VMI) (citation omitted). VMI is often
extolled for its long history of producing outstanding military leaders dating back to the
Civil War era. See United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 976 F.2d 890,892-93 (4th
Cir. 1992); William A. DeVan, Toward A New Standard in Gender Discrimination: The
Case of the Virginia Military Institute, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 489, 493 n.22 (1992)
(citing VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE, CATALOGUE (1990-91)).
4. Mary M. Cheh, An Essay on VMI and Military Service: Yes, We Do Have to Be
Equal Together, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49,56-57 (1993); Merrianne E. Dean, Women
in Combat - The Duty of the Citizen-Soldier, 2 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 429, 431-34 (1994);
Pamela R. Jones, Women in the Crossfire: Should the Court Allow It?, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 252, 257-58 (1993); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit ofManhood and the Desegregation
of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 500-03, 525, 545 (1991); Stephanie A. Levin,
Women, Peace, and Violence: A New Perspective, 59 TENN. L. REV. 611, 613-14, 616
(1992); Cynthia Lewis, Plessy Revisited: The Separate but Equal Doctrine and Sexsegregated Education, 12 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 585, 594-98 (1977). Prof. Karst also
argues in his comparative article that women, African-American males, gays, and lesbians
have suffered similar exclusion, discrimination, and harassment in the military as reflective
of white male efforts to define manhood and power in society through control over the
country's preeminent symbol of raw power, the military. See Karst, supra, at 499-500. See
infra notes 15-182 and accompanying text.
Under a social contract theory, the government protects the body politic in exchange
for their promise to defend the state. Through protection of the state, the government is able
to meet its obligations to the body politic. Since women have not been required to register
or serve in the military, they are not viewed as full bargaining members in this social
contract. Linda K. Kerber, A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like . .. Ladies: Women,
Civic Obligation, and Military Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 95-96, 104
(1993); James M. Thunder, Note, The Jurisprudence of Conscription: Social Contract,
Moral Obligation and Proposals, 23 CATH. LAW. 255, 258-60 (1978). The Military
Selective Service Act echoes this social contract approach stating that "in a free society the
obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces ... should be shared generally."
50 U .S.c. app. § 451 (c) (1988).
In 1980, the congressional debates over the inclusion of women into draft registration
plans further illustrated the interrelationship of military service and full citizenship:
The paternalistic attitude inherent in the exclusion of women from past draft
registration requirements not only relieved women of the burden of military
service, it also deprived them of one of the hallmarks of citizenship. Until
both men and women share both the rights and obligations of citizenship,
they will not be equal.
126 CONGo REC. S6548 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield). But see Levin,
supra, at 614-15 (arguing that women should use assimilation into military and other violent
institutions to redefine citizenship to include the importance of nurturing others).

Winter 1996]

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

3

minority groups have been denied the opportunity of military service and
training because of their subordinate social and legal statuS. 5

5. Traditionally, women were lumped together with African-American slaves, children,
and criminals as members of the lower castes of society who were not deserving of the full
status and rights of manhood. MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 1073-78; Helen Mayer Hacker,
Women as a Minority Group, 30 Soc. FORCES 60, 65-66 (Oct. 1951) (pioneering work on
women as "minority" group); Jo Freeman, The Building of the Gilded Cage, 1 SECOND
WAVE: A MAGAZINE OF NEW FEMINISM (1971), reprinted in JEROME H. SKOLNICK &
ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRISIS IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 230, 231-32, 238-43 (3d ed. 1976)
(utilizing Hacker's theory to illustrate legal, economic and social controls on female
behavior); Lewis, supra note 4. Although women are not statistically in the minority,
women are often coupled with other minority groups because of the discriminatory, unequal
treatment they receive in society. Hacker, supra, at 59-60; Freeman, supra, at 239-42.
Myrdal notes that paternal power over women, African-American slaves and children
was often justified as part of a divine order. "When a legal status had to be found for the
imported Negro servants in the seventeenth century, the nearest and most natural analogy
was the status of women and children. The ninth commandment-linking together women,
servants, mules, and other property--can be invoked, as well as a great number of other
passages of Holy Scripture." MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 1073. See Dean, supra note 4, at
431-32 (discussing the role of religious doctrine in supporting women's inferior status to
men).
As part of a divine order, the Supreme Court adopted the paternalistic view that women
were the weaker sex who needed men to be their protectors:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . .. This is the law of
the creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general
constitution of things.
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) l30, 141-42 (1873) (upholding denial of women's
right to practice law).
Scholars have often acknowledged strong parallels between the exclusion from military
service and the subordinate social and legal status accorded both women and AfricanAmericans throughout our history. Cheh, supra note 4, at 56-57; Dean, supra note 4, at
434-35; Jill L. Goodman, Women, War and Equality: An Examination of Sex-Discrimination in the Military, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 243, 247, 262 (1980); Jones, supra note
4, at 257-58; Karst, supra note 4, at 500-03, 508-09, 525-27, 545; Levin, supra note 4, at
6l3-14. In particular, women and both African-American slaves and free persons were
viewed as socially inferior groups whose "proper place" in society was often enforced
through laws and the legal system. MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 1077; Freeman, supra, at
231-32, 238-43; Hacker, supra, at 61-63; Lewis, supra note 4. The Supreme Court
recognized the law's enforcement of women's lower social status in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,684-85 (1973). In Frontiero, the court noted that:
[O]ur statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped
distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th
century the position of women in our society, was in many respects,
comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither
slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their
own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity
to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children .... And although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870,
women were denied even that right-which is itself 'preservative of other
basic civil and political rights'--until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later.
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In the 1970s, revisions in statutes and case law began to pry open the
doors of federal service academies to women, and the changing demands
of combat expanded opportunities for women in the military. Despite these
changes, VMI defiantly refused to admit women into its all-male military
traming program. VMI's all-male admissions policy has its roots in
stereotypical thinking about a women's proper place in society and the
exclusion of women from full participation in every aspect of society,
including military training and service. 6
VMI has succeeded in convincing the district and appellate courts that
its all-male admissions policy is about preserving diverse pedagogical
choices rather than the reinforcement of stereotypical views about women
in the military. VMI argues that its all-male program serves the public's
desire for single-gender education and provides greater educational diversity
and choice within Virginia's educational system. Although VMI couches
its arguments in terms of such positive concepts as educational choice or
diversity, VMI's vehement opposition to admitting females cannot be
separated from stereotypical views about the proper societal roles of women
and an extensive history of gender exclusion, segregation, and discrimination against women in the military. 7
This article argues that the battle for female admissions into VMI is
rooted in the debate over gender roles in military training and service, but
that VMI has successfully masqueraded the dispute as a debate over the
value of single-gender education and its adversative training method. In
both the trial and appellate cases, the judiciary failed to consider the case
in its proper historical military context, thereby missing its true place within
the arduous struggle for recognition, respect, and equality for women in the
military as well as women in society as a whole. Instead, the appellate
court sanctioned the creation of a separate and unequal leadership program
for women at a private all-female college. The end result is that VMI's allmale educational program reinforces the archaic notion that full citizenship
and leadership roles in society should be reserved for men, who alone bear
the burden of defending the nation. 8
Part I of this article will examine the historical role of women in the
military-a history marked by exclusion, segregation, inequality and finally,
the beginnings of integration. Throughout this history, the military's male
/d. at 685 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 130; Radice v.
New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (upholding limits on night work hours for women);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding statutory ban on female bartenders);
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding jury duty as compulsory only for men, not
women); Miskunis v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1066
(1968) (upholding right to loss of consortium only for husbands, not wives).
6. See infra notes 100-19, 146-68 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 15-182, 383-537 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 15-182 and accompanying text.
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hierarchy has narrowly prescribed women's choices and has not recognized
the benefits of expanding female opportunities or promoting true diversity. 9
As women's roles in the military expanded and combat restrictions were
eased, it became more difficult for VMI to sustain its all-male program on
the basis of traditional gender roles in the military. As a result, a new line
of defense based on diversified educational choices emerged. 1O
Part II analyzes VMI's use of the separate but equal standard in the
military education context. The strange paradox of the demise of the
concept of separate but equal for race-segregated public education but its
continuing vitality in gender-segregated public education is explored.
Further, the impact of the Supreme Court's shift from a rational basis test
to a heightened scrutiny standard in gender discrimination cases is
delineated. In Craig v. Boren, II the Court adopted a heightened scrutiny
test to determine the legitimacy of all male institutions. Prior to Craig, the
rational basis test was used. The rational basis test focused on whether
single-sex programs were generally similar and overlooked substantial
inequalities between male and female educational institutions. This allowed
inferior public educational programs for women to be created and
maintained, rather than opening male institutions to women. In these
earlier cases, all-male military academies were often held out as examples
justifYing the continuation of gender segregation, and therefore inequality,
in public education. With the development of the heightened scrutiny test
for gender discrimination, the validity of this earlier precedent was cast into
serious doubt.
Part III considers the first set of court decisions regarding VMI (VMI
I) which upheld the single-sex educational choice for men only under the
perverse guise of educational diversity. Ignoring the role of historical
discrimination against women in the military, the deeply flawed decision
twisted the concepts of educational choice and diversity in order to sustain
VMI's discriminatory policy. The appeals court weakly reversed the
district court's decision but opened the door for VMI to propose a separate
but unequal program for women. 12

9. For excellent surveys of American women's roles in military history, see generally:
MAJOR GEN. JEANNE HOLM, USAF (RET.), WOMEN IN THE MILITARY, (ed. rev. 1992);
MARTIN BIN KIN & SHIRLEY J. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY (1977); Goodman, supra
note 5. In the anned forces, African-American females face the double-bind of gender and
race. For an overview of the roles of African-American women in the military, see
generally: OFF. OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CIVILIAN
PERSONNEL POLIcy/EQUAL OPPORTUNITY U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, BLACK AMERICANS IN
DEFENSE OF OUR NATION, 137-147 (1991) [hereinafter BLACK AMERICANS]; HOLM, supra,
at 77-79.
10. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
II. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S 190 (1976).
12. See infra notes 383-460 and accompanying text.
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Part IV analyzes the second set of court decisions regarding VMI (VMI
II) in which the courts consider VMI's proposed separate leadership
program for women, resuscitating the pernicious notion of separate but
equal in public education. Despite significant tangible and intangible
inequalities in the program, the district court approved of the separate and
unequal program for women, undermining many of its own assertions in
VMI I. Recognizing the proposal's obvious disadvantages, the VMI II
appeals court upheld the lower court's approval under a new substantive
comparability test, which elevates similar educational goals above equality
in facilities, faculty, endowment, curriculum, alumni support and reputation.
Through its unwillingness to change the status quo at VMI, the appeals
court approved separate and unequal military training for women under its
new test. 13
This article concludes that there was no need for a new standard of
review, only a willingness to properly apply intermediate scrutiny to this
dispute. The intermediate or heightened scrutiny test would determine
whether single gender institutions are substantially related to a stated
government interest, such as educational diversity. Given the historical
discrimination against military women, VMI's asserted objectives cannot
withstand traditional intermediate scrutiny review. VMI should be ordered
either to integrate its military training program or surrender its public
funding. Any other outcome simply reinforces archaic stereotypes about
the proper roles of women in the military and assures women's continuing
second class status in society. 14

I.

Historical Overview of Women in the Military

A. PRE-WORLD WAR II PERIOD

Before 1901, women were officially excluded from military actions and
were not allowed to serve in any of the military service branches. 15 This
treatment was seldom questioned since, based on stereotypical views about
appropriate gender roles in society, most viewed the military as purely a
male domain. 16

13. See infra notes 463-537 and accompanying text.
14. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. See infra notes 15-182 and accompanying text.
15. HOLM, supra note 9, at 9; Women in the Military, 11 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPS.
495, 496 (1981). Despite severe shortages of military personnel, Army regulations allowed
for the enlistments of men only. HOLM, supra note 9, at 5. See infra notes 52-77 and
accompanying text.
16. BIN KIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 4-5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 16-17; Jones, supra
note 4, at 257-58; Karst, supra note 4, at 500-01,525,534-37. General Robert H. Barrow,
former Commandant of the Marine Corps, asserted the traditional view of male and female
roles in the military stating:

Winter 1996]

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

7

However, this lack of official recognition does not mean that women
did not participate in military support and combat activities prior to the
20th century.17 Throughout American history, women have played diverse
and significant roles in military activities. In the 18th and 19th centuries,
thousands of women accompanied battlefield army units during the
Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and Spanish-American War, facing
the hardships of war without official military statuS. 18 Most women
participated as nurses providing desperately needed medical services, 19

War is man's work. Biological convergence on the battlefield would not
only be dissatisfYing in terms of what women could do, but it would be an
enormous psychological distraction for the male who wants to think that he's
fighting for that woman somewhere behind, not up there in the same foxhole
with him. It tramples the male ego. When you get right down to it, you
have to protect the manliness of war.
Karst, supra note 4, at 534. This sentiment was recently echoed in a college lecture given
by Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, about the biological roots of the roles of men and
women in the military.
If combat means living in a ditch, females have biological problems
staying in a ditch for 30 days because they get infections and they don't
have upper body strength. I mean some do, but they're relatively rare.
On the other hand, men are basically little piglets, you drop them in the
ditch, they roll around in it, it doesn't matter ....
On the other hand, if combat means being on the Aegis-class cruiser
managing computer controls for 12 ships and their rockets, a female may
again be dramatically better than a male who gets very, very frustrated
sitting in a chair all the time because males are biologically driven to go out
and hunt giraffes.
Gingrich on Men, Women and the Roles They're Made to Play, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
19, 1995, at 7. The Defense Department distanced itself from Gingrich's remarks, claiming
that military women do not go into ground combat and are not known to have any higher
incidence of infection than males. Defense Department Regular Briefing, Federal News
Service, Jan. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file.
Maj. Gen. Jeanne Holm, USAF (Ret.) recognized that long-held beliefs about the
proper roles of military men and women continue to block female attempts to fully integrate
into the military.
One of the barriers facing women then, as now, was the prevalence in the
military of the masculine mystique, the idea that the military is a man's
world and warfare is a man's business, not a fit or proper place for a
woman.
HOLM, supra note 9, at 16-17.
17. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 4-5; BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 137-39;
HOLM, supra note 9, at 3-9.
18. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 4-5; BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 137-39;
HOLM, supra note 9, at 3-9; James D. Milko, Beyond the Persian Gulf Crisis: Expanding
the Role of Servicewomen in the United States Military, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1301, 1303
(1992).
19. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 138-39;
HOLM, supra note 9, at 4, 7-9. Some women participated as volunteers while others were
paid employees. BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 138-39; HoLM, supra note 9, at 4,
7-9. During the Civil War, with the leadership of Clara Barton and Dr. Mary Walker, the
first female doctor for the Army, battlefield nurses made major contributions to the improvement of sanitation standards and patient care for soldiers wounded in battle. HOLM, supra
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while others accompanied their husbands' military companies and
performed various domestic duties for the troops. 20 During this period,
the acceptance of women in battlefield nursing and domestic positions was
reflective of societal views of appropriate feminine roles. 21 However,
some women did depart from these traditional pursuits, disguising
themselves as men to become involved in direct combat or to participate
as military spies and couriers. 22
During the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, government and
military leaders reluctantly came to the conclusion that a permanent
structure for organizing and directing female nursing activities was needed

note 9, at 7. Inspired by Barton, Susan King Taylor became a famous African-American
volunteer nurse for African-American Civil War troops. BLACK AMERICANS, supra note
9, at 138. In Taylor's memoirs she chronicled the only written record of the efforts of
African-American female volunteer nurses during the Civil War. !d.
In 1861, the Secretary of War appointed Dorothea Dix, Superintendent of Women
Nurses, to recruit some 6,000 women as nurses. HOLM, supra note 9, at 8. At the end of
the war, the Army returned to the use of men for patient care. Id. With the start of the
Spanish-American War, women were called on again when there was an insufficient number
of men recruited for medical services. !d.
20. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 4. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, poor women often did not have any real alternatives but to join their
spouses at battlefield outposts. Typically, three to six women accompanied each unit to
perform domestic tasks in return for food for themselves and their children. HOLM, supra
note 9, at 4. It is also important to note that during the Revolutionary War, many AfricanAmerican females, motivated by promises of freedom from slavery, participated in medical,
spying and domestic activities. BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 137. Many AfricanAmerican females saw this reward for wartime efforts as a preferable alternative to the
common fate of being forced to marry an African-American free man who might purchase
a female's freedom from slavery. Id.
21. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 4-5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 4.
22. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 4-5; BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 137-39;
HOLM, supra note 9, at 3-6. During the Revolutionary War, Molly Pitcher (Mary Ludwig
Hays McCauley) became a famous symbol of the woman warrior when she took over as a
rammer for cannon artillery after her husband fell in battle. BIN KIN & BACH, supra note
9, at 4; HOLM, supra note 9, at 3-4. Another renowned Revolutionary War combatant,
Deborah Sampson (Robert Shirtliffe) was a common foot soldier for three years in the
Continental Army. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 5; Milko,
supra note 18, at 1303 n.8. In the War of 1812, the first female marine, Lucy Brewer,
served for three years on the USS Constitution as George Baker. BINKIN & BACH, supra
note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 5.
During the Civil War, it is estimated that some 400 women disguised themselves as
men and participated in direct combat. HOLM, supra note 9, at 6. For the Union Army,
some of the best documented are: Sarah Edwards, a Union army soldier and spy and Anne
Caroll, a military strategist who advised General Grant on his Tennessee campaign. Id.
Harriet Tubman also participated in direct combat; her spying and soldiering efforts winning
her the unofficial title of "General" Tubman. BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 138.
For the Confederate forces, Loreta Velasques rose to the level of army commander and
fought the first battle of Bull Run as Harry T. Buford. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at
5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 6. Velasques ultimately earned a commission in the calvary and
was only unmasked when she suffered serious battle wounds. BINKIN & BACH, supra note
9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 6.
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for both routine and battlefield military health services?3 In 1901,
Congress created the Army Nurses Corps, the first uniformed women's
auxiliary branch, with the Navy Nurse Corps following in 1908. 24 These
two uniformed female corps were separate from the four main service
branches, and carried no military rank, no equal pay provisions, and no
veteran's or retirement benefits. 25
With the onset of World War I, women returned to their traditional
roles in the nurse COrpS,26 but also expanded into clerical positions as
secretaries and telephone operators,27 positions formerly held only by
men. 28 Recognizing a severe shortage of male recruits, the Navy took the
unprecedented step of enlisting women in 1917,29 followed by the Marines
in 1918. 30 These women were the first to receive full, although unequal,

23. HOLM, supra note 9, at 8-9; Milko, supra note 18, at 1303 n.9. During the SpanishAmerican War nearly 75% of all combat casualties were from diseases such as typhoid and
yellow fever. Tragically, many African-American female volunteer nurses were directly
exposed to these illnesses on the illogical view that "their darker thicker skin made them
immune to those diseases." BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 139. The numbers of
these volunteer nurses who ultimately became victims of this reckless exposure is not
known. Id.
24. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 9. Once again AfricanAmerican female nurses were forgotten volunteers. Originally, these women were not
expected to play any role in future recruitment efforts. Despite this view, the National
Association of Colored Graduate Nurses was privately founded in 1909. See BLACK
AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 139.
25. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 9; Milko, supra note 18,
at 1304 n.l O.
26. HOLM, supra note 9, at 10, 12; Milko, supra note 18, at 1304. At the start of World
War I, the Red Cross initially refused to recruit any African-American female nurses.
BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 139. In the final two months of the war, AfricanAmerican nurses were finally accepted into the Army Nurse Corps. Id. Despite these
official obstacles, African-American females also played important roles aiding soldiers at
YWCA Hostess Houses and selling Liberty Bonds. Id. at 140.
27. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 10, 12; Milko, supra
note 18, at 1304 nn.1O-11.
28. HOLM, supra note 9, at 10, 12.
29. Id. at 12; BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5. The Navy classified these women as
yeoman (t), known as "yeomanettes." BIN KIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra
note 9, at 12; Goodman, supra note 5, at 249 n.53. Although largely functioning in clerical
roles, some yeomanettes became translators, draftsmen, camouflage designers and recruiters.
HOLM, supra note 9, at 12. Navy regulations required that all yeomen must be assigned to
ships, but these regulations also prohibited women from serving on ships at sea. !d. To
avoid these regulatory hurdles, all yeomanettes were assigned to sunken tugboats at the
bottom of the Potomac River. Id.
30. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 12, 17.
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military status and rank. 31 The Anny, however, continued to limit women
to civilian roles as nurses. 32
Some in the War Department were greatly concerned about the growing
female presence in the armed forces. 33 The War Department cautioned
that "with careful supervision, women employees may be permitted in
camps without moral injury either to themselves or to the soldiers" so long
as these women were "of mature age and high moral character. ,,34
By the end of World War I, some 34,000 women served in civilian and
enlisted capacities, including 10,000 who served overseas. 35 In 1918, the
end of the war lead to rapid demobilization of all enlisted women, with
only civilian nurses surviving the post-war disbandment. 36 The armed
forces returned once again to all-male enlistments. 37
Historically, the armed forces followed a pattern of disbanding female
military support groups after each war, only to be later forced to recruit
women all over again when male enlistments did not meet wartime
needs. 38 After World War I, two military studies considered proposals for
the mobilization and integration of women into the armed forces, but no
changes were ever instituted. 39 It took another world war for the military
establishment to finally consider a more permanent, but by no means equal,
role for women in the military.

B.

THE WORLD WAR

II ERA

With the rumblings of World War II on the international horizon,
Congress strongly rejected a bill that would establish a women's army

31. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 12, 17; Goodman, supra
note 5, at 249 n.53. During World War I, some 13,000 women enlisted in the Navy and
Marines. BIN KIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; Goodman, supra note 5, at 249 n.53.
32. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 12-13; Milko, supra note
18, at 1304.
33. HOLM, supra note 9, at 13.
34. Id.
35. /d. at 10.
36. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; HOLM, supra note 9, at 16; Milko, supra note
18, at 1304 n.lI.
37. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5; Milko, supra note 18, at 1304 n.ll.
38. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text; see infra notes 50-55, 77-79 and
accompanying text.
39. BIN KIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 5-6; Milko, supra note 18, at 1304 n.13. The first
draft plan came out of the office of Anita Phipps, the Anny's civilian director of women's
relations. Her plan called for the training and assignment of women enlistees to units under
the command of female officers. This proposal was rejected by the Army in 1926. BIN KIN
& BACH, supra note 9, at 6 nA (citing MATnE TREADWELL, THE WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS
12, 14-15 (1954». Under Major Everett S. Hughes, the Hughes Plan followed which called
for women who served overseas or in militarized zones to be integrated into the all-male
Army with similar military uniforms and status. Despite being submitted twice, in 1928 and
1931, to the Army chief of staff, no action was ever taken on the Hughes Plan. Id. at 6.
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auxiliary corps in 1941. 40 However, after the shock of Pearl Harbor,
Congress passed the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps Bill in 1942,41
followed by congressional authorization two months later for women's
auxiliaries in the Navy and Marine COrpS.42 The Air Force43 and Coast
Guard44 followed with their own female auxiliary units. Despite congressional approval, some members of Congress protested the establishment of
women's auxiliaries as a serious challenge to the prescribed roles of men
and women in American society:

40. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 6-7; HOLM, supra note 9, at 23-24. With the
support of the War Department, Representative Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts
introduced a bill calling for a women's civilian auxiliary, separate from the Army, in May
1941. The bill was shelved after referral to the Bureau of Budget. BINKIN & BACH, supra
note 9, at 7. Due to manpower shortages, the British already relied heavily on women's
auxiliaries, while Russian and Chinese women actively participated in their national defense,
including as soldiers in front-line combat duties. /d. at 6, 9.
41. Women's Army Auxiliary Corps Act, Pub. L. No. 77-554,56 Stat. 312 (1942). The
law created the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps which was transformed into the Women's
Army Corps (WACs), with full military status in 1943. HOLM, supra note 9, at 81; Milko,
supra note 18, at 1304-05 nn.I3, 15. See infra notes 52-77 and accompanying text.
Some 4,000 African-American females and about 1,000,000 African-American males
served in the armed forces in World War II. Karst, supra note 4, at 518. The Army was
the only service branch that accepted African-American female recruits from the start of the
war. HOLM, supra note 9, at 77; BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 140; MYRDAL, supra
note 1, at 42l. However, African-American female officers and enlistments were stationed
in segregated units with separate housing and dining facilities. HOLM, supra note 9, at 7778; BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 140-43; MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 421. Units of
African-American women were only stationed at bases that specifically requested their
presence, usually at bases where there were African-American male troops or near large
African-American communities. HOLM, supra note 9, at 77-78; BLACK AMERICANS, supra
note 9, at 140-41. Often female officers became isolated, unable to visit the officer's club
or participate in other social functions. HOLM, supra note 9, at 78. With pressure from
community leaders, African-American officers and enlistees served in Europe in postal and
medical units. BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 141. African-American female nurses
provided medical services primarily to African-American soldiers in segregated hospitals,
in the U.S. or in overseas locations where African-American soldiers served such as New
Guinea, Philippines, Burma, and Australia. Id. at 140-43. However, the Navy refused to
open enlistment until the end of the war, with the first African-American woman, Phyllis
Mae Daily, enlisting in March 1945. /d. at 141-42. Only four African-American females
were commissioned into the Navy by the end of World War II. Id. at 142. The Marines
delayed opening their ranks to African-American females until 1948, with the first AfricanAmerican female, Annie L. Graham, enlisting in September 1949. Id. at 142. In 1948,
President Truman's executive order officially required the racial integration of the armed
forces. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 2673 (1948).
42. Naval Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 77-689, 56 Stat. 538 (1942). The law created the
Navy's Women Reserve, Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES),
and the Marine Corps Women's Reserve. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 7; HOLM, supra
note 9, at 27.
43. The Air Force created the Women's Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs). BINKIN &
BACH, supra note 9, at 7; HOLM, supra note 9, at 67.
44. The Coast Guard Women's Reserve, known as the SPARs, derived their name from
the Coast Guard motto "Semper Partus, Always Ready." BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9,
at 7; HOLM, supra note 9, at 27.
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I think it is a reflection upon the courageous manhood of the
country to pass a law inviting women to join the armed forces in
order to win a battle. Take the women into the armed service, who
then will do the cooking, the washing, the mending, the humble
homey tasks to which every woman has devoted herself. Think of
the humiliation! What has become of the manhood of Americar 5
Initially, the military branches tried to restrict women to traditional
roles such as clerical and nursing positions. 46 However, constant manpower shortages forced the expansion of female roles into nearly every
military occupation, outside of direct combat,47 particularly in the field of
aviation. 48 Female recruits also participated on highly classified military
projects. 49 By the end of World War II, an unprecedented 350,000
women served both domestically and overseas in the military. 50 Aside

45. HOLM, supra note 9, at 24. The decision of a 1968 federal district court case
reiterated the nearly century-old societal view of women in the military asserting that "if
a nation is to survive, men must provide the first line of defense while women keep the
home fires burning." United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See supra notes 5, 16 and accompanying text. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying
text.
46. BIN KIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 7; HOLM, supra note 9, at 59.
47. BIN KIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 7; HOLM, supra note 9, at 60. Women took on
such nontraditional tasks as air traffic controllers, gunner instructors, engine mechanics,
navigators, aerophotographers and radio operators. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 7;
HOLM, supra note 9, at 60.
48. BIN KIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 7; HOLM, supra note 9, at 63-65. The WASPs
deserve special attention as about a thousand women between 1942-44 were actively
involved in flying all types of military aircraft, including combat airplanes, such as bombers
and fighters. BrNKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 7; HOLM, supra note 9, at 64; SALLY V AN
W AGENEN KEIL, THOSE WONDERFUL WOMEN IN THEIR FLYING MACHINES: THE
UNKNOWN HEROINES OF WORLD WAR II 4 (1979). Although not permitted to fly "combat"
missions, 38 WASPs died during these dangerous ferrying assignments. HOLM, supra note
9, at 64; VAN WAGENEN KEIL, supra, at 6. Unlike their male pilot counterparts, the
W ASPs were not given insurance, benefits, or honors if they were killed or injured on their
missions. HOLM, supra note 9, at 64; VAN WAGENEN KEIL, supra, at 234. In 1977,
WASPs were finally granted veteran's status. HOLM, supra note 9, at 64; VAN WAGENEN
KEIL, supra, at 316. The American Legion lobbied against extending veteran's benefits to
the WASPs, as not deserving of this recognition. VAN W AGENEN KEIL, supra, at 312. The
Veteran's Administration also opposed the bill as discriminating against other civilian
groups who had served during World War II. HOLM, supra note 9, at 64.
In addition, some 23,000 women participated in Navy aviation, primarily as flight
instructors or teaching aircraft gunnery and celestial navigation. !d. at 64-65. About one
third of women Marines served in aviation duties in air traffic control and parachute
packing, repair and inspection. Id. at 65.
49. WACs participated on the Manhattan Project, while SPARs and WAVES worked at
Long-Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN) stations and the night fighter training project.
HOLM, supra note 9, at 60.
50. Aside from nurses, only the WACs, who were provided with full military status in
1943, were allowed to be deployed overseas in the European and Pacific theaters. !d. at 81;
BIN KIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 7-9. At their peak, 17,000 WACs served overseas in
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from the Women's Anny Corps (WACs), female partIcIpants in these
critical civilian auxiliary units were not accorded military status for their
wartime efforts. 5l
C.

THE WOMEN'S ARMED SERVICES INTEGRATION ACT OF

1948

Despite women's impressive wartime achievements, the female
directors of each branch of the anned forces resigned at the end of the war,
as there was no pennanent role for women in military service,52 and the
women's branches were rapidly dismantled. 53 Yet the overall post-war
demobilization resulted in a sharp decline in U.S. military strength from
12.1 million in 1945 to 1.4 million in 1948. 54 This decline, coupled with
the discontinuance of the draft in 1947, forced military planners to
reconsider women as an alternative source for fulfilling military staffing
needs. 55 With the support of military leaders, Congress passed the
Women's Anned Services Integration Act of 1948 (the Act),s6 a triumph
more for military expediency than for women's rights. 57
The Act provided women regular and reserve status in the four main
military branches. 58 Although considered revolutionary in 1948, the Act
established a statutory scheme that allowed the secretary of each branch to
distinguish between male and female recruits. 59 These distinctions created

every combat theater of operations. HOLM, supra note 9, at 94. Sixteen WACs received
Purple Hearts for their injuries in Europe. ld. at 83. Women in the Navy, Marines, and
Coast Guard were limited by law to serving within the continental U.S., which was later
modified to allow them to assist in U.S. territories. Id. at 63-64. Some 4,000 WAVEs,
1,000 female Marines, and 200 SPARs served in Hawaii, with another 200 SPARs based
in Alaska. !d. at 94.
51. HOLM, supra note 9, at 81; BrNKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 7.
52. HOLM, supra note 9, at 102-03. The wartime female directors of each women's
branch believed that women should only serve during wartime emergencies and opposed the
notion of an interim role for female military service. Jd. at 102-03, 106. The newlyappointed female directors, Lt. Col. Mary A. Hallaren (WACs), and Joy Bright Hancock
(WAVEs) began to promote the concept of permanent women's branches. Jd. at 106-07.
53. ld. at 102-03; BrNKrN & BACH, supra note 9, at 10. After the war, the number of
women dropped from 266,000 to about 14,000, only about one percent of the military. ld.
54. BrNKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 10.
55. Id.; HOLM, supra note 9, at 114.
56. Women's Armed Services Integration Act, Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 356 (1948)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.c.).
57. The objectives of the Act emphasized meeting personnel goals, facilitating service
mobilization in national emergencies, and easing restrictions on the military's experimentation with economical uses of female recruits. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 10;
HOLM, supra note 9, at 114. The right or obligation of women to serve in the military was
not a recognized objective.
58. HOLM, supra note 9, at 114. See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 10-12.
59. The Act permitted the secretary of each branch to adopt gender-based enlistment and
reenlistment requirements that institutionalized inequalities. Women's Armed Services
Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 625, §§ 106(a), 204, 213(a), 305, 62 Stat. 356, 360,
364,369,372 (1948); BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 10-12; HOLM, supra note 9, at 119-
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a maze of inequalities that institutionalized discrimination against military
women impacting their training and career opportunities even today. 60
Fearing a "feminization" of the military, the Act imposed a two percent
ceiling on the number of females in each military branch, along with a host
of other institutional barriers to full integration. 61
At induction, women were limited by age,62 parental consent,63 and
educational constraints 64 in enlistment procedures. If these hurdles were
passed, women faced further obstacles in their military careers in the fonn
of promotional limits,65 unequal dependency benefits,66 and combat

27.
60. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 10-12; HOLM, supra note 9, at 119-27, 178.
61. Women's Armed Services Integration Act, Pub. L. No. 80-625, §§ 102,202, 213(b),
302, 62 Stat. 356, 357, 363, 369, 371 (codified at 10 U.S.c. § 3209(b)(1959», repealed by
Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat. 375 (1967); BINKIN & BACH, supra note
9, at 10-12; HOLM, supra note 9, at 119-27; Milko, supra note 18, at 1305. Fearing that
too many women would join the armed forces, military planners pushed for the two percent
ceiling, although women recruits rarely exceeded one percent until the late 1960s. HOLM,
supra note 9, at 122.
62. Women could only enlist when they reached the age of 18, while males were
permitted to enlist at age 17. 10 U.S.c. § 505(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). HOLM, supra
note 9, at 120. The age limits were only lifted in 1974. Act of May 24, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-290, 88 Stat. 173 (1974).
63. If under 21 years of age, women recruits were required to obtain parental or guardian
consent to join the armed forces, while males only needed such approval if they were under
age 18. Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, §§ 106(a),
201, 305, 62 Stat. 356, 360-361, 363, 373 (1948); BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 11;
HOLM, supra note 9, at 120. The age and consent requirements were instituted to protect
female enlistees from making "rash and immature" decisions. Note, The Equal Rights
Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE LJ. 1533,1540 n.41 (1973) [hereinafter Yale Note].
It would seem that any woman who might choose to defer marriage to join the military
needed parental intervention to review her decision. These gender-based distinctions
perpetuated the "shibboleth that women are frail and emotionally immature." Major Harry
C. Beans, Sex Discrimination in the Military, 67 MIL. L. REV. 19, 73 (1975). Paternalistic
societal attitudes, reflected throughout the legal system, viewed women, like minors, as
"perpetual children" who required adult guidance. Freeman, supra note 5, at 231. Like the
age restrictions, the parental consent requirement was only repealed in 1974. Act of May
24, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-290, 88 Stat. 173 (1974).
64. Females were required to have at least a high school diploma or a certification of
passage of an equivalency examination in order to enlist. Male recruits needed only to
fulfill the particular educational requirements of the skill area they were applying for, some
of which did not demand a high school diploma. Yale Note, supra note 63, at 1540 n.42.
The military asserted that lowering female enlistment requirements would result in bettereducated female recruits who would not have otherwise considered enlisting in the armed
forces. Beans, supra note 63, at 66-67. In fact, lowered standards for female Army recruits
at the end of World War II resulted in a dramatic decline in WAC applicants. Id. at 66.
65. Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, §§ 104,203206, 213-216, 301-305, 309, 509A, 62 Stat. 356, 357-360, 363-367, 369-372, 374-375
(1948). Except for the Air Force, the other three service branches established separate
promotion lists for female officers. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 11; HOLM, supra note
9, at 120. Women generally could not hold command positions or grades above lieutenant
colonel in the Army or commander in the Navy and Marines or full colonel in the Air
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restrictions. 67 In addition, women were subject to unprecedented discharge authority without the nonnal procedural safeguards that protected
their male counterparts. 68 These deliberate limits effectively excluded
women from the military's senior level policy-making positions. 69 Despite
their diverse duties in World War II, military women were once again
shunted into traditional females roles in nursing and clerical jobs. 70
The Act's lofty goals of integrating more women into the military was
soon undercut by the reinstatement of the draft just twelve days after
passage of the Act. 71 This tension affected female recruiting efforts into

Force. BrNKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 11; HOLM, supra note 9, at 120, 123. Grade
ceilings were set at a 10% limit on the number of lieutenant colonels and 20% on commanders. HOLM, supra note 9, at 120, 123. Although Air Force females were on integrated
promotion lists, they were barred from the top ranks because they were not allowed to
participate in the key service positions of pilots and navigators. Id. at 123. The
promotional limits helped to keep women from reaching top policy-making roles in the
military. Id. at 122. The grade limits were not repealed until 1967. Act of Nov. 8, 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-130,81 Stat. 374 (1967).
66. Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, §§ 107,306,
503,62 Stat. 356,361,369,373 (1948) (codified at 10 U.S.c. § 1072 (1970) and 37 U.S.c.
§ 410 (1970»). Husbands of military women were not considered dependents unless their
spouses provided for over one-half of their support. Civilian wives were assumed to be
dependent on their military husbands. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 11; HOLM, supra
note 9, at 123-124; see infra notes 78-119 and accompanying text.
67. By statute, women in the Navy and Air Force could not participate in combat.
Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, §§ 210, 213(a),
307(a), 62 Stat. 356, 368-369, 373 (1948) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 6015,
repealed by Act of Nov. 30, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 541(a), 107 Stat. 1659, and 10
U.S.c. § 8549, repealed by Act of Dec. 5,1991, Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 531(a)(1), 105 Stat.
1365 (1991»; HOLM, supra note 9, at 120. Women are excluded by a matter of policy in
the Army and Marines. Id. at 126-27. The term "combat" has often been interpreted to
assure women's second-class status by excluding female participation in numerous skills and
positions at the core of the military's mission. /d. at 126-27, 305-06, 432-34; James
Kitfield, Women Warriors; In Today's More "Gender-Neutral" Military. Service-Women
are Reaping Greater Risks and Rewards, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Mar. 1994, at *3, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File; Susanne M. Schafer, Aspin Tries to Open More
Combat Jobs to Women, A.P., Jan. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
ALLNEWS File; Andrea Gross, Women Under Fire, LADlES HOME JOURNAL, Dec. 1990,
at 93, reprinted in WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 80, 81-82 (E. A. Blacksmith ed. 1992). See
generally Robin Rogers, A Proposal for Combatting Sexual Discrimination in the Military:
Amendment of Title VII, 78 CAL. L. REV. 165, 165-71 (1990) (providing a detailed
discussion of varying combat definitions and restrictions and proposing application of Title
VII to armed forces).
68. HOLM, supra note 9, at 120, 125-26. The law allowed women to be discharged for
unspecified reasons and without the usual due process safeguards afforded males. This
provision was often used to discharge women once they became pregnant or otherwise
gained custody of children on the assumption that maternal duties took precedence and were
incompatible with military service. Id. at 125. See irifra note 90 and accompanying text.
69. HOLM, supra note 9, at 122, 126-27, 305-06. See supra note 65 and accompanying
text.
70. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 12.
71. Id. at 11.
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the 1950s,72 as the military sought highly-qualified female candidates 73
but offered only limited career opportunities, poor pay scales, and low
standards of living.74 In addition, military women endured accusations of
"masculinity and immorality," and a negative public image. 75
From the 1950s to the mid-1960s, the military expanded tremendously
as the Cold War intensified and the Vietnam War escalated. 76 Yet during
this same time period, women in the atmed forces struggled for institutional
support and survival, seldom reaching numbers much beyond one percent
of the atmed forces. 77
D.

THE 1970's LIBERALIZATION OF MILITARY POLICIES

As in previous wars, the Department of Defense turned to women to
bolster their staffing needs during the Vietnam War.78 To attract more
women, the Johnson Administration approved a 1967 law that lifted the
Act's promotional ceilings, two percent limit on female enlistments, and
differences in retirement benefits. 79 Even with these changes, females
continued to constitute less than two percent of the military until the
80
1970s.

72. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 11-12; HOLM, supra note 9, at 152-53, 157-58.
The military held recruitment goals of 112,000, but only reached about 46,000. BINKIN &
BACH, supra note 9, at 11-12; HOLM, supra note 9, at 153. In 1951, the military sought to
prop up sagging numbers of female recruits through its creation of the Defense Advisory
Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), a group of 50 women charged with
informing the public about career opportunities for women in the military. HOLM, supra
note 9, at 15I.
73. HOLM, supra note 9, at 154-55, 159. Women were required to meet higher educational, physical, and mental standards than their male counterparts, and were subjected to
psychological examinations to weed out those with "personality problems." !d. at 154-55.
74. Id. at 154.
75. Id. Reading between the lines of Holm's historical review, one can assume that the
military and the public feared lesbianism among military women. Clearly, this fear has
remained unabated as expressed in the debate over gays and lesbians in the military. See
Karst, supra note 4, at 500-01, 545-46; Margo Hammond, The Military Balks Again, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, lan. 31, 1993, at 1D (discussing the debate over gays and lesbians in
military through comparisons with military resistance to racial integration).
76. The armed forces increased from about 190,000 after the Korean War to 2,655,000
by 1965. HOLM, supra note 9, at 177.
77. BINKIN AND BACH, supra note 9, at 12; HOLM, supra note 9, at 157-58. By 1965,
enlisted women participated in only 36 of 61 noncombat occupational groups with 93%
serving in clerical or medical jobs. HOLM, supra note 9, at 184. Female officers only filled
35 out of 46 occupational groups with 75% filling administrative positions. Id.
78. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 12; HOLM, supra note 9, at 157-58.
79. Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat. 375 (1967); BINKIN & BACH,
supra note 9, at 12; HOLM, supra note 9, at 192, 203.
80. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 12.
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In the 1970s, the role of women in the military began to undergo
serious changes. 8l The end of the draft in 1970,82 congressional passage
of the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972,83 and growing legal trends in
gender discrimination cases 84 forced the military to expand women's roles
in the anned forces in order to meet the staffing demands of the al1volunteer force. 85 Despite the courts' traditionally deferential stance on
most military matters,86 many of the changes in women's military roles

8l. Id. at l3-19; HOLM, supra note 9, at 3l3. These changes came too late to improve
the situation for women who served in the Vietnam War. Underscoring the indifference to
military women, neither the Veteran's Administration nor the Department of Defense
maintained accurate records on women serving in Vietnam. HOLM, supra note 9, at 241.
Unfortunately, this lack of institutional recognition and support only further heightened the
alienation and struggles of military women returning back home. The women of Vietnam
returned to a nation that ridiculed their voluntary participation and to a military that ignored
their plight. For example, the Veteran's Administration studies of the psychological impact
and delay shock of Vietnam veterans considered 1340 male veterans, but not a single
woman. Id. at 240-42.
82. Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, 85 Stat. 353 (codified at 50 US.c. app.
§ 467(c) (1976». The law stated: "No person shall be inducted for training and service in
the Armed Forces after July 1, 1973 ...." See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at l3-14.
83. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 2d Spec. Sess. (1972). See BINKIN & BACH, supra note
9, at 14; HOLM, supra note 9, at 249, 263-64. See generally Yale Note, supra note 63
(considering the impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on gender-based military policies).
84. In a broad range of civilian situations, the Supreme Court relied on equal protection
to strike down numerous gender-based federal and state statutes that were based on sexual
stereotypes or administrative convenience. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979) (adoption statutes); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony payments); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (alcohol drinking); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (support payments); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (jury service); Reed v. Reed, 404
US. 71 (1971) (estate administration). At this time, these civilian gender disputes had a
great impact on the military community, prodding the military to experiment with
broadening female integration in the military. Tim M. Callaghan, Bona Fide Occupational
Qualifications and the Military Employer: Opportunities/or Females and the Handicapped,
11 AKRON L. REv. 182, 183 (1977).
85. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 13-14; HOLM, supra note 9, at 249, 263-64, 266;
Callaghan, supra note 84, at 183.
86. The courts have generally deferred to the other branches of government to make
decisions about proper military policy based largely on its own lack of expertise in this
arena.
It is difficult to conceive of an area of government activity in which the
courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional
decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military
force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to the
civilian control of the Legislative and Executive branches.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 431 US. 1, 10
(1972». See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding limitations on right
of military personnel to petition); Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (limiting review
of due process claims in court-martial proceedings); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
(sustaining a ban on political speeches by civilians on military bases). This reliance on the
other branches of government to regulate military matters can also be traced to the judicial
branch's concerns about becoming entangled in nonjusticiable political questions. See
generally Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
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resulted from extensive litigation on a host of gender issues. 87 These legal
challenges struck down unequal dependency benefits88 and upheld genderbased discharge statutes aimed at remedying unequal promotional
opportunities for female officers. 89 The courts also ordered the abandonment of automatic discharges for pregnancy90 and gender-based assignments on all naval vessels. 91
With the increasing liberalization of military policies during this time
period, the percentage of women in the military began to rise quickly from
less than two percent in 1971 to about five percent in 197692 and more
than seven percent in 1980. 93 In addition, more positions in the military

Analysis, 75 YALE L. J. 517 (1966).
87. BIN KIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 14; HOLM, supra note 9, at 266. See Sonja A.
Soehnel, Annotation, Sex Discrimination in the United States Armed Forces, 56 A.L.R. FED.
850 (1982).
88. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality utilized strict scrutiny to
strike down gender-based dependency benefits).
89. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), reh 'g denied, 420 U.S. 966 (upholding
statute providing longer service periods for women to attain promotions based on combat
restrictions). See Thomas A. Coyne, Note, Schlesinger v. Ballard: Equal Protection
Washes Out to Sea, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 317 (1977). Schlesinger was part of a line of
cases that allowed preferential statutory treatment of women that aimed to remedy the
damaging effects of past discrimination. Califano v. Webster, 430 u.s. 313 (1977) (Social
Security survivor benefits); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (Social Security
benefits); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (property tax exemptions for widows). See
generally Karen A. Emden, Intermediate Tier Analysis of Sex Discrimination Cases: Legal
Perpetuation of Traditional Myths, 43 ALB. L. REv. 73 (1978); Nancy S. Erickson, Kahn.
Ballard, and Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test in "Reverse" Sex Discrimination
Cases?, 42 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1975).
90. The anned forces abandoned its discharge policy for pregnancy due to persistent
litigation in the 1970s and the desire to attract and retain more women into the military.
BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 17; Women in the Military, 11 EDITORIAL RESEARCH
REPS. 498, 505-06 (1981). See Cook v. Arentzen, 582 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1977) (striking
down the Navy's automatic pregnancy discharge under rational basis test); Crawford v.
Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976) (striking down the Marines' automatic pregnancy
discharge under rational basis test); Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.
1971) (holding pregnancy to be a compelling reason for removing Air Force women from
combat zones, while denying interference with privacy rights); Robinson v. Rand, 340 F.
Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972) (holding that pregnancy provided a rational basis for discharge,
but transfer and other less sweeping measures should be utilized by the Air Force to protect
privacy interests). Contra Gutierrez v. Laird, 346 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1972) (upholding
the Air Force pregnancy discharge and denying violation of privacy interests).
91. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978) (utilizing strict scrutiny to strike
down statute barring women from all naval vessels). Contra Kovach v. Middendorf, 424
F. Supp. 72 (D. Del. 1976) (upholding gender-based statutory bar on naval vessels under
either rational basis or strict scrutiny).
92. BIN KIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 14-16. In 1971, women made up only 1.6% of
military personnel, rising to 5.2% by 1976. Id. at 15. Female numbers were projected to
reach seven percent by 1982. /d. at 18-19.
93. Carolyn H. Becraft, Women and the Military: Bureaucratic Policies and Politics, in
WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 10 (E. A. Blacksmith ed., 1992). In 1980, women made up 8.9%
of the Anny, 6.6% of the Navy, 3.16% of the Marines and 10.8% of the Air Force. /d.
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began to open up to women with about eighty percent of all military
specialties becoming accessible to women in 1972. 94 For instance, in the
Vietnam War, women participated primarily as nurses and medical
specialists. 95 However, even with the asserted combat restrictions on
women, about 7,000 women qualified for combat pay in the Vietnam
War,96 and some 200 women received Purple Hearts. 97 By the end of
the 1970s, women were instrumental in keeping the all-volunteer force
viable and represented the military's higher quality recruits.98 The Carter
Administration, supportive of the Equal Rights Amendment, implemented
a plan to increase the amount of women in the services to twelve percent
by 1986. 99
In addition, the first legal challenge to the exclusion of women from
military academies was heard in Waldie v. Schlesinger lOO in 1974. The
plaintiffs sought a court order mandating that the Secretary of Defense
consider female nominees on the same basis as male applicants to the
military academies. 101
The government defendants countered that
preparing cadets for combat was the main purpose of the federal academies. 102

94. BINKIN AND BACH, supra note 9, at 17. Before 1972, women were only eligible for
35% of all military jobs which increased to over 80% after a Department of Defense task
force reassessment in 1972. ld. More importantly, women increased their participation in
nontraditional fields from 10% in 1972 to 40% in 1976. !d.
95. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 12; HOLM, supra note 9, at 228.
96. 126 CONGo REC. 13,878 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Kassebaum).
97. !d. at 13889.
98. BINKIN AND BACH, supra note 9, at 14-17; HOLM, supra note 9, at 384. While the
military struggled to meet its recruiting goals, the armed forces began to accept lower
quality male recruits, but continued to enlist higher quality female candidates. Most women
were likely to have a high school diploma and scored in the highest mental categories, while
their male counterparts were mostly high school dropouts and scored in the lowest mental
categories. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 17, 19; HOLM, supra note 9, at 384. The
poorer quality male recruits also had higher attrition rates than females. BINKIN & BACH,
supra note 9, at 19.
99. HOLM, supra note 9, at 387.
100. Waldie v. Schlesinger, 509 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Prior to the Waldie litigation,
the Secretary of Commerce moved to open state maritime academies to women in 1973.
U.S. v. Mass. Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142, 144 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing 46 C.F.R.
§ 31O.6(a)(1) (1984». Despite this mandate, full compliance did not result until some 10
years later due to resistance to full integration from the leaders of these military academies.
Mass. Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d at 144. See infra notes 146-65 and accompanying text.
101. 509 F.2d at 508. The plaintiffs were two female candidates and four Congresspersons
who nominated these applicants for admissions to the U.S. Air Force and Naval academies.
The plaintiffs did not seek to challenge the combat restrictions, they only challenged
whether the academies should train women for positions open to them in the military. !d.
at 508-09.
102. ld. at 510. In affidavits, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the three superintendents of the military academies claimed that the role of the academies was to prepare men
for combat, a role for which women were not eligible. !d. at 510 n.1.
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Seeking to neutralize the gender issue, the government stressed combat
eligibility, that is, combat eligible persons in relation to combat ineligible
persons, rather than gender as the distinguishing factor in the academies'
admissions policies. 103 The district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment, finding that combat restrictions provided a
rational basis for the single-gender admissions policies. The plaintiffs appealed,l04
In response to the Waldie lawsuit and appeal, Congress held hearings
on the admission of women into the national service academies in
1974. \05 The Secretary of Defense and the military chiefs, with the
support of President Nixon, opposed the admission of women into the
academies on the basis of combat restrictions and concerns about women
cadets disrupting the disciplined atmosphere needed to train future combat
leaders. \06 In the hearings it became clear that many graduates of the
service academies never participated in combat roles while others failed to
qualify for positions as combat leaders. \07 Congress also determined that
academy graduates pursued many career fields open to women. \08 In
addition, each service branch grudgingly admitted that women could be
integrated into the academies if Congress mandated this action. 109
Meanwhile, on appeal, the Waldie court questioned the district court's
use of the rational basis test and pointed out the prevailing judicial
uncertainty over the proper equal protection standard for gender classifications. I \0 The appeals court also questioned the actual meaning of the

103. Id. at 509, 510 n.l. In the earlier Supreme Court case of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1973), the Court similarly sought to neutralize gender in its review of a state health
plan that excluded pregnancy from its health care benefit plan. In sustaining the program,
the Court asserted that the plan was not gender-based but merely divided plan recipients into
two groups: pregnant women and non-pregnant persons, who might be either male or
female. /d. at 497 n.20. Later in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76 (1981), the Court
would use this approach again by stressing combat eligibility, not gender, as the
distinguishing factor in the all-male draft registration plan. See infra notes 120-82 and
accompanying text.
104. 509 F.2d at 510.
105. HOLM, supra note 9, at 306-09.
106. Id. at 307. Military chiefs asserted that it was uneconomical to provide expensive
military training at the academies for women who would not be combat leaders. Id. at 30708.
107. HOLM, supra note 9, at 309-10. Statistics showed that less than 40% of Air Force
Academy graduates from 1964-1973 ever participated in combat jobs, and about 12% of the
graduates of all three academies never even had a combat assignment. Id.
108. /d. at 309.
109. Id.
110. The appeals court stated that the district court too quickly utilized the rational basis
test as the proper equal protection standard. Waldie v. Schlesinger, 509 F.2d 508,509 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). The decision cited numerous Supreme Court and federal cases in which the
courts struggled with the proper equal protection standard for gender. Id. at 510-11. During
the 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court and the lower courts also vacillated on the
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term "combat" and whether combat leadership was the only objective of the
federal academies' training programs. I I I The appeals court remanded the
case for further factual and legal investigation of these issues. 112 However, Congress acted to open up the national service academies by 1976
before a further determination was rendered. l13
In 1978, subsequent federal statutory amendments mandated state
military colleges open up their admissions to female candidates and provide
opportunities for female military training in order to retain designation as
a military academy or college. 114 At that time, the Department of the
Army classified four colleges as essential state military colleges: North

proper equal protection standard (strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, and rational basis) to
apply to gender-based distinctions in the armed forces. Lucille M. Ponte, Waldie Answered:

Equal Protection and the Admissions of Women to Military Colleges and Academies, 25
NEW. ENG. L. REV. 1137, 1144-53 (1991).
Ill. The Waldie court stated that:
[AJ crucial element of plaintiffs' case is the distinction between combat roles
for which women are barred by policy and statute and combat support roles
in which women may now serve. . .. [I]t is impossible to know exactly
what the [government] affiants mean when referring to the role of the
Academies in preparing men for 'combat.' Likewise, when affiants declare
that the purpose of the Academies is to prepare men for combat, it is unclear
whether they mean it is the sole purpose, the primary purpose, or merely a
purpose. Plaintiffs' case hangs on resolution of such ambiguities, and
plaintiffs should have the opportunity to resolve them in court.
509 F.2d at 510 n.l. See DeVan, supra note 3, at 520-22 (arguing that VMI's mission is
to train combat leaders, and therefore, should remain all-male). See infra note 113 and
accompanying text.
112. 509 F.2d at 510.
113. In 1975, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to adopt measures for the
appointment and admissions of women into the established military academies by 1976. Act
of Oct. 21,1976, Pub. L. No. 94-572,90 Stat. 2708 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 182 (1982»
(allowing for appointment and admission of women to United States Coast Guard
Academy); Act of Oct. 7, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-106, § 803 (a)-(c), 89 Stat. 537 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 4342 (1988» (allowing for appointment and admission of women to United
States Military Academy, Naval Academy and Air Force Academy). To integrate women
into the academies, the facilities needed to be modified to provide barracks, dormitories, rest
rooms and locker rooms for women. The curricula remained virtually unchanged, except
for revisions in physical training to reflect gender differences in upper body strength.
HOLM, supra note 9, at 310-11. See generally CAPT. CAROL BARKALOW WITH ANDREA
RAAB, IN THE MEN'S HOUSE (1976) (accounting of female cadet's experiences in first class
of women candidates to enter West Point in 1976 and the harsh realities for women seeking
to integrate into this service academy and the military); HOLM, supra note 9, at 305-12.
When the service academies began to admit women, VMI revised the terms of the
mission statement from training "combat officers" to "career officers" in an effort to
distinguish VMI from other military academies. DeVan, supra note 3, at 521 n.226. See
U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432 (W.D. Va. 1991) (distinguishing VMI from coeducational military academies and asserting that VMI prepares cadets
for both military and civilian careers).
114. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-485, 92 Stat. 1623 (codified at 10 U.S.c.
§ 2102 (1988» repealed and amended by Act of Oct. 10,1984, Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98 Stat.
2619 (codified at 10 U.S.c. § 2009 (1988».
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Georgia College, Norwich University, Virginia Military Institute and the
Citadel. 115
North Georgia College and Norwich University quickly
116
I17
moved to admit women.
However, VMI
and the Citadel l18 obstinately refused to admit women into their full-time programs and little
was done to demand their compliance until the 1990s.11 9

E.

THE ROSTKER SETBACK AND CONTINUING BATTLES FOR GREATER
INTEGRATION IN THE 1980s AND 1990s

In the wake of this liberalization, women stood on the threshold of
greater integration. This advancement was due in large part to the Carter
Administration's call to reactivate draft registration and its recommendation

115. 34 C.F.R. 668.33 (1990); see Williams v. Owen, 241 Ga. 363, 245 S.E.2d 638 (1978).
As essential state military colleges, these institutions are allowed to operate officer procurement or training programs with curriculum approved by the Secretary of Defense. Students
at these colleges are offered the opportunity to pursue military leadership positions as
commissioned officers in the armed forces.
116. Susan Dodge, In the Corps of Cadets at North Georgia College. Men and Women
Learn and Train Side By Side, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 21, 1990, at AI;
Richard Halloran, Citadel's Lonely Battle to Keep Women Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1989,
at B9.
117. VMI refused to accept women into any of their full-time campus programs. Dodge,
supra note 116, at AI; Judy Mann, Neanderthal Bonding, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 7,1990,
at B3. Women may register for summer courses provided that they secure off-campus
housing. DeVan, supra note 3, at 493 n.25. Women also may elect evening classes which
cadets are not allowed to attend. Id. VMI's public information officer, Tom Joynes, in
response to questions about VMI's all-male admissions policy, stated: "We're not antifemale here .... Our guys date them. And a lot of our alumni married them." Tom
Watson, Military Tradition v. Title VI: Justice Inquiry Threatens Va. All-Male Bastion,
LEGAL TIMES, May 1, 1989, at 9. See infra notes 383-460 and accompanying text.
118. The Citadel has accepted women into their summer sessions and evening college, but
not in their full-time corps of cadets. Halloran, supra note 116, at B9. See infra note 119
and accompanying text.
119. In March 1990, the Justice Department filed an action against VMI for its failure to
admit women under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 14th Amendment. U.S. v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1992). See Dodge, supra note 116,
at 1; Watson, supra note 117, at 9. At the time of the action, VMI accepted about $11
million in state government funds which was about half its operating budget. Dodge, supra
note 116, at 1.
In 1993, Shannon Faulkner instituted an action against the Citadel seeking admissions
into its cadet program. The Citadel had originally accepted Faulkner but revoked the
acceptance upon learning that she was a woman. A district court issued a preliminary
injunction allowing Faulkner to participate in day classes but not cadet corps, which was
upheld by the Fourth Circuit. Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552, 567-69 (D.S.C. 1993),
aff'd 10 F.3d 226, 228-29 (4th Cir. 1993). After a trial on the merits, the district court
ordered the Citadel to admit Faulkner as its sole remedy for violating her equal protection
rights. Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. at 567-69. On appeal, the appeals court upheld the
finding of an equal protection violation but ordered the district court to allow the state a
reasonable time frame to formulate a remedial plan, which could include a proposal for a
separate program for women. If the plan was not completed by August 1995, the Citadel
would have to admit Faulkner. Faulkner v. Jones, No. 94-1978, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
8252 (4th Cir. 1995).
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that women be included in the registration process,120 The Carter
Administration's efforts were criticized by military experts, who attributed
the push for expanding the role of women in the military to excessive
social experimentation and a reliance on females military personnel that had
already gone to far,121
Ultimately, Congress rejected the idea of mandatory draft registration
for women,122 Even though draft registration does not mean one will be
involved in combat,123 Congress based its exclusion of women on
traditional concerns about women in combat, with congressional debate
often reflecting stereotypical views about the proper societal roles of
women, 124 In opposing the draft registration of women, one senator
argued:
I am not about to vote for one more strike against the American
family and the traditionalism we have known in this country, , , ,
No matter how much we want to say we are equal in those child
rearing areas, we are not. A father cannot replace a mother and
that closeness , .. , How far do we carry this ridiculous game of
equality, on the basis of equity?125

120. In response to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter acted to
restore draft registration, suggesting the registration of both men and women. HOLM, supra
note 9, at 350. Without congressional amendment to the Military Selective Service Act (50
U.S.c. app. § 4453 (1976», the President could only recommend, not mandate, the
registration of women. 50 U.S.c. app. § 451 note 4 (1981).
121. HOLM, supra note 9, at 385, 387-89. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
122. The Senate rejected a proposed amendment that would include women in the
registration plans by a vote of 51-45. 126 CONGo REc. 13,898 (1980). Excluding women
from draft registration also impacts their ability to secure public employment opportunities
due to state and federal government veteran's preferences. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding veteran's job preferences as constitutional
despite disproportionate benefit to males). In addition, some private sector jobs are based
on training and experience derived primarily from the military, such as airline pilots.
Goodman, supra note 5, at 244.
123. In the previous draft, only five percent of all eligible registrants were ever drafted and
less than one percent were placed in combat roles. R. EISLER, THE EQUAL RIGHTS
HANDBOOK 13 (1978).
124. 126 CONGo REc. 13,877-98 (1980). Congress' conclusory findings placed a heavy
emphasis on the notion that women and ''young mothers" should not be placed in combat
roles. Id. at 13,881 (remarks of Sen. Warner). See supra notes 21, 45,59 and accompanying text. See also Goodman supra note 5, at 262.
125. 126 CONGo REc. 13,889 (1980) (remarks of Senator Garn). Although hailing the
contribution of women to the military, the Senate's specific findings asserted that women
should not be placed in combat positions, in part, because of "the strains to family life that
would result from the registration and possible induction of women." Id. at 13,881 (Sen.
Warner reporting the findings of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the
Senate Armed Services Committee).
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In Rostker v. Goldberg,126 the Supreme Court reviewed whether the
exclusion of women from draft registration plans was violative of equal
protection under the heightened scrutiny test. 127 The Rostker decision
stated that congressional findings showed that the purpose of draft
registration was to provide combat replacements in any future draft. 128
With only males eligible for combat, the Court decided that the registration
of both men and women would be an administrative inconvenience. 129
In addition, the Court stated that the registration of women would
negatively impact military flexibility as to troop rotation and emergency use
of support troops in combat situations. 130 The Court held that combat
replacement policy was an important governmental interest, with the singlesex plan being substantially related to the accomplishment of that
objective. 131
As in Waldie, seeking to neutralize the gender issue, the majority
stressed combat eligibility rather than gender as the distinguishing factor in
the registration plan. 132 The Court never questioned the underlying
constitutionality of combat restrictions on women nor whether impermissible sexual stereotyping provided the basis for these combat restrictions. 133
The Rostker decision simply remarked that "Congress was certainly
entitled, in the exercise of its constitutional powers to raise and regulate
armies and navies, to focus on the question of military need rather than
'equity,.,,134 The case screeched to a halt the march towards gender
equality not only in the armed forces, but also in society at large, by
contributing to the defeat of the enactment of the Equal Rights Amendment. 135

126. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). See Lucille M. Ponte, Rostker v. Goldberg-Upholding All-Male
Draft Registration Plans, 18 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 239 (1982) (discussing in detail the
Rostker decision).
127. 453 U.S. at 69-70.
128. Id. at 75. Excerpts from floor debates and congressional findings support the view
that draft registration was intended to pave the way for a draft for future combat activities.
Id. at 76-78.
129. !d. at 81.
130. Id. at 81-82.
131. Id. at 78-79.
132. Id. at 76-81; Ponte, supra note 126, at 256-57. See supra notes 100-04 and
accompanying text.
133. 453 U.S. at 76-77. The Court relied primarily on Congress' conclusory findings
which also did not examine the underlying reasons for combat restrictions but merely stated
that "[t]he principle that women should not intentionally or routinely engage in combat is
fundamental and enjoys wide support among people." !d. at 77 (citation omitted). See
Ponte, supra note 126, at 256.
134. 453 U.S. at 80.
135. HOLM, supra note 9, at 386-87. Phyllis Schlafley, a vocal opponent of the Equal
Rights Amendment, said that the Rostker decision was a "tremendous victory. . .. I think
this decision puts the nails in the coffin of the ERA." Bennet H. Beach, The Draft: For
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With Rostker and the imminent transition to the Reagan Administration,
those military policy-makers hostile to female integration into all-male
spheres saw an opportunity to reverse the liberalization of the 1970s.1 36
Leaders of the armed forces secretly sent proposals to the presidential
transition team to roll back plans for further integration of women. These
proposals expressed serious concerns about the impact of women on
military readiness and effectiveness,137 despite a series of military studies
that clearly reached opposite conclusions. 138
The military misread the Reagan Administration, which included in its
objective to build up the military, the inclusion of women. By 1990,
women comprised almost twelve percent of the total of the active forces
and more than thirteen percent of the reserve forces, amounting to the
largest number of women in the military in U.S. history.139 In the
Reagan military expansion, women became eligible for fifty percent of the
two million military jobs in eighty-eight percent of all military job

Men Only, TIME, July 6, 1981, at 44.
136. HOLM, supra note 9, at 387-89.
l37. Jd.
138. To determine the effectiveness of women in the armed forces, the military undertook
a number of studies known as Women in the Army (WITA) studies. HOLM, supra note 9,
at 401. In three-day field exercises, one study found that women did not degrade unit
performance. U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,
WOMEN CONTENT IN UNITS FORCE DEVELOPMENT TEST (MAXW AC) 1-2 (1977). See
BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 95; HOLM, supra note 9, at 401.
A second study focused on extended duty assignments of 30 days based on Army
combat simulations in West Germany. Once more, women effectively achieved established
standards and did not negatively impact unit performance. U.S. ARMY RESEARCH
INSTITUTE FOR BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (ARl), WOMEN CONTENT IN THE
ARMY-REFORGER (REFWAC) 77 (1978). See HOLM, supra note 9, at 401.
Also, the Navy undertook its own preparedness experiment by reviewing female
performance on the USS Sanctuary in 1972. Again, women performed their shipboard
functions with the same dedication and expertise as their male counterparts. 126 CONGo
REC. l3,877 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Cohen); BINKIN & BACH, supra note 9, at 93-95.
DACOWITS (Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services) challenged the
military for its incessant studying of female participation as mere attempts to justify their
own desire to roll back the advances of military women. In a letter to the Secretary of
Defense, DACOWITS asserted that,
We [DACOWITS] have serious questions regarding the merit of continual
studying of women's military participation. As a study reaffirms the
positive performance and contribution by [women] ... a new one seems to
be ordered. This finally raises the question of whether objectivity or "right
answers" is the purpose.
HOLM, supra note 9, at 403 (quoting letter from DACOWITS Chair, Dr. Mary Huey to
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger dated July 1983).
l39. HOLM, supra note 9, at 385, 396-97.
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classifications. 140 Yet about one million positions remained closed to
women due to combat restrictions. 141
Technological developments and advanced weaponry outpaced and
steadily blurred the traditional distinctions between combat and noncombat
support positions. In addition, a series of foreign military actions called
into question these remaining combat barriers. Brief military confrontations
in Grenada 142 and Panama 143 exposed the American public to women
who were integrated into military units and who were successfully
perfonning their duties in combat-sensitive areas. The media attention
began eroding the myth that female troops were not confronted with the
risks of combat. 144 However, this positive image of women as competent
and effective soldiers was attacked by critics who charged that these limited
engagements did not fully test women's abilities to handle combat. 145
Despite women's efforts in these police actions, their roles in the
military were questioned once again in U.s. v. Massachusetts Maritime
Academy,146 a federal court case reviewing an all-male admissions policy
at a state maritime academy. The dispute arose out of regulatory changes
in 1973 that lifted gender restrictions on admissions to state maritime
academies. 147 A woman who applied to the Academy in 1974 was
infonned that women were not eligible for acceptance, despite the

140. Elaine Sciolino, Battle Lines Are Shifting on Women in War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1990, at AI, 023.
141. 134 CONGo REC. 13,135 (1988) (General Accounting Office reports on women in the
military detailing that more military jobs can be opened to women under then existing
statutes).
142. In October 1983, the Army's Operation Urgent Fury gave Americans an opportunity
to see gender-integrated units, with some 170 women participating in the effort. Originally,
some military policewomen were returned to the U.S. due to the high risk of direct combat.
But that initial action was overruled and the female soldiers were sent back to Grenada.
HOLM, supra note 9, at 404-05; Kitfield, supra note 67, at *4. About two percent of the
Grenada troops were female. Kitfield, supra note 67, at *4.
143. In the 1989 Operation Just Cause, some 770 female soldiers participated in the
military action and Americans had the opportunity to see military women leading troops in
the mission. HOLM, supra note 9, at 434-35; Kitfield, supra note 67, at *4. About four
percent of the deployed Army forces were women. Kitfield, supra note 67, at *4. A great
deal of media attention was focused on Capt. Linda L. Bray who lead a unit that became
embroiled in a three-hour fire-fight when trying to take control of an attack dog kennel of
the Panamanian Defense Forces. HOLM, supra note 9, at 434-35. Unfortunately, Bray
found that the public attention bred great resentment from fellow male soldiers and negative
treatment from Army officers, which lead to her resignation from the Army. HOLM, supra
note 9, at 436.
144. HOLM, supra note 9, at 404-05, 434-36.
145. Milko, supra note 18, at 1312 n.54.
146. U.S. V. Mass. Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142 (1 st Cir. 1985). See Ponte, supra
note 110, at 1156-59.
147. After these regulatory changes, most of the state maritime academies started to admit
women. 762 F.2d at 144. Federal regulations were updated to allow the academies to
recruit both male and female cadets. Id. at 144 (citing 46 C.F.R. § 310 (a)(1) (1984).

Winter

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

27

regulation to the contrary. 148 Similar to VMI and the Citadel, the
Massachusetts Maritime Academy refused to extend equal admission to
women, dragging the matter through the courts for more than a decade to
avoid admitting female cadets.149
The Academy's initial response to the action was to hastily form a
committee which reviewed the issue for nearly a year. 150 Finally, in
April of 1976, the Attorney General brought suit against the Academy and
the institution responded by voting to allow female admissions in the
entering class of 1977. 151 Despite the announced policy, the Academy
refused to actively recruit women and continued to discriminate against
female applicants. 152
After years of legal wrangling, the dispute was finally brought to trial
in 1982. 153 The district court found that the academy intentionally
discriminated against women prior to 1976 and continued to discriminate
against women after formally opening admissions to females in 1977. 154

148. The plaintiff was advised that women would not be admitted into the academy. 762
F.2d at 145. In the plaintiff's testimony, she stated that the admissions director mockingly
told her "that the only way she would be admitted to the Academy was by going to Sweden
and undergoing a sex change operation." Id. at 145 n.l. She was also advised that she
lacked a prerequisite mathematics course. !d. at 145.
149. See infra notes 150-64 and accompanying text.
150. 762 F.2d at 145-46. After the complaint was filed, the Attorney General advised the
Academy that its all-male admissions policy violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In response to the Attorney General's letter, the Academy
formed an ad hoc committee in November 1975 to study the issue. Id. at 145.
151. The Academy sought to have the complaint mooted by a 1976 vote that would allow
for the admissions of women in the 1977 entering class. Id. at 145-46. But the Attorney
General amended the complaint, which claimed discrimination prior to 1976, and included
a new claim that the Academy was continuing to intentionally discriminate against women
in recruitment, admissions, and training. Id.
152. Id. at 154-56. The appeals court agreed with the lower court's findings regarding the
continuing discrimination by the Academy. After changing the policy, the Academy failed
to make meaningful efforts to recruit women and lagged well behind other maritime
academies in female enrollment. Id. The Academy treated women unequally in the
admissions process from grade and SAT scores to the scheduling of physical examinations
for admission. !d. at 154-55. The court pointed out that recruiting and catalog materials
did not include any textual information or photos of women until 1979, with application
materials referencing traditional male activities and sports. Id. at 154. A recruiting poster
requested applications from "qualified females" with no similar term utilized for males. Id.
In addition, there were no women on the admissions staff until 1981 with the Academy
visiting the same all-male schools but no all-female schools. Id.
153. Id. at 146. After recessing for more than one year, the trial resumed in 1984. Id. at
147.
154. Id. The court issued a permanent injunction to enjoin the Academy from discrimination on the basis of gender. The Academy was also ordered to provide a plan for
eradicating gender discrimination and a procedure for reviewing rejected female applicants
for specific graduating classes. Id. The court retained jurisdiction for three years to enforce
its order to ensure that the Academy not revert to its previous discriminatory practices. Id.
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Nearly eleven years after the regulatory mandate, the Academy
appealed the decision in 1984. Using the heightened scrutiny test, the
appeals court affinned the lower court's decision to strike down the
Academy's all-male admissions policy and its residual discriminatory
practices. 155
Initially, the Academy argued that its single-sex admissions policy
complied with existing Supreme Court precedent such as Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan,156 and that statutory law exempted state
maritime academies from equal opportunity mandates. ls7 However, the
appeals court indicated that these earlier cases coupled with the statutory
exemption did not preclude constitutional analysis under equal protection. lss
Secondly, the Academy asserted that national defense is an important
governmental objective. The maritime academies were auxiliary units to
the U.S. Navy during war time or national emergencies. 159 Since female
cadets would not be allowed to serve in combat, the Academy asserted that
women should not be admitted. As in Rostker, the Academy tried to
neutralize gender by pointing to combat restrictions. 16o
Citing Rostker, the appeals court agreed that national defense is an
important government objective. However, the court indicated that national
defense is a federal, not a state, prerogative within the domain of the
congressional and executive branches. 161 Therefore, the appeals court
reasoned that the case would hinge on existing federal policy.162
Despite the existence of combat restrictions, the court stated that singlesex admissions policies for military colleges and academies had already
been abandoned by Congress and the executive branch. 163 Examining the
successful history of female integration at other military academies and
congressional support for open admissions, the appeals court detennined

155. Id. at 156.
156. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking down an all-female
nursing program as inconsistent with the state goal of educational affirmative action).
157. 762 F.2d at 153. Under Title IX, any educational program that receives or benefits
from federal funding is not allowed to discriminate on the basis of gender. 20 U.S.c.
§ 1681(a) (1978). Educational institutions that provide primarily military or merchant
marine training are exempt. 20 U.S.c. § 1681(a)(4) (1978).
158. 762 F.2d at 153. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 732. (Title IX exemption for traditionally
single-sex schools did not obviate constitutional analysis of single-sex admissions policy).
See generally Comment, The Expansion of Constitutional and Statutory Remedies for Sex
Segregation in Education: The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972,32 EMORY LJ. 1111 (Fall 1983) (discussing the roles of constitutional
law and Title IX in dealing with gender discrimination in higher education).
159. 762 F.2d at 153.
160. Id. See supra notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
161. 762 F.2d at 153.
162. !d.
163. !d.
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that the all-male policy was not substantially related to the stated objective. l64
Based on the court's interpretation of statutory and regulatory revisions,
military academies and colleges were not solely training grounds for
military leaders in combat situations. The decision illustrates that the
military training of women at state and federal military institutions was
appropriate, despite the continuing existence of combat restrictions.
According to this holding, men and women were now similarly situated
with respect to recruitment, admission, training and commissioning at
military academies and colleges. Despite this precedent, VMI and the
Citadel continued to refuse to admit women into their programs. The
impetus for full gender integration of these recalcitrant programs was
military engagement which brought the role of military women directly into
American homes.
That seminal event for women in the military was the Persian Gulf War
in which the U.S. deployed its largest concentration of uniformed troops in
its military history.165 About 41,000 women participated in Operation
Desert Storm l66 and made major contributions to the effort, including
sacrificing their lives and being wounded and taken prisoner during the
battle. 167 The intensive media coverage awakened Americans to the
courage and abilities of military women, fueling the debate over the
military's combat exclusion policies. 168
In response to women's efforts in the Persian Gulf War, Congress
called for the reconsideration of combat restrictions. 169 President Bush
convened the 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women
in the Armed Forces to consider lifting the formal bans on women in

164. Id.
165. Milko, supra note 18, at 1313.
166. HOLM, supra note 9, at 469. These female troops accounted for 7.2% of all troops
deployed in the Gulf War. Id.
167. Id. at 459-62, 464; Milko, supra note 18, at 1313; Kitfield, supra note 67, at *4-5.
Thirteen servicewomen were killed in the Persian Gulf War and some 19 were wounded.
Milko, supra note 18, at 1313. Two women were taken as prisoners of war. HOLM, supra
note 9, at 464.
168. HOLM, supra note 9, at 471-72; Milko, supra note 18, at 1313, Jones, supra note 4,
at 252; Kitfield, supra note 67, at *4-5. See generally WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 62-114
(E. A. Blacksmith ed., 1992) (providing a variety of excellent articles drawn from
mainstream magazines debating combat exclusion in the wake of Persian Gulf War).
Extensive media coverage of the Grenada, Panama, and Persian Gulf military actions
impacted public opinion about women in combat. A 1990 New York Times/CBS News Poll
indicated that 70% of Americans believed that women should be allowed to serve in combat
positions. Sciolino, supra note 140, at AI.
169. HOLM, supra note 9, at 471; Jones, supra note 4, at 252 n.5; Kitfield, supra note 67,
at *5. See also Utilization of Women in the Military Services: Hearings on SI507 Before
the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 795 (1991).
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combat. 170 At the outset, the Commission's objectivity was challenged
since many of its members had previously voiced their opposition to
women in combat. 171
The Commission's hearings received little substantive evidence that
women were unsuited for combat roles. l72 Yet, by a narrow margin, the
controversial Commission ultimately defeated greater integration of women
in military combat roles. 173
At the same time the Commission had been convening, the Tailhook
Convention scandal, in which Air Force women were sexually assaulted at
an aviator's convention, came to light. 174 The incident heightened public
awareness about the pervasive sexual discrimination and harassment faced
by military women. 175 In the ensuing Tailhook investigation, some
suggested that the participation of women in the Gulf War and the
reexamination of women in combat had contributed to an even greater male
animosity towards women who were now viewed as potential competitors
in a down-sizing military. 176
Despite such resistance from the rank and file, institutional advancements continued to unfold. Effectuating the policies of the Clinton
Administration, an April 1993 Defense Department directive halted the
exclusion of women from combat aircraft and ships,l77 followed by

170. HOLM, supra note 9, at 503-05; Kitfield, supra note 67, at *5.
171. Kitfield, supra note 67, at *5.
172. [d. at *5-6.
173. !d. at *6-7.
174. Jones, supra note 4, at 266. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T
OF DEFENSE, THE T AILHOOK REPORT: THE OFFICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS OF
T AILHOOK '91 (1993) [hereinafter T AILHOOK REpORT].
175. In the aftermath of Tailhook, the Pentagon recently released new rules regarding
sexual harassment and discrimination against women and minorities. The rules place greater
accountability for charges of bias with top generals and admirals. Claimants will also be
provided with a new avenue of appeal to service branch secretaries on their harassment and
discrimination claims. Reuters, U.S. Officers Made Accountable on Bias, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, May 13, 1995, at 3.
176. T AILHOOK REPORT, supra note 174, at 82-86. The expanding role of military women
was threatening to many men, who wanted to tum back the clock on female advances. As
one female officer asserted,
This was the woman that was making you, you know, change your ways.
This was the woman that was threatening your livelihood. This was the
woman that was threatening your lifestyle. This was that woman that
wanted to take your spot in that combat aircraft.
[d. at 83-84.
177. The April 1993 directive permitted women to serve in combat aviation positions and
warship duty. Kitfield, supra note 67, at * 1; Schafer, supra note 67. Women have served
on Navy support and other noncombat vessels since 1978. Bradley Graham, Steady as She
Goes on the Navy's First Coed Carrier, THE WASH. POST, June 27,1994, at AI. The USS
Eisenhower is the first Navy combat vessel to be gender-integrated, with most agreeing that
the process has progressed better than expected. !d.
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statutory enactments of these directives. 178 In January 1994, the Defense
Department abolished the policy that excluded women from military
specialties considered "dangerous," although women continued to be barred
from direct ground combat units. 179 With these 1993 and 1994 military
policy changes on the meaning of combat, a number of previously
restricted skills and positions were opened up to women. 180
By the early 1990s, women were becoming more integrated into
traditionally male military roles. The military could no longer deny that
women had experienced actual combat dangers: being killed, injured and
taken prisoner. With the decrease of combat restrictions on military women
and the Mass. Maritime decision, VMI (as well as the Citadel) could no
longer argue that combat restrictions justified the bar on female admissions
to state military academies. 181 In addition, the integration of the federal
and most state military academies made it clear that men and women could
be trained together for military leadership positions without impacting
military effectiveness.
With the expanding role of women in the military, VMI was not able
to defend its all-male admissions policy based on combat readiness or
military effectiveness. Another line of legal argument was needed to
support VMI's exclusionary policy. In an effort to neutralize the gender
issue, VMI would have to back away from its military history and
pervasive military environment. VMI looked to support its discriminatory
ban, not from a military perspective, but an educational one. In earlier case
precedent, the concept of educational diversity had been used to limit
women's educational choices and, ultimately, their career opportunities.
Under the guise of educational diversity, VMI would now assert that
providing an all-male educational institution served to diversify and expand

178. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
179. The January 1994 directive abolished the Department of Defense's "risk rule." See
Kitfield, supra note 67, at *5. The 1988 rule excluded women from positions characterized
as presenting "risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture ... [provided that]
such risks are equal to or greater than that experienced by associated combat units in the
same theater of operations." HOLM, supra note 9, at 433. Despite the end of this rule, the
Army and Marines continue to exclude women from ground combat roles and anticipate
only very gradual growth in women's positions. Army, Marines to be Slow in Adding to
Women's Roles, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1994, at 13.
180. Schafer, supra note 67; Kitfield, supra note 67, at *1-2. The current percentage of
skills and positions open to women in each branch are as follows: Air Force--95% of skills
open, 97% of positions open; Army-90% of skills open, 61 % of positions open;
Navy--83% of skills open, 60% of positions open; Marine Corps--80% of skills open, 34%
of positions open. Kitfield, supra note 67, at *7.
181. VMI also faces the reality that only about 15% of its graduates pursue military
careers. U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432 (W.D. Va. 1991).
Contra DeVan, supra note 3, at 520-22 (arguing that VMI's mission to train combat leaders
justifies all-male admissions policy).
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educational choices for both genders. 182 By claiming educational diversity, VMI sought to neutralize gender and protect a discriminatory policy
born of stereotypical views about women's roles in the military.

II.

Sex-Segregation in Education Cases Under the Guise of
Diversity

Traditionally, women, like African Americans, were stereotyped as
intellectually inferior to men with little or no need for formal education. I83 The later development of separate girls' schools and women's
colleges, considered an important advancement at the time, never aspired
to provide females with an education equal to males. l84 Women's
education was narrowly aimed at preparing women for their "proper place"
in society,185 focusing on training women for domestic chores or low

182. Bennett L. Saferstein, Revisiting Plessy at the Virginia Military Institute: Reconciling
Single-Sex Education with Equal Protection, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 637, 656 (1993). The
author correctly asserts that the district court in the VMI case stressed the term "diversity"
rather than gender discrimination to support VMl's all-male admissions policy. "This
argument is a clever rhetorical device. The word diversity has positive, politically correct
connotations. When used in reference to higher education, one naturally thinks of a diverse
student body or diverse academic offerings, not an all-male-military school." Id. See infra
notes 395, 405-07, 409-18, 423-33 and accompanying text.
183. MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 1077; Hacker, supra note 5, at 65; Lewis, supra note 4,
at 595, 599-600; Robert B. Barnett, Note, The Constitutionality of Sex Separation in School
Desegregation Plans, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 296, 312-13 (1970) [hereinafter Chicago Note].
Myrdal summarized this viewpoint as follows:
As in the Negro problem, most men have accepted as self-evident, until
recently, the doctrine that women had inferior endowments in most of those
respects which carry prestige, power, and advantages in society ... , The
arguments, when arguments were used, have been about the same: smaller
brains, scarcity of geniuses and so on. The study of women's intelligence
and personality has had broadly the same history as one we record for
Negroes.
MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 1077.
184. MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 1077; Daniel Gardenswartz, Public Education: An Inner
City Crisis! Single-Sex Schools: An Inner City Answer?, 42 EMORY L.J. 591, 604-05;
Hacker, supra note 5, at 63; Lewis, supra note 4, at 599-600; Saferstein, supra note 182,
at 641, 646-47.
As Lewis properly asserted:
Sex-segregated education, like racial segregation, did not represent a genuine
attempt to guarantee equality. Just as the improvements in the legal status
of blacks prompted the development of separate but equal doctrine in the
field of race, an improvement in the status of women, i.e. the recognition by
some that women could and should be educated, prompted the development
of separate schools for women. Women could no longer be denied an
education, but they could be denied coeducational learning. It is highly
unlikely that females would have been educated separately from males had
there not been prejudice against and stereotypical notions about women.
Lewis, supra note 4, at 599.
185. MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 1077; Gardenswartz, supra note I 84"at 607; Hacker, supra
note 5, at 62-63; Lewis, supra note 4, at 600-01; Saferstein, supra note 182, at 646-47.
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wage jobs in teaching or clerical positions. 186 Reflecting social stereotypes, the courts often upheld state laws and policies that pennitted gendersegregated schooling which marginalized women in the social, employment,
and political spheres. 187 Gender-segregated schools are often compared
to race-segregated schools as both types of schools provided limited
educational opportunities and were based on social stereotypes of
intellectual inferiority.188
Unlike gender-segregation in education, a number of important
Supreme Court challenges began to erode the acceptability of raciallysegregated schools under Plessy's pernicious notion of "separate but
equal.,,189 Even before Brown 190 finally struck down Plessy, these cases
initially sought to operate within the confines of "separate but equal" by
comparing separate programs to detennine if they were indeed equal.
These courts looked at both tangible (facilities, number of faculty, variety
of courses, library, funding and student programs) and intangible (prestige,
reputation, alumni influence, historic traditions, experience of administrators
and standing in the community) factors in comparing separate or parallel
programs. 191 Leading up to Brown's reversal of Plessy, issues of prestige
and history became more important than physical facilities in measuring the
equality of separate educational institutions.
The first important development occurred in Missouri ex ref. Gaines v.
Canada 192 concerning the admissions of an African-American male to the

186. MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 1077; Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 607; Lewis, supra
note 4, at 600-01; Saferstein, supra note 182, at 647; Chicago Note, supra note 183, at 31213. See Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 136 n.3 (D.S.C. 1970), ajJ'd per curiam,
410 U.S. 951 (1971) (upholding an all-female admissions policy for Winthrop College
which prepared women for teaching, typing, stenography, sewing, drawing, millinery, dressmaking, needlework, cooking, housekeeping, and other skills "suitable to their sex and
conducive to their support and usefulness"); But cf Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 720, n.l (1982) (striking down an all-female admissions policy in nursing school
of college established to train women in teaching children, typing, bookkeeping,
photography, stenography, drawing, needlework and other skills "necessary or proper to fit
them for the practical affairs of life").
187. MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 1077; Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 607; Lewis, supra
note 4, at 599-601; Saferstein, supra note 182, at 646-47; Chicago Note, supra note 183,
at 312-13. See supra notes 52-91, 103-60 and accompanying text.
188. MYRDAL, supra note 1, at 1077; Hacker, supra note 5, at 65; Lewis, supra note 4,
at 594-95, 599-600; Chicago Note, supra note 183, at 312-13.
189. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See infra note 325 and accompanying text.
190. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally J. HARVIE
WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE, THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979) (providing a detailed discussion of Brown and the judiciary's role
in racial integration efforts).
191. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950). See infra notes 197-225 and
accompanying text.
192. 305 U.s. 337 (1938). See Saferstein, supra note 182, at 643-44.
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all-white University of Missouri School of Law. 193 In this case, no other
state-supported school offered a law degree program for African Americans,194 although the state argued that it intended to create a separate but
equal law program at all-black Lincoln University. 195 Since Lincoln did
not provide legal training, Gaines was allowed to request reimbursement for
reasonable tuition fees for a law program in a neighboring state under
Missouri law. 196
Examining both tangible and intangible qualities, the Court noted that
the out-of-state programs were substantially equal because these schools
possessed fine reputations and utilized the same pedagogy, case books and
courses of study as the University of Missouri's law program. 197 However, the Court also recognized that there were special advantages to attending
law school in Missouri, including opportunities to study Missouri state law,
to observe the local state courts, and the prestige of the university's law
program as attractive to prospective clients. 198
Despite providing nearly identical out-of-state educational options, the
Court rejected the state's offer to provide Gaines with substantially equal
facilities at out-of-state schools as violative of equal protection. 199 By
rejecting the out-of-state option, Gaines recognized that equal protection of
the law mandates the preservation of the individual's right to an equal
educational opportunity within the state's borders, even if this means
segregated programs. 2OO Under a states' rights argument, the decision
stated that once Missouri created the training opportunity it could not foist

193. 305 U.S. at 342-43.
194. The registrar at the law school advised Gaines to contact all-black Lincoln University,
even though that university did not have a law degree program. Id. at 342.
195. The state claimed that the legislature was intending to bring Lincoln University up
to the level of the University of Missouri so as to avoid racial integration of public higher
education. Id. at 344. Under state law, Lincoln University was authorized to develop
programs equal to those accorded white students either at the University or to arrange for
the attendance of African-American students at programs in adjacent states. Id. at 340, 34244.
196. Id. at 343. The state tried to fulfill its duty to provide equal educational opportunities
through nearly identical facilities at out-of-state schools in neighboring Nebraska, Iowa,
Kansas, and Illinois. Id. at 343-44.
197. !d. at 348-49.
198. !d. at 349.
199. Id. at 349-50.
200. Id. at 349-50. The Court stated that:
The white resident is afforded legal education within the State; the negro
resident having the same qualifications is refused it there and must go
outside the State to obtain it. That is a denial of the equality of legal right
to the enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set up, and the
provision for the payment of tuition fees in another State does not remove
the discrimination . . . .
Id.
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its responsibility to provide an equal program on to other states. 201 The
Court also noted that the claim of limited demand for legal training among
African Americans was insufficient to justify the State's actions since equal
protection is a personal right, not a group one. 202 Since equal protection
is an individual right, the Court detennined that the number of persons
discriminated against was not important to its constitutional review. 203
In Sweatt v. Painter,204 the Supreme Court revisited a challenge to
another all-white law school admissions policy at the University of
Texas. 205 In Sweatt, the state hastily created an alternative school for
African Americans in response to the lawsuit which the plaintiff found
unacceptable. 206 As in Gaines, the Court's decision examined both
tangible and intangible factors in detennining whether the newly-developed
school was separate but equal to the all-white university program. 207 In
addition, the Court indicated that law is a practical profession that involves
the healthy exchange of ideas and views and that the new law school for
African Americans excluded the overwhelming majority of the population
that lawyers must deal with in their professional careers. 208
After reviewing these factors, the Court detennined that although the
new school was making progress, it was significantly inferior to the

201. The decision stated that:
Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws
can be perfonned only where its laws operate, that is within its own
jurisdiction .... It is an obligation the burden of which cannot be cast by
one State upon another, and no State can be excused from perfonnance by
what another State may do or fail to do. That separate responsibility of each
State within its own sphere is of the essence of statehood maintained under
our dual system.
/d. at 350. See infra note 496 and accompanying text.
202. 305 U.S. at 351.
203. /d. at 351. The Gaines decision indicated that:
It was as an individual that he was entitled to the equal protection of the
laws, and the State was bound to furnish him within its borders facilities for
legal education substantially equal to those which the State there afforded
for persons of the white race, whether or not other negroes sought the same
opportunity.
Id. See infra notes 513-15 and accompanying text.
204. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
205. Id. at 631.
206. Id. at 632-33. The original "parallel" program had no independent faculty, no library,
few law books and lacked accreditation. Id. at 633. After the trial, a law school for
African Americans was opened at Texas State University for Negroes with a small student
body, five full-time professors, a full-time administration staff, a moot court program, a
legal aid program and one graduate who was a member of the Texas Bar. Id. See infra
notes 475-503 and accompanying text.
207. 339 U.S. at 632-34.
208. Id. at 634. The decision noted that the law school's admissions policy excluded 85%
of the State's population including most of the State's lawyers, jurors, witnesses, judges and
other government and court officials. Id.
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University's law school on both tangible and intangible grounds. 209 In
particular, the Sweatt Court emphasized the importance of a school's
intangible qualities:
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School
possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable
of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law
school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of
the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence
of alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It
is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these
law schools would consider the question close. 2lo
Despite the parallel program, the Court required the admissions of the
plaintiff since the new school was separate but not equa1. 211
Decided the same day as Sweatt, in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents/ 12 the Court considered the admissions of an African-American
student into a graduate program213 that required him to sit apart from his
fellow students in the classroom, library and cafeteria. 214 Although the
student had access to the school's tangible facilities,215 the Court determined that his segregated locations prevented him from enjoying the
intangible benefits of "intellectual commingling" with fellow students. 216
The Court noted that his separation from other students handicapped his

209. /d. Compared to the new law school, the University of Texas boasted three times as
many full-time faculty with national reputations, a wide variety of courses, a law library
with more than 65,000 volumes, a law review, moot court facilities, scholarship funds,
Order of the Coif affiliation, and influential alumni in private practice and public life. Id.
at 632-33. See infra notes 496-97, 524-30 and accompanying text.
210. 339 U.S. at 634.
211. Id. at 636.
212. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
213. Id. at 640-41. Originally, the plaintiff was denied admission to the University of
Oklahoma's doctoral program in education. The district court determined that the refusal
violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. In response to the outcome, the Oklahoma
legislature lifted the ban as to courses of study not available at separate African-American
schools, but mandated that African-American students receive their instruction on a
segregated basis. Id. at 639.
214. Initially, McLaurin's section in the classroom was surrounded by a rail with the sign
"Reserved for Colored," which was later removed. Aside from his assigned seat in the
classroom, McLaurin was assigned a separate table in the library and the cafeteria. Id. at
640.
215. Id. at 640-41. The state had argued that his separations were only nominal and did
not put him at any disadvantage. Id.
216. Id. at 641. "Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his
profession." Id. at 641.
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graduate studies and therefore his education was not equal, in violation of
his personal right to equal protection. 217
In Brown, the Court examined racially-segregated schools in which
tangible components or facilities were equal or being equalized. 2ls
Despite this tangible equality, the decision focused on intangible qualities
'incapable of objective measurement, ,219 as had been discussed in Gaines,
Sweatt, and McLaurin. 220 The Court determined that separate programs
were unconstitutional because they engendered an unacceptable social
stigma on African Americans.221 Overturning Plessy, the Court concluded that as to public education, separate educational institutions were
inherently unequal and a denial of equal protection. 222
Even after Brown struck down race-segregated education, the courts
continued to uphold sex-segregated schools and colleges. 223 Unlike race,
some courts asserted that women and men are not similarly situated and,
therefore, may be treated differently under the law. 224 In initial challenges to gender-segregated educational programs, courts typically examined a
state or city school system that offered both coeducational and single-sex
programs. States often supported all-male or all-female admissions policies

217. Id. at 641-42. The Court recognized a distinction between state-mandated separation
and individual bias. McLaurin stated that the removal of state barriers would not free
McLaurin from individual or group prejudices. However, the Court stated that the
Constitution, nonetheless, mandated the removal of state restrictions to student interaction
to protect his rights. Id.
218. 347 U.S. 483,492 (1953).
219. !d. at 493.
220. See supra notes 192-217 and accompanying text. See infra notes 223-26 and
accompanying text.
221. "To separate [students] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 347 U.S. at 494.
222. Id. at 495.
223. It is important to note that many racial desegregation plans allowed for sex-segregated
schools, at least on a transitional basis, until final adoption of a unitary school system. See
Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 419 F.2d 1211, 1220 (5th Cir. 1970); Moore
v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244,254-55 (E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed,
421 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1969); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Bd., 302 F. Supp. 106,
108-09, 112-13 (E.D. La. 1969). It has also been suggested that the courts may have upheld
sex-segregated schools after Brown as a reflection of a prevalent social desire to prevent the
commingling of white females and black males. Chicago Note, supra note 183, at 300-02.
See MVRDAL, supra note 1, at 586-87 (suggesting that segregation grew primarily out of
fear of sexual relations and intermarriage between white females and black males).
224. Most courts distinguish educational segregation based on gender from race because
only race is viewed as a suspect classification. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phila.,
532 F.2d 880, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1976); Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 136-37 (1970),
ajf'd per curiam, 401 U.S. 951 (1971); Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251, 260-61 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86, 99-100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959). See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
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by claiming a rational objective of providing both sexes with the same
benefits of diverse educational choices within the school system. 225
Utilizing rational basis, the courts accepted the notion of educational
diversity as a reasonable state objective provided that the single-sex options
were substantially equal. Programs were viewed as substantially equal
provided that the separate programs offered educational choices to both
genders and did not provide better benefits to one gender over the
other. 226 By using the notion of substantial equality, courts avoided
undertaking a detailed comparison between all-female and all-male schools,
looking only for similar, but not equal, educational opportunities within a
state's entire educational program?27 Glossing over serious inequalities
between separate programs, courts did not carefully evaluate tangible and
intangible aspects of gender-segregated programs as found in the race-based
cases of Gaines, Sweatt, and McLaurin. 228
Typically, the application of substantial equality analysis results in
female applicants being excluded from all-male schools that are both
tangibly and intangibly superior to all-female schools, thereby impacting
women's long-term personal development and career options. 229 Substantial equality decisions often twist the notion of diversity to mean maximum
educational choice for men and the exclusion of women from the most
prestigious educational institutions. 23o Often, the government in substantial equality cases would hold out the all-male military program as a
justification for preserving an educational system based on stereotypical
views about the military not being a proper place for women. 23 1
A. SUBSTANTIAL EQUALITY UNDER THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST
A critical commonality in earlier gender-segregation cases is that the
Court used rational basis analysis in reviewing gender-based distinctions. 232 These cases were decided before the Supreme Court began to
225. See infra notes 236-71, 285-305 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 251-52, 291, 296 and accompanying text.
227. Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 612-13; Lewis, supra note 4, at 608-09.
228. Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 612-13; Lewis, supra note 4, at 608-09. See supra
notes 192-217 and accompanying text.
229. Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 613-14; Saferstein, supra note 182, at 648-49;
Lewis, supra note 4, at 611. Often, female aspirations to attend an all-male school were
belittled and characterized as "an individual whim rather than a genuine attempt to seek
equal rights." Lewis, supra note 4, at 608. See infra notes 245, 257, 264, 270, 286, 291,
322-23 and accompanying text.
230. See infra notes 232-305 and accompanying text. See also Cheh, supra note 4, at 6061 (warning that the concept of educational diversity can be easily manipulated to exclude
or segregate on the basis of race, gender, and national origin).
231. See infra notes 240-44, 270-71, 281-83 and accompanying text.
232. The rational basis test permits legislative classifications that are reasonably related
to legitimate state objectives. F.S. Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 416 (1920).
Legislative classifications are usually upheld unless the distinctions are patently arbitrary.
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consider higher levels of scrutiny for gender and issues of impermissible
sex stereotyping in legislative classifications. 233 The Court did not utilize
Craig s more rigorous intermediate scrutiny standard/34 which should be
applied to the VMI dispute today. Despite using the rational basis test,
these earlier cases are often cited to justify sex-segregated education in a
post-Craig period. 235
In gender cases, the concept of substantial equality is initially found in
Heaton v. Bristol,236 the first case to challenge sex-segregated schools.
The case involved a challenge to the custom of excluding women from
admissions to Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College (Texas
A&M).237 The appeals court rejected the district court's determination
that the bar to female admission violated the Texas and U.S. Constitutions
under the concept of separate but equal. 238
In reviewing Texas A&M's all-male policy, the appeals court supported
this custom by pointing to the college's historic tradition as a military
college. Unlike race, the court contended that men and women were not
similarly situated as prospective Texas A&M students because of the
school's role as a military college with a lengthy record of student
participation in mandatory military training. The students were members
of military corps, divided up into military units, and lived in barrack-like
dormitories under full-time military discipline. The Bristol court stated that
the military training at the college was materially different from ROTC

Id. See EDWARD J. CONRY, ET AL., THE LEGAL ENVrRONMENT OF BUSrNESS 96-98 (1st ed.
1986) (discussing three levels of judicial scrutiny under equal protection challenges).
233. See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 625-37.
234. The heightened or intermediate scrutiny test requires that gender-based classifications
must serve important governmental objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
The distinctions must be substantially related to the achievement of these objectives. Id.
at 198. Gender-based classifications cannot be based upon archaic and stereotyped notions
of sex roles. Id.; Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982).
235. Lewis, supra note 4, at 589; Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 617-18, 624-25.
236. 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959).
237. It is important to note that the district court concluded that exclusion of females was
not based on any direct statutory or constitutional mandate, but merely on the college's
Board of Directors' tradition and practice. Id. at 88, 90. The appeals court overruled this
interpretation and deferred to the college's all-male admissions policy based upon Board of
Directors' resolutions and exercise of discretionary authority under the statutes creating the
college. [d. at 93-95. In addition, the appeals court asserted that the Texas legislature's
failure to countermand the Board's policy excluding females was viewed as tacit approval
of the all-male admissions policy. Id. at 96. However, the appeals court did recognize that
daughters of college faculty and staff had been admitted to the college in the past. !d. at
94-95. The appeals court justified these exceptions by asserting that these students were
admitted to alleviate financial hardships on college employees. Id. at 95. See infra notes
245,254,261,286,288 and accompanying text.
238. 317 S.W.2d at 90-91,97-99. The district court stated that the sex-segregated colleges
amounted to separate but equal facilities for males and females which were inherently
unequal. Id. at 91.
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programs offered at other colleges. The appeals court asserted that the
admissions of women would result in a costly renovation plan for the
physical facilities and might present other "vexing problems" not resolved
in the district court's decree. 239
To avoid undermining this justification for the all-male policy, the
appeals court glossed over the fact that the college had suspended
mandatory military training in 1954. Military training and courses in the
military sciences had been purely voluntary for four years when the case
went to trial. 240 At the time of the lawsuit, less than half the students at
Texas A&M were cadets taking courses in military science and tactics. 241
In an effort to salvage their all-male policy, the Board reinstated a two-year
requirement of mandatory military training after the women had filed their
legal action.242 Clearly, the Board believed, and correctly so, that
reinstating military training would help thwart the women's claims,243
since the military, like many other avenues of life, was not viewed as a
proper place for women. 244
The female appellees primarily sought to attend Texas A&M based on
the college's prestige, cost, and proximity to their homes. 245 In reviewing
their concerns, the appeals court considered the entire Texas university
system, rather than Texas A&M's individual policy, to determine whether
the policy resulted in illegal sex discrimination. 246
Applying the rational basis test,247 the court asserted that the state has
a legitimate interest in providing diverse educational choices for its

239. Id. at 98.
240. Id.
241. ld. at 89.
242. The women filed their action after being rejected for admissions solely based on
gender in January 1958. Id. at 88. The Board reinstituted mandatory military training at
the college in September 1958. ld. at 98. The appeals court decision was rendered in
October 1958. ld. at 86.
243. The appeals court noted this change in policy, but avoided delving into the motive
for the change, stating only that it "represents nothing more than a return to a long observed
policy." Id. at 98.
244. See supra notes 4-5, 16-17 and accompanying text.
245. 317 S.W.2d at 92-93. One appellee, Mrs. Bristol, who was married and the mother
of two children, wanted a degree in biology. She wished to attend Texas A&M because of
its cost, closeness to her home, and prestige. She stated that Texas A&M "is one of the
better schools, one of the larger schools of the south, and carries with it a great deal of
prestige .... " Id. at 92. She indicated that if her family and home were not located near
the college she would consider other educational options. Id. at 92-93. The other appellee,
Mrs. Barbara Tittle, a widow with two children, sought a chemistry degree in order to
become a laboratory technician. As with Mrs. Bristol, Mrs. Tittle indicated that the cost and
proximity of the college influenced her choice. In addition, she asserted that she could not
afford to go to any other school outside her community. Id. at 93.
246. Id. at 98-100.
247. Id. at 99.
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citizens. 248 Reasonably related to meeting this goal, the Texas university
system provided for one all-female college, Texas Women's University,249
and one all-male college, Texas A&M, and sixteen coeducational
institutions. 250 Since most Texas state colleges were coeducational, the
court determined that maintaining these single-sex options provided the
same benefits and choices for both sexes. 251
Under the concept of
substantial equality, the court simply stated that "[s]uch a plan exalts
neither sex at the expense of the other, but to the contrary recognizes the
equal rights of both sexes to the benefits of the best, most varied system
of higher education that the State can apply. ,,252
Even though Texas A&M's bar to female admissions might prevent
these women applicants from pursuing higher education, the appeals court
noted that the degrees they sought could be obtained at other Texas
colleges. 253 Under the application of substantial equality, the appeals
court dismissed the women's hardships by stating that the goals of
educational diversity should not be sacrificed to fulfill individual concerns
of convenience and expense. 254
However, this same diversity argument could be used to uphold racially
segregated schools which had been struck down in Brown. 255 The
appeals court sidestepped this issue by asserting that gender, unlike race,
provides a legitimate basis for legislative classification pointing to a host
of Supreme Court cases that limited female participation in the legal,
political, and employment arenas. 256
The court did not address the appellees' desire to attend Texas A&M
because of the college's widely-recognized prestige. 257 Nor did the court
248. ld. at 98-99.
249. Bonnie Erbe, Should We Fund Single-Sex Colleges?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec.
29, 1994, at 53A. Under threat of a lawsuit from a male applicant, Texas Women's
University recently announced that it will open all of its programs to both males and
females. TWU; Regents Were Right Not to Bar Male Students, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 15, 1994, at 24A; Down With Women's Colleges?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 22,1994, at
A20. The university had already accepted males into its health sciences programs since
1972. TWU; Regents Were Right Not to Bar Male Students, supra.
250. 317 S.W.2d at 98, 100.
251. ld. at 100.
252. ld.
253. ld. at 94.
254. ld. at 100. See Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 613. However, the same individual
concerns of convenience and expense for faculty and other college employees justified the
admissions of their daughters to the college. The appeals court did not address this
inconsistency. See supra notes 237, 245 and accompanying text; see infra notes 261, 286,
288 and accompanying text.
255. See Cheh, supra note 4, at 60-61.
256. 317 S.W.2d at 99. The appeals court noted that other cases distinguished between
the sexes on such important issues as jury duty, voting rights, employment opportunities and
conditions, and property rights. !d. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
257. See Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 613; Saferstein, supra note 182, at 648.
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compare Texas A&M and Texas Women's University in terms of
reputation, which would have shown that the all-male school's prestige was
derived primarily from its better and broader range of academic programs. 258 Under the guise of educational choice, the Bristol court
managed to limit only women from choosing to attend the best and most
prestigious school in the state?59
Two years later, Allred v. Heaton,260 a class action brought on behalf
of Texas women again seeking admissions to Texas A&M, the court relied
on Bristol s combat preparedness reasoning to justify upholding the
school's exclusively male system. As in Bristol, most of the plaintiffs
asserted convenience and expense as the main reasons for their desire to
attend the all-male military college. 26 \ Using the same reasoning applied
in the Bristol case, the court restated the purported benefits of educational
diversity on a system-wide basis262 and rejected the class action. 263
However, unlike Bristol, one of the plaintiffs, Margaret Allred, alleged
a desire to study floriculture, a degree program offered only at Texas A&M
and not taught at any other state-supported college. 264 The Bristol
holding did not extend to this issue, and the court had to contend with the
precedent in Gaines which required the admission of a black male to an allwhite Missouri law school when no other state-supported school offered a
law degree program.
Despite this precedent, the court stated several reasons to reject Allred's
request. First, the Allred court narrowly interpreted the Gaines case as only
applying to distinctions based on race and would not extend the case by
analogy to gender discrimination. 265 Citing Bristol, the court reiterated
the contention that sex, unlike race, provided a permissible basis for
legislative classification on a wide range of subjects. 266

258. 317 S.W.2d at 98-99. Cf Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (I 949) (emphasizing
the importance of a school's prestige and reputation); Missouri ex. ret. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938) (recognizing prestige as an intangible quality of a school).
259. Saferstein, supra note 182, at 647-48. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying
text.
260. 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
26l. Id. at 258-60.
262. Id. at 262.
263. The court determined that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence that they
represented a class of women seeking admission to the college. Id. at 259. In addition, the
court held that the female plaintiffs did not represent all women because other females
might wish to retain a single-sex option in a primarily coeducational system. Id. at 262.
264. !d. at 252, 254, 258-59.
265. Id. at 260-61. Interestingly, on motions for a rehearing, the court struck out dicta that
indicated that if Allred made an application to study floriculture and was otherwise qualified
to attend the college, that the Gaines precedent would mandate her admission. Id. at 26263.
266. Id. at 260-61.
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Second, the court asserted that, unlike the student in Gaines, Allred had
not been rejected for admission because she had not filled out an application for full-time admission to the college. 267 In a rather disingenuous
statement, the court indicated that Allred failed to make known her special
educational needs to the college, which might have resulted in the college
making an exception in her case. 268 The court also doubted that she had
any serious desire to study floriculture because her summer session
application stated an interest in law. 269
Even if she had a serious interest in floriculture, the court once again
raised the issue of military training as a basis for blocking her admission.
As in Bristol, the court recited Texas A&M's long history as a military
college. 270 However, the Allred court pressed the military issue even
harder than Bristol:
This Court is of the further view that the duty of the United
States Government to train its militia for the protection of the
public transcends any private desire of any particular citizen in the
United States to take a course of study offered at one of the United
States military academies, whether that course includes basic
military science, veterinary medicine or floriculture. In keeping
with the foregoing view, we also think that it is the duty and a
function of the State in the exercise of its public policy to provide
military training for its youth, if it elects to do so, for the protection of the public, and that this duty and the form it assumes
transcends any private desire of any particular citizen to take a
course of study offered at its state military college, however
desirable its course of study may be. 271
In this statement, the court assumes that military training is appropriate
only for young males and suggests that Allred's admission to Texas A&M
was somehow unpatriotic and would endanger the national defense. Once
again, the twin concerns of military training and educational diversity

267. /d. at 256-57. It is important to note that originally the college refused to send any
applications to the women, citing their all-male policy. Id. at 256. The plaintiffs' attorney
sent a letter indicating that the women were prepared to provide application information
only if the school's policy was changed to allow female admissions. Id. at 257. In
response, the college sent four applications with a curt letter asserting that the forms were
being supplied "as a courtesy only." /d. The plaintiffs' attorney then sent a letter notifYing
the college that his clients would not waste the effort to complete the form unless the
college intended to consider their applications in good faith. Id.
268. Id. at 260.
269. 336 S.W.2d at 259-60. See infra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.
270. 336 S.W.2d at 258-61.
271. Id. at 261. Interestingly, the court uses the gender-neutral term "youth" when it
actually means young males. See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
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silenced women's calls for equal admissions to a prestigious state-funded
college.
Nearly a decade later, the federal court in Kirstein v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia 272 reviewed objections to a two-year
plan to admit women to the all-male University of Virginia. 273 The court
initially indicated its reluctance to interfere with the internal operation of
the college, but deferred to the willingness of Virginia educational
authorities to open the university to female students. 274
In affirming the plan, the court indicated the difficulty in evaluating the
quality of education and made no attempt to compare the university with
other state coeducational or single-sex colleges. 275 Referring to both
tangible and intangible factors, the court acknowledged that the all-male
University of Virginia was the state's largest educational institution
providing the most diverse educational programs and maintaining a
reputation of unparalleled prestige. 276 In finding a violation of equal
protection, the court asserted:
The pattern of separation by sex of educational institutions is a
long established one in America and a system widely and generally
accepted until the last decade. Despite this history, it seems clear
to us that the Commonwealth of Virginia may not now deny to
women, on the basis of sex, educational opportunities at the
Charlottesville campus that are not afforded in other institutions
operated by the state. Unquestionably the facilities at Charlottesville do offer courses of instruction that are not available elsewhere. Furthermore, as we have noted, there exists at Charlottesville a "prestige" factor that is not available at other Virginia
educational institutions. 277

272. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
273. !d. at 187. The plaintiffs raised concerns about whether the plan would be permanently implemented or later undone by the state legislature or future boards. In addition,
the plaintiffs objected that the plan did not address gender barriers at other state educational
institutions. Id.
274. Id. at 186. The court congratulated the state's educational authorities for their
willingness "to innovate and favorably entertain the relatively new idea that there must be
no discrimination by sex in offering educational opportunity." !d. The court also noted that
the suggested integration plan was in line with the general public trend toward coeducation.
!d. at 188.
275. !d. at 186-87.
276. Id. at 187. Clearly, the all-male university'S superiority in the state system supports
the idea that sex-segregated colleges lead to inferior educational opportunities for women.
See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
277. 309 F. Supp. at 187 (emphasis added). The court specifically stated that two of the
plaintiffs were married to graduate students at the University and could not move without
disrupting their marriages. The court asserted that it did not wish to force the plaintiffs to
make a choice between marriage and education. Id. The sentiment smacks of gender
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In reaching this conclusion, the court added that "separate but equal"
analysis need not be applied to this situation since the university was
unrivaled in the state system. 278
Despite governmental approval for removing gender barriers to
education,279 the court carefully limited its ruling favoring coeducation to
the University of Virginia. 280 The court would not extend its reasoning
to other single-sex colleges offering unique educational opportunities in the
state, such as the Virginia Military Institute.28I The court opined:
We are urged to go further and to hold that Virginia may not
operate any educational institution separated according to the sexes.
We decline to do so. Obvious problems beyond our capacity to
decide on this record readily occur. One of Virginia's educational
institutions is military in character. Are women to be admitted on
an equal basis, and, if so, are they to wear uniforms and be taught
to bear arms ?282
The court does not respond to this rhetorical question, assuming that it is
self-evident that women do not belong in the military environment. 283
A few months later, a second federal court in Williams v. McNai?84
reviewed a case in which males challenged an all-female admissions
policy.285 The males stated that their desire to attend Winthrop College
was based upon its proximity to their home. 286 Using the rational basis
test,287 the court determined that the males' concern about proximity was

stereotyping since the court did not wish to disrupt the lives of women who were fulfilling
the traditional role of wife.
278. !d. at 187 n.1. By refusing to apply this concept, the court avoided an important
examination of whether sex-segregated schools resulted in inferior facilities, faculty, and
programs at all-female colleges. Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 615.
279. The court stated that it was impressed that the governmental report from the Woody
Commission strongly supported the removal of gender-based admissions policies at all
Virginia colleges and universities. 309 F. Supp. at 186.
280. Id. at 187.
281. !d.
282. Id. (emphasis added).
283. Even though VMI, like the University of Virginia, provides a unique and highly
prestigious educational option, the court fell back into stereotypical thinking about the
proper roles of women. See infra notes 385-537 and accompanying text.
284. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 951
(1971).
285. Id. at 135 n.l. The court detennined that the statute establishing the college excluded
men by implication, not by its explicit tenns. Id.
286. Id. at 138. The males did not claim that any specific programs or courses made
Winthrop educationally advantageous to them. !d.
287. Id. at 138.
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insufficient to overcome the history and tradition of single-sex colleges in
the South Carolina system. 288
Similar to Bristol, the court stated that the women's college must not
be considered in isolation, but as part of a diverse state-wide higher
education system. The state of South Carolina had a legitimate state
purpose in creating diverse educational choices for its citizens. 289
Reasonably related to this objective, the state had established eight separate
educational institutions that offered varied courses and degree programs,
with only two single-gender colleges: an all-female Winthrop College and
an all-male military college, the Citadel. 290 The court held that the male
plaintiffs were not educationally disadvantaged since they could choose
from a wide range of comparable state educational institutions. 291
As in the earlier cases, the court relied on the tradition and history of
a prestigious military college to block demands for equal admissions. 292
The court stated that the Citadel offered a full range of liberal arts courses
and engineering degrees. Since it was a military school, the court made the
conclusory statement that the legislature's all-male policy was therefore
appropriate. 293
In stark contrast with the Citadel's broad educational opportunities, the
court pointed out that Winthrop "was designed as a school for young
ladies, which, though offering a liberal arts program, gave special attention
to many courses thought to be specially helpful to female students. ,,294
The all-female training at Winthrop College was limited to traditional
female jobs in the clerical, teaching, and domestic spheres. 295 Even
though Winthrop is clearly not educationally equal to the Citadel, the court
claimed that the state's single-gender approach was pennissible because it

288. !d.
289. Id. at 135-36.
290. Id. at 136. The court did recognize that pedagogical research is split over the quality
and effectiveness of single-sex schools. Id. at 137. Although recognizing the trend towards
coeducation, the court asserted that there was still substantial pedagogical support for singlesex education. Id.
291. Id. at 137-38.
292. !d. at 136. See supra notes 240-46, 270-71, 281-83 and accompanying text.
293. Id. at 136.
294. !d.
295. Id. at 136 n.3. The statute establishing Winthrop sought to provide for:
[The] thorough education of the white girls of this State, the main object of
which shall be (1) to give young women such education as shall fit them for
teaching and (2) to give instructjon to young women in stenography,
typewriting, telegraphy, bookkeeping, drawing[,] ... designing, engraving,
sewing, dressmaking, millinery, art, needlework, cooking, housekeeping and
such other industrial arts as may be suitable to their sex and conducive to
their support and usefulness . . . .
Id.
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did not provide one sex with better educational advantages than the
other. 296 Remarkably, the Williams court asserted that limiting educational choice by gender was merely a reflection of the differing interests of
men and women. 297 However, this analysis is deeply flawed because it
does not recognize that these differences in educational options were based
primarily on socialized stereotypical views of gender roles.
Building on Gaines and Kirstein, the court suggested that Winthrop
would have to open its doors to males only if comparable schools were not
available in the state. 298 Distinguishing Kirstein, the court asserted that
unlike the University of Virginia, Winthrop College did not offer more
diverse areas of study or possess greater prestige than other coeducational
institutions in the state. 299 It is not surprising that the court did not
compare Winthrop to the only other single-gender college in the state, the
prestigious Citadel. The fact that Winthrop lacked any special or
outstanding qualities is illustrative of the typical inferiority of all-female
institutions in sex-segregated educational systems. 3OO The court simplistically concluded that these admission policies are acceptable because they
are based upon permissible gender classifications and not impermissible
racial ones. 301 Once again, the court referred to numerous cases that limit
women's opportunities in the legal, political, social, and employment
spheres to support these gender-based policies. 302
Awash in archaic gender stereotypes, the Williams court upheld the
single-sex policy under the guise of educational diversity. 303 Unfortunately, in its first opportunity to review sex-segregated schools, the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed Williams. 304 Despite the Williams court's
reliance on the rational basis test and the lack of a written Supreme Court

296. Id. at 138 (quoting Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86, 100 (Tex. 1958)). See supra
notes 258-59 and accompanying text; see irifra notes 299-300, 309 and accompanying text.
297. The Williams court recognized the opposing views on single-sex education, but
basically ignored them:
It is conceded that recognized pedagogical opinion is divided on the wisdom
of maintaining "single-sex" institutions of higher education but it is
stipulated that there is a respectable body of educators who believe that "a
single-sex institution can advance the quality and effectiveness of its
instruction by concentrating upon areas ofprimary interest to only one sex."
/d. at 138. (emphasis added).
298. Id. at 137. Under this concept, VMI should have been required to open its doors to
women since no comparable choice is available to females in the state. See supra note 282
and accompanying text.
299. Id. at 138-39.
300. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
301. Id. at 138.
302. Id. at 136-37. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
303. See Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 616-17.
304. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970) affd mem., 401 U.S. 951
(1971).
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opinion, this affinnation would provide the basis for justifying sexsegregated education in later cases. 305
B.

ApPLICATION OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY TO CLAIMS OF EDUCATIONAL
DIVERSITY

Within a few months of Williams, the Supreme Court began to show
greater sensitivity to the issue of sex discrimination and to consider the use
of a modified rational basis test. 306 The Court turned its attention toward
divisions based upon sex and invalidated gender-based distinctions based
on "overbroad generalizations" or "archaic notions" about the societal roles
of both men and women. 307 However, the Court vacillated on the proper
standard of review of gender-based classifications, moving from modified
rational basis to strict scrutiny and then finally to intennediate scrutiny.308
As courts began to move away from the rational basis standard for
gender-segregation cases, as set forth in the Sweatt and McLaurin cases, the
tangible-intangible benefits analysis became central to the courts'
Initially, the rising
evaluations of gender-segregated programs. 309
importance of intangible factors, such as history, prestige, and tradition
along with the growing recognition that such gender-segregated programs
are based on archaic stereotyping, signalled the end of the separate but

305. See infra notes 310-32, 393-400 and accompanying text.
306. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down gender-based estate administration
law based on administrative convenience under modified rational basis test). See
Gardenswartz, supra note 184, at 617-18; Lewis, supra note 4, at 589.
307. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US. 645 (1972) (striking down gender-based fitness
hearings for custody of illegitimate children); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 US. 522 (1975)
(striking down a law that limited female participation on juries); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975) (striking down gender-based Social Security survivor benefits provided
only to widows); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (striking down gender-based support
payment law).
308. See supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text. This judicial confusion is mirrored
by the variety of standards utilized within a single decade to analyze gender discrimination
in the military context: strict scrutiny in Frontiero, rational basis in Ballard, and
intermediate scrutiny in Rostker. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Brennan,
J., plurality) (striking down gender-based military dependency benefits under strict scrutiny);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), reh 'g denied, 420 US. 966 (1975) (upholding
gender-based promotion and separation statutes under complete rationality test); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (utilizing intermediate scrutiny to uphold all-male draft
registration plans). See Lewis, supra note 4, at 625-37; Ponte, supra note 110, at 1144-53.
309. In one instance in which a federal court did compare individual schools in detail, the
court tended to disregard specific inequalities as insignificant. See Vorchheimer v. School
Dist. of Phil a., 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976) (comparing and upholding two sex-segregated
academic high schools as substantially equal). See irifra notes 310-32 and accompanying
text. But cf Newberg v. Bd. of PUb. Educ., No. 5822, 1983 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 94,
at *1 (26 Pa. D. & C. 3d 682 Aug. 30, 1983) (comparing same sex-segregated academic
high schools and found substantial inequalities in violation of equal protection). See irifra
notes 362-90 and accompanying text.
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equal justification for publicly funded gender-segregated schools, analogous
to race-segregated schools.
Within this context, the Court applied a modified rational basis test to
the constitutionality of two sex-segregated academic high schools in
Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phi/a. 310 The Philadelphia public school
system maintained two academic high schools, one for boys, Central High
School, and one for girls, Girls High.311 The plaintiff, a female honor
student, challenged her rejection from all-male Central High School based
solely on her gender. 312 She wanted to attend Central because she
preferred its learning environment and academic program over that of Girls
High's.313
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. However, in a split
decision, the appeals court upheld the gender-based admissions policy as
not violative of the Constitution's equal protection clause. 314 The court
applied a modified rational basis tesf l5 and cited Williams, with its
emphasis on protecting the all-male military educational system, as
controlling precedent. 316
Relying heavily upon the lower court's factual findings, the appellate
court stated that the two schools were academically and functionally
comparable as to academic facilities, course quality, teaching faculty,
academic standing, and prestige. 317 However, both courts noted that
Central High was superior to Girls High in the scientific field, but largely

310. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
311. Id. at 882. In the Philadelphia school system, academic high schools maintain "high
admissions standards and offer only college preparatory courses." Id. at 881. Attendance

at these schools is voluntary with only seven percent of city students meeting the schools'
scholastic standards. Id. There is no coeducational equivalent in the city's public school
system. Id. Both schools were founded in the early 1800s and have maintained excellent
educational reputations with distinguished records of alumni achievement. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 882.

The plaintiff believed that the environment at Girls High would be
detrimental to her academic goals. She had previously been dissatisfied with her education
at another city high school which she felt did not apply rigorous academic standards. !d.
See supra note 21 7 and accompanying text.
314. 532 F.2d at 888.
315. The Vorchheimer court claimed that under either a rational basis or substantial
relationship test the outcome of the case would be the same. Id. at 888. However, the
court did not use the traditional language of the intermediate test. Based upon the Reed
standard, the court reviewed whether the school board had a legitimate interest in single-sex
education and whether the two schools bore a 'fair and substantial relationship' to this goal.
Id. at 882.
316. See supra notes 284-305 and accompanying text.
317. 532 F.2d at 882-83. However, the plaintiffs had initially argued that there were
substantial differences between the schools in such areas as relationships with community
leaders, endowments, libraries, speakers, lecture programs, and prestige. Lewis, supra note
4, at 610 n.117.
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ignored this important difference. 3lg Also, the court dismissed the
plaintiff's concerns as merely personal preference, not supported by
evidence of psychological or other harm from attending Girls High. 319
Although the court indicated that it was sympathetic to her desire to expand
her choices, the court concluded that providing the plaintiff with her choice
would deny the choice of others to attend single-sex academic schools. 320
Both the district and appeals courts determined that providing high
schools with outstanding academic standards was a legitimate state
objective.32I The real dispute arose over whether a dual single-sex
system was substantially related to that goal. The district court asserted
that although single-sex education had value, it was not substantially related
to the interest of providing academically challenging high schools. 322 The
appeals court disagreed, reasoning that equal educational opportunities were
available to both sexes since the academic high schools were academically
and functionally equivalen~23 and attendance at these schools was
voluntary. 324 Although the appeals court upheld the separate programs,
Vorchheimer marks the first serious attempt to compare the tangible and
intangible benefits of gender-segregated programs not found in earlier
substantial equality cases.
However, the court refused to analyze this dual system under the
"separate but equal" doctrine, used in the line of cases challenging racial
segregation in education and ultimately struck down in Brown. 325
Distinguishing Brown, the appeals court stated that unlike race, gender is
not a suspect classification and that it provides a basis for different
treatment under the law in certain circumstances. 326 Relying on Williams,
318. 532 F.2d at 882. See supra notes 300-01, 310 and accompanying text.
319. 532 F.2d at 882. See supra note 230 and accompanying text; see infra note 322 and
accompanying text.
320. 532 F.2d at 888.
321. Id. at 882.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 881-83.
324. Id. at 881. The dissent scoffed at this claim stating that the plaintiff's "choice, like
Plessy's, is to submit to that segregation or refrain from availing herself of the service."
Id. at 889 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 886. In his dissent, Judge Gibbons vociferously disputed this point, stating that
"separate but equal" analysis in public education had been laid to rest for all citizens in
Brown. Id. at 888-89 (Gibbons, 1., dissenting). "The majority opinion, in establishing a
twentieth-century sexual equivalent to the Plessy decision, reminds us that the doctrine can
and will be invoked to support sexual discrimination in the same manner that it supported
racial discrimination prior to Brown." Id. at 889. Judge Gibbons creatively replaced the
word "race" with "sex" in an excerpt from Plessy v. Ferguson to help prove his point. Id.
at 888.
326. Id. at 886-87. "We are committed to the concept that there is no fundamental
difference between races, therefore, in justice, there can be no dissimilar treatment. But
there are differences between the sexes which may, in limited circumstances, justify
disparity in law." Id. at 886.
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the court explained that the gender-based admissions policy applied to both
genders without providing a benefit to one gender over the other. 327
Even though Williams was decided under the rational basis test, the appeals
court asserted that the decision would still pass constitutional muster under
the modified rational basis test. 328
Further, the court would not distinguish Williams although Williams
dealt with discrimination against males rather than females.
The
Vorchheimer appellate court recognized that gender-based distinctions
favoring females are justifiable to remedy past discrimination. However,
the court noted that there was no past deprivation of educational opportunities for women in Philadelphia that needed to be remedied. Therefore,
Williams was still controlling authority.329
On its second opportunity to consider the issue of sex-segregated
education, the Supreme Court deadlocked, affirming Vorchheimer without
a written opinion. 330 Although Vorchheimer stands as precedent, its
controlling authority is undermined by later gender cases raising the
applicable level of scrutiny.331 Its factual findings were also questioned
in Newberg v. Bd. of Public Education, where the court felt that the
academic high schools in Vorchheimer, on closer review, were not
substantially equal. 332
The Vorchheimer court did not apply the heightened scrutiny test that
the Supreme Court enunciated for gender-based distinctions in Craig v.
Boren. 333 Heightened scrutiny, or the intermediate standard, requires that
the government show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its
gender-based distinction. 334 At a minimum, the government has the
burden of proving that its objectives are not just rational, but legitimate and
important. 335 The gender-based classification or discriminatory means
must be substantially related to the achievement of the purported objec-

327. Id. at 886. The appeals court distinguished earlier Supreme Court precedent
invalidating gender distinctions by asserting that those cases involved an actual loss of a
female benefit. Id.
328. Id. at 887. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
329. 532 F.2d at 881.
330. Id. at 880.
331. See infra notes 362-82 and accompanying text.
332. Id.
333. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In Craig, the Court struck down an
Oklahoma statute that pennitted the sale of 3.2% beer to females over 18, but only to males
over 21. Id.
334. Id. See also Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979);
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 (1982). This test is to be applied to distinctions that discriminate against men
as well as women. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
335. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
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tives. 336 This test does not abolish all gender-based distinctions, but only
those in which gender is not an accurate proxy for attaining the stated
ends. 337 In limited circumstances, the Court has upheld gender-based
classifications that sought to remedy the effects of past discrimination
against women. 338
However, the Court has also recognized that such benign classifications
must be carefully examined to avoid reinforcing stereotypical notions about
gender roles. 339 Therefore, the application of heightened scrutiny must
permit careful examination of the purported purposes to avoid perpetuating
archaic or stereotypical views about the roles of men and women. 340 The
first two decisions to clearly apply Craig's intermediate scrutiny standard
have struck down gender-based public education.
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan ,341 a male applicant
challenged his rejection from MUW's School of Nursing solely on the basis
of his gender. 342 Although the notion of personal convenience had been
rejected in earlier cases/43 the applicant argued that he wished to attend
MUW's nursing program because it was close to his home. 344 The state
countered that its objective was maximizing the range of female educational
choices to remedy past discrimination against women in education. 345
The state asserted that its all-female admissions policy was not arbitrary
because it sought to provide women with the recognized educational
benefits of single-sex education. 346

336. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
337. Craig, 429 US. at 198; Orr, 440 U.S. at 280-83; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726. A genderbased law can only stand if it better serves government interests than a gender-neutral one.
Orr, 440 U.S. at 283.
338. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 US. 351 (1974) (upholding tax exemption for widows
based on greater economic difficulties); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), reh 'g
denied, 420 U.S. 966 (upholding gender-based promotion and separation statutes based on
past discrimination against military women in promotional opportunities); Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 ( 1977) (allowing gender difference in computing Social Security
benefits based on economic disparity for women in earning ability).
339. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975); see also E. A. Hull, Sex Discrimination and the
Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of Kahn v. Shevin and Orr v. Orr, 30 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 639, 641 n.lO (1979).
340. Craig, 429 US. at 198; Orr, 440 U.S. at 280-83; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26.
341. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
342. Id. at 720-21. The applicant, Joe Hogan, was a registered nurse who sought to attain
a baccalaureate in nursing. Id. at 720. Although qualified for admission, MUW advised
him that he could only audit nursing courses, not take the classes for credit. !d. at 721.
343. See supra notes 245, 254, 261, 286, 288 and accompanying text.
344. 458 U.S. at 718 n.8. Unlike earlier cases, the Court considered the issue of proximity
as an important, rather than a peripheral, issue in determining the validity of the all-female
admissions policy.
345. Id. at 721, 727-28.
346. Id.
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Applying the intennediate scrutiny test,347 the Court rejected the
state's all-female admissions policy, despite the claim of educational
Under the first prong of the inaffinnative action for women. 348
tennediate standard, the state had the burden of showing an "exceedingly
persuasive" justification for a discriminatory classification. In Hogan, the
Court examined the state's purported objective of educational affinnative
action for women. 349 The Court stated that it was not required to accept
the state's claim of a benign, compensatory purpose at face value but must
undertake a "searching analysis" of the claimed purpose. 350 The Court
reasoned that the state's asserted compensatory purpose must actually
benefit those who have suffered a disadvantage related to the gender
classification. 351
In explaining why an analysis of the claimed objective was critical, the
Hogan Court stated that the state's objective must not reflect unacceptable
generalizations about gender roles:
Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective
itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory
objective is to exclude or "protect" members of one gender because
they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be
innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate. 352
In reviewing the role of women in nursing, the Court found that the
state's claim of educational affinnative action was unpersuasive and was
based upon stereotypical views of women. The Court detennined that the
state had failed to show that women suffered any disadvantages in

347. Id. at 724-26. It is important to note that the district court had entered summary
judgment for the state after utilizing the rational basis test. /d. at 721. The appeals court
reversed the district court's decision after applying the intermediate standard. Id. at 721-22.
In dicta, the Court hinted that the door was still open to the application of strict scrutiny for
gender-based distinctions. "Because we conclude that the challenged statutory classification
is not substantially related to an important objective, we need not decide whether classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect." Id. at 724 n.9 (citation omitted).
348. Id. at 731. In order to receive federal assistance, the Court recognized that Title IX
exempts traditionally single-sex undergraduate colleges from its mandate against gender
discrimination. Id. at 732. However, the Court determined that under the Supremacy
Clause, Title IX cannot abrogate the constitutional right of equal protection of the laws. Id.
at 733.
349. Id. at 728. In examining the establishment ofMUW, the Court noted that MUW was
created to provide women with limited access to higher learning, not to offer women
educational options equal or superior to men. Id. at 727 n.l3. The Court noted that "in
Mississippi, as elsewhere in the country, women's colleges were founded to provide some
form of higher education for the academically disenfranchised." /d.
350. Id. at 728.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 725. The Court referred to numerous historical examples in which women were
excluded from career options because of a paternalistic desire to protect them. !d. at 725.
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obtaining nursing education or leadership roles in the nursing profession. 353 Rather, the Court detennined that instead of compensating for
past discrimination, the state's all-female admissions policy reinforced the
stereotypical view that nursing is a woman's job. 354
By excluding men, the Court opined that the state was actually hurting
women because wages are usually depressed in female-dominated
prQfessions like nursing. 355 In addition, the Court reasoned that even if
women did face discrimination in the nursing field, the state had failed to
provide any evidence that the state legislature had instituted the all-female
admissions policy to compensate for past discrimination. 356 Therefore,
under the first prong of the intennediate test, the Court concluded that the
state failed to show how its claim of educational affinnative action
supported its discriminatory admissions policy. 357
Under the second prong of the test, the Court also decided that the
discriminatory means chosen, the gender-based admissions policy, were not
substantially related to the purported compensatory objective. 358 The
Court found that men were already auditing nursing courses and did not
adversely affect the learning environment. 359 The Court noted that a
male's presence in nursing classes neither impacted teaching styles nor
caused any detrimental effect on female academic perfonnance. 36o
Therefore, the Court concluded that excluding men was not necessary in
order to reach MOW's educational goals. 361
Following Hogan, the Pennsylvania state court in Newberg v. Board of
Public Education 362 revisited Philadelphia's sex-segregation policy which
was challenged in the Vorchheimer case. 363 In Newberg, three female
plaintiffs challenged the denial of their admission to Central High School
based solely on their gender.364 Noting the revised standard of judicial

353. !d. at 729. Prior to the establishment of MUW's nursing program, the Court found
that women earned 94% of all the nursing degrees conferred in Mississippi and women
received 98.6% of all nursing degrees nationwide. Id.
354. Id. at 729-30.
355. !d. at 729 n.15.
356. Id. at 730 n.16.
357. Id. at 730.
358. !d.
359. Id.
360. !d. at 731.
361. !d.
362. Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., No. 5822, 1983 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 94, at *1 (26
Pa. D. & c. 3d 682 Aug. 30, 1983).
363. The original Vorchheimer decision did not constitute res judicata with regard to the
federal constitutional issue because the plaintiffs' representation in Vorchheimer was found
to be materially inadequate. Id. at * 11-12, 15. The original case also did not address the
state constitution's Equal Rights Amendment. Id. at *1, 21, 26.
364. !d. at *3. The court noted that there were no known instances of Central High male
students trying to transfer or enroll in Girls High, suggesting the clearly superior educational
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review for gender classifications since Vorchheimer, 365 the state court
struck down the single-gender admissions policy, in part, under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 366
In Vorch h eimer, the city claimed that the important government
objective of providing a quality education for top students justified its sexsegregated academic high schools. 367 The Newberg court doubted that
this important governmental objective was being served by sex-segregated
schools. 368 Although the parties had stipulated that single-sex education
was a reasonable educational option, the court criticized the parties for not
providing sufficient evidence from qualified educators to support this
view. 369 Further defeating the purported justification of insulating the
genders from each other, the court stated that some Girls High students did
attend certain Central High classes and Central High students regularly
went to Girls High for tennis and basketball. 370
Based primarily on the unequal educational outcomes achieved by
Central and Girls High School, the court also questioned the pedagogical
value of single-gender education.37I The court found that the singlegender education policy resulted in poorer academic performance, weaker
standardized test scores, and a lower college acceptance rate for female
students from Girls High.372 These educational results undermine the
asserted claim that "adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex
schools. ,,373
Under the second prong of the test, the court determined that the
single-sex schools were not substantially related to the asserted objective
of quality education. 374 Comparing the two high schools, the court found
offerings provided at Central High. Id. at *20.
365. !d. at *5-9.
366. Id. at *20-21. Also, the court determined that the single-sex admission policy
violated the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment. !d. at *27-28.
367. 532 F.2d at 882.
368. Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., No. 5822, 1983 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 94, at *20
(26 Pa. D. & c. 3d 682 Aug. 30, 1983).
369. Id. at *16-17. The court stated that the value of this objective "is meaningless
without background information concerning the educators, their qualifications, sources, and
analyse~as well as those holding opposing views." !d. at * 17.
370. ld. at *12, 14 n.104.
371. !d. at *13, 20.
372. The court found that female students from Girls High scored lower than their male
counterparts on the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test and the Scholastic Aptitude Test.
Id. at * 13. About four percent fewer female students from Girls High were accepted into
colleges and universities than males from Central High. Id. In addition, boys from Central
High received $1.2 million in college scholarships, while their female counterparts received
less than half that amount, approximately $500,000. !d. at * 13-14.
373. I d. at * 12, 19. The court also pointed to a 10-year study that illustrated the
successful integration of boys and girls at Boston Latin School as undermining the claimed
benefits of single-sex education. Id. at * 17, 19.
374. ld. at *19-20.
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that female students at Girls High School received separate and materially
unequal educational opportunities/ 75 consistent with the historically
inferior educational offerings afforded women through sex-segregated
education. 376 Using the measured analysis of Gaines, Sweatt, and
McLaurin, the court found substantial differences as to library and
computer resources, quality of faculty, program funding, curriculum
prerequisites, instructional equipment, degrees awarded, and campus
facilities. 377 The court determined that these material differences, some
of which were known to the Vorchheimer court/ 78 provided separate and
unequal educational facilities for female students who would continue to
lag academically behind their male counterparts under this single-sex
approach. 379 The court, therefore, ordered Central High to open its doors
to qualified female students. 380
Courts continued to apply the intermediate standard to educational
diversity claims. In the first two cases, Newberg and Hogan, gender-based
nonmilitary educational programs were struck down. 38 ! However, the two
challenges to single-sex education within the military context, VMI and
Faulkner, revive the pre-Craig approval of gender-based public education
based on stereotypical views about acceptable gender roles. Similar to
other gender-based military cases, the VMI decisions take great pains to
avoid addressing the historical problem of gender discrimination in the
military. The VMI decisions never squarely faced the issue of gender

375. Id. at *12-13, 19-20.
376. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
377. Central High's aesthetically superior library possessed twice as many volumes as
Girls High. It had a smaller population than Girls High, but maintained twice as many
computers. Central High also had nearly three times as many faculty members with Ph.D. 's
and 1.5 times more faculty with 21 or more years of teaching experience than the Girls
High faculty. In addition, Central High students received about $382,145 in scholarships
from the Barnwell Foundation over a twelve-year period. This fund was not available to
Girls High students who raised money through an annual campaign of magazine subscription
sales. Students at Girls High were required to fulfill academic prerequisites for advanced
placement chemistry and physics that were not required of students at Central High.
Finally, Central High possessed more instructional equipment than Girls High, including a
separate computer room, planetarium, and cyclotron. Newberg, No. 5822, 1983 Phila. Cty.
Rptr., LEXIS 94, at *12-14.
378. The court noted that the Vorchheimer court was aware of the disparities in library
resources, planetarium and cyclotron, and superior scientific facilities. /d. at * 11, 13, 14
n.l 05. However, the inadequate representation of counsel prevented the earlier court from
becoming fully aware of many the other differences. Id. at *12.
379. /d. at *19-20.
380. /d. at *30.
381. See supra notes 341-80 and accompanying text. Another appeals court decision
upheld preliminary injunctions against sex-segregated education without deciding the dispute
on its merits. Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (upholding
preliminary injunction blocking creation of all-male public academies without comparable
all-female schools).
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discrimination and stereotyping. Instead, they focused on educational
choice, system-wide diversity, and the value of single-gender education. 382

III.

The VMI I Decisions-Upholding All-Male Military Training
and Education

The first round of the VMI dispute (VMI I) considered the constitutionality of the Commonwealth of Virginia's provision of male only military
training under a proffered objective of educational diversity. The VMI I
district court upheld the constitutionality of this all-male option applying
the pre-Craig standard of substantial equality.383 The VMI I appeals
court reversed the lower court's holding, but stopped short of mandating
the integration of VMI. Instead, the appellate court offered VMI an escape
hatch: the "separate but equal" solution to the equal protection violation. 384
The second round of the litigation (VMI II) focused on the proposed
separate all-female leadership program at a private institution, Mary
Baldwin College. Discarding race and gender-based precedent, the VMI II
district court approved a separate and substantially inferior training program
for women as to both tangible and intangible elements. Recognizing the
inferiority of the all-female program, the VMI II appeals court upheld the
district court's decision under a new test of substantive comparability. This
test, which is akin to the analysis underlying the pre-Craig substantial
equality test, suggests that equality is based on bare assertions of similar
educational goals rather than a detailed comparison of tangible and
intangible aspects of each program.
The VMI I and II decisions ignore existing relevant race and genderbased educational precedent in a continuing effort to exclude women from
a traditionally male sphere. A review of these decisions illustrates not the
derogation of earlier educational precedent, but the continued embrace of
stereotypical thinking about the proper role of women in society.
A.

UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA-A DEEPLY FLAWED DISTRICT COURT
DECISION

In 1990, the Department of Justice brought an action against VMI on
behalf of a female high school student who wished to be considered for

382. See infra notes 383-538 and accompanying text.
383. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), rev'd. reh'gdenied,
976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
384. See generally Jon Allyn Soderberg, Essay, The Virginia Military Institute and the
Equal Protection Clause: A Factual and Legal Introduction, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 15
(1993) (overview of VMI I decision).
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admission. 385 The Justice Department argued that the exclusion of
females, regardless of their qualifications, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. VMI responded that its all-male admissions policy promoted
the legitimate state interest of diversity in educational choice. 386
At the outset, the VMI I district court indicated the importance of
deference to state educational policy-makers. 387 The opinion stated that
courts should defer to state educational policy based upon First Amendment
concerns about academic freedom, including the freedom to set diverse
admission standards and to create different missions for different schools
within a state system. 388 Yet the court did note that this deference is
neither as high as the deference to Congress in national defense matters 389
nor is it absolute, as racial segregation cases illustrate. 390
Despite the claim of educational diversity, the district court could not
help but recognize the military dimension of this case. The court's decision
began by analogizing the lawsuit to VMI's participation in a Civil War
battle. 391 Before even discussing Hogan, the district court revisited the
Kirstein and Williams decisions and approved of the system in which the
military character of VMI and the Citadel called for an all-male admissions
policy.392 The district court went so far as to quote the Kirstein court's
concern about the propriety of women receiving military training, wearing
unifonns, and bearing anns. 393 Not surprisingly, those initial remarks
preceded a finding of constitutional validity of the Commonwealth's
provision of single-gender military education for men but not for women.

385. 766 F. Supp. at 1408. See also Watson, supra note 117, at 9.
386. 766 F. Supp. at 1408.
387. 766 F. Supp. at 1409. In this instance, the controlling state authority is the VMI
Board of Visitors, a 17 member board appointed by the state's governor and subject to the
supervision of the state's legislative assembly. Id.
388. Id. The court noted that the "attainment of a diverse student body ... is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education." Id. (citing Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)). The court added that this
goal was not limited to individual programs, but could be extended to a review of a state's
educational system. 766 F. Supp. at 1409.
389. Id. at 1409 n.2. The court makes this remark without recognizing that VMI's allmale admissions policy clashed with Congress' view that military training should be coeducational. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
390. 766 F. Supp. at 1409. See supra notes 236-71, 284-305 and accompanying text.
391. 766 F. Supp. at 1408. This court stated that:
It was in May of 1864 that the United States and the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI) first confronted each other. That was a life-and-death
engagement that occurred on the battlefield at New Market, Virginia. The
combatants have again confronted each other, but this time the venue is the
court. Nonetheless, VMI claims the struggle is nothing short of a life-anddeath confrontation.
Id.

392. !d. at 1409-10.
393. See supra notes 232-71, 280-305 and accompanying text.
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The court professed to use the Hogan test in addressing whether VMI's
all-male program supported the state's asserted objective of educational
diversity. Under Hogan, however, the state has the burden of showing an
exceedingly persuasive justification for the gender classification. Thus, the
court's standard of review more closely resembled the pre-Craig substantial
equality reasoning. The VMI I district court considered the asserted
objective of educational diversity in the context of Virginia's entire state
system rather than just examining VMI's single-gender program. 394 The
court determined that VMI's all-male admissions policies met this first
prong of educational diversity within the Virginia system of higher
education by providing a single-sex choice395 and a unique pedagogical
model of character and leadership development. 396
Initially, the district court improperly manipulated the Hogan standard
by considering VMI's single-sex policy as an end rather than a means. The
single-sex policy was not intended to be an end, but rather the means to
train white males for military leadership. The single sex policy was not
implemented for the development of educational choice or diversity. 397
Unlike the Hogan Court, the district court also seemed to accept at face
value VMI's claim that the Commonwealth of Virginia consciously adopted
a single-sex policy in order to promote diversity in the Virginia educational
system. However, this asserted state objective ignores both history and
current reality.
Within a historical context, it is ludicrous to claim that the founding of
all-male VMI in 1839 reflected a concern for educational diversity or
choice. The school's policy was adopted in a time when military training
was exclusively provided to white males, since white males were the only
full citizens and the only ones expected to participate and provide
leadership in the armed forces. 398
394. 766 F. Supp. at 1409-10.
395. Id. at 1415.
396. Id. at 1413, 1419-20.
397. Id. at 1412-13. See Faulkner v. Jones, No. 94-1978, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 8252,
at *23, *32 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 1995) (Hall, J., concurring); Saferstein, supra note 182, at 657.
Judge Hall stated that he chose to write a concurring opinion because he believed that VMI
rs elevation of a means to an end would ultimately deny women equal access to power and
position in society. Faulkner, No. 94-1978 at *32. As Judge Hall wrote:
We began this unfortunate journey in VMI I, when we promoted a means
to an end--single-gender education--to the status of an end in itself and
avoided ascertaining, let alone analyzing, the true purpose behind the state's
decision to keep women out of VMI. Though we correctly concluded that
maintaining the status quo offended the Constitution, we failed to mandate
VMI's integration--and thus we failed.
Id.

398. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1243, 124748, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995)
(Phillips, J., dissenting); Cheh, supra note 4, at 56. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Phillips
properly asserted:
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The court's deference to the state was also clearly misplaced since there
is no evidence of any established state policy of educational diversity
through single-sex institutions. 399 In actuality, the Virginia legislature
repealed statutes requiring single-sex institutions and sought the eradication
of discrimination in education based on gender, race, or national origin. 400
Despite a substantially higher demand for single-sex education among
females,401 the state voluntarily opened up all four all-female schools to
men, primarily in the 1960s.402 In addition, the governor and the state
refused to defend VMI's all-male admissions policy or actively participate
in the lawsuit,403 Instead, VMI was represented by private counse1. 404
Furthermore, the lack of a coherent policy of diversity through singlesex educational institutions is shown by the fact that VMI is the state's
only single-gender educational institution. 405 The VMI I district court
extolled the benefits of single-sex education without reconciling this
position with the failure of the Commonwealth to provide such single-sex
When Virginia Military Institute was founded in 1839 as a state-supported
military school for men only, it is inconceivable that any thought was given
by the founders to the possibility that women should not be denied its
intended benefits. No conscious governmental choice between alternatives
therefore dictated the original men only policy; it simply reflected the
unquestioned general understanding of the time about the distinctively different roles in society of men and women . . .. Since that time and until this
litigation (so far as anything before us reveals) no conscious governmental
choice had ever been made by the Commonwealth of Virginia to reexamine
that original policy. So far as can be told, the gender-role premises of its
origins were those that continued over time to sustain it as official state
policy.
44 F.3d at 1243 (Phillips, 1., dissenting) (citation omitted).
399. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 890, 898-99 (4th Cir. 1992).
400. 766 F. Supp. at 1414 n.10. Furthermore, the state's Commission on the University
of the 21 st Century stated in its 1990 report that there should be no discrimination in higher
education based on gender, race, or national origin. 976 F.2d at 898-99.
401. 766 F. Supp. at 1414, 1420. The court found this greater demand by women in both
Virginia and the nation. Id. at 1420.
402. !d. at 1414 n.10. Longwood College became coeducational in 1949, and Mary
Washington, Radford, and James Madison became coeducational in the 1960s. The Kirstein
litigation motivated the Commonwealth to open the doors of the all-male University of
Virginia to coeducation in 1970. Id. at 1419. See supra notes 223-83 and accompanying
text.
403. 766 F. Supp. at 1408. At the outset of the suit, then Governor Wilder indicated his
personal opposition to VMI's admissions policy. 976 F.2d at 894; Soderberg, supra note
384, at 19. Governor Wilder had been refused admission to law school in Virginia because
of his race and sought his degree outside the state. Soderberg, supra note 384, at 18. Mary
Sue Terry, the Commonwealth's first female Attorney General, found herself in the ironic
position of defending an all-male admissions policy. !d. She eventually withdrew, claiming
a conflict of interest. 976 F.2d at 894; Soderberg, supra note 384, at 20.
404. 766 F. Supp. at 1408. VMI was ultimately defended by private counsel for the VMI
Foundation and VMI Alumni Association and by pro bono counsel for the Commonwealth.
976 F.2d at 894; Soderberg, supra note 384, at 20.
405. 766 F. Supp. at 1419.
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options for women. 406 Even the pre-Craig substantial equality cases were
based on the notion that both genders were offered substantially equal
educational opportunities within the state's entire educational system. In
the earlier cases of Bristol, Allred, and Williams, single-gender educational
options, although inferior, were already available to women within the
state's educational system. 407 As indicated in Williams, providing a
single-gender choice in education must not exalt one gender over the
other.408
The VMJ I district court failed to recognize that substantial equality
reasoning had not been applied in situations in which no all-female
educational option existed. Even under the stereotype-laden Williams
decision, a lack of single-gender education choice for women exalts one
gender (males) over the other (females). The court embraced single-sex
education without considering the failure of the Commonwealth to provide
such single-sex options for women. 409 The court stated that no witnesses
for Virginia could explain this failure to provide a single-gender educational choice for women. 4JO Yet, the court concluded its inquiry prematurely
and failed to realize that its holding was condoning diversity of educational
choice for men only. Instead, it blithely asserted that this omission was not
before the court. 4JJ
The district court also focused on VMI's unique utilization of the
"adversative" educational model as contributing to diversity in the state's
higher education system. 4J2 The court determined that this model was
unique and could not be replicated by ROTC programs or training at other

406. Id. at 1411-12. Relying primarily on Dr. Alexander Astin's 1977 research study,
Four Critical Years, the court determined that single-sex education increased student selfesteem, increased student involvement in academic life, and resulted in greater professional
leadership and achievement. Id. at 1412. However, the Supreme Court in Hogan made it
clear that there was not universal agreement that single-gender education provided unique
educational benefits. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 721. Also, the court's reliance on twenty-year
old research does not reflect feminist thought or studies that illustrate that single-gender
education benefits women more than men. See Saferstein, supra note 182, at 657-58, 679
n.194. It is important to note that Dr. Astin had testified that he ethically opposed singlegender education because fairness and equity should be a higher societal goal than
sustaining VMI's single-gender policy. U. S. v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 479 (W.D. Va.
1994).
407. See supra notes 259-60, 297 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 291, 296-99 and accompanying text.
409. 766 F. Supp. at 1411-12. See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
410. 766 F. Supp. at 1420. The court suggests that the Commonwealth may wish to rely
on private colleges to provide single-gender options for women. !d. at 1420-21. See supra
note 400 and accompanying text.
411. 766 F. Supp. at 1414-15. The court claims that the Department of Justice was
seeking the admission of women to VMI; therefore, the failure of the state to provide an allfemale option was not an issue before the court. Id.
412. Id. at 1413, 1415.
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military academies. 413 The court described how this adversative approach
involves intense indoctrination through the use of ritualistic activities that
emphasize physical and psychological stress and punishments, absolute
equality of treatment, absence of privacy, military drills, and regimentation
of cadet behavior. 414 For the first seven months, new cadets are called
"rats," subject to collective rewards and punishments for their conduct,
comparable to the Marine Corps boot camp.415 It is suggested that this
approach strips away prior views and habits and instills loyalty to fellow
cadets and VMI values. 416 Supporters of VMI assert that this method,
along with VMI's pervasive military environment,417 promote leadership
and character development. 418
Although the unique educational benefits of the University of Virginia
demanded its integration in Kirstein, the district court decided against
integration after considering the second prong of the intermediate
standard. 419 Distinguishing Hogan, where the Court stated that the
admission of men to the all-women nursing school in Hogan would not
impact pedagogical methods or classroom performance,420 the district
court contended that admitting women to VMI would impair the egalitarian
atmosphere that it claimed was central to the adversative model and would
require its modification and ultimate destruction. 421 The court never
examined whether the adversative model could withstand modification or
elimination and still meet VMI's asserted educational mission. 422
With the adversative model viewed as sacrosanct, the district court
determined that the exclusion of women under the single-sex policy was

413. Id. at 1411, 1413-14. The court strained to distinguish VMI's approach from the
successful coeducational military experiences at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, the
federal service academies, and ROTC programs. Id. at 1428-34, 1437-42. See supra note
113 and accompanying text.
414. 766 F. Supp. at 1421-24. See infra note 438 and accompanying text.
415. 766 F. Supp. at 1422-23. The court states that "the 'rat' is 'probably the lowest
animal on earth, '" and "rats are treated miserably for the first seven months of college."
Id. at 1422.
416. Id. at 1423. Each rat is linked up with an upperclassman as a mentor, called a
"dyke," who helps the cadet through this stressful process. !d. This relationship is also
claimed to promote "cross-class bonding." Id.
417. !d. at 1423-24. "The military regulations, etiquette, and drill, primarily furnish a
rationale for the rigorous activities that are features of other VMI systems, including the
comprehensive regulation of behavior and the wearing of uniforms." Id. at 1424.
418. Id. at 1423-24, 1426. But cf United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 92-94 (4th Cir.
1995) (Motz, 1., dissenting). See also infra note 438 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 272-83 and accompanying text.
420. 766 F. Supp. at 1411. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 731 (1982).
421. 766 F. Supp. at 1411.
422. United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 92-93 (4th Cir. 1995) (Motz, 1., dissenting).
See infra note 438 and accompanying text.
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substantially related to the goal of educational diversity.423 Reminiscent
of the flawed reasoning of Williams, the court, determined that providing
this unique form of education only to men does not favor one gender over
the other:
Gender discrimination, as a rule, works to the benefit of one group
and to the detriment of another. But in a real sense of the word,
that is not true in this case because, as the testimony of experts
demonstrates, it would be impossible for a female to participate in
the 'VMI experience.' Even if the female could physically and
psychologically undergo the rigors of the life of a male cadet, her
introduction into the process would change it. Thus, the very
experience she sought would no longer be available. 424
The court's concern that female admissions would end the adversative
method suggests an underlying concern that it might come under closer
scrutiny if allowed in a coeducational program, since its tactics might be
viewed as sexual harassment. 425 However, even in a single-sex environment, critics charge that the adversative model promotes unacceptable
conduct that is tantamount to hazing, brainwashing, or sadomasochistic acts,
which do not accomplish VMI's mission. 426
The claim that admitting women would destroy the complete equality
among VMI cadets is based on a false construct. VMI already recognized
racial differences between white and African-American cadets starting in
1983. VMI funded a special recruitment and retention program for
African-American cadets. The program offered special academic assistance
in English and mathematics. It also sought to provide social and cultural

423. 766 F. Supp. at 1413.
424. Id. at 1414.
425. In VMI II, the appeals court asserts that to employ the adversative method in a
coeducational environment would destroy "any sense of decency that still permeates the
relationship between the sexes." U.S. v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1239 (4th Cir. 1995), reh 'g
denied, 52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995). The court does not reconcile why it is concerned about
decency or mutual respect in only a coeducational, and not in a single-gender environment
as well. See supra notes 113, 174-76 and accompanying text.
426. See Cheh, supra note 4, at 52-53; Saferstein, supra note 182, at 655. While VMI
seeks to retain this model, West Point has moved away from it and emphasizes more
developmental and positive approaches to training and leadership. 766 F. Supp. at 1440.
Under West Point's 1990 Code of Conduct revisions, new cadets may not be hazed nor
subjected to psychologically or physically demeaning or excessive conduct from other
cadets. Id. at 1441. Congress and the Department of Defense have often criticized the
failures of the federal service academies and demanded greater efforts to eradicate all forms
of physical and psychological hazing, particularly at the Air Force Academy. David
Singband, Hazing Persists at Military Academies, Report Says, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 22,
1992, at 8A; Hazing a 'Croel Fact of Life' at Academies, Glenn Says, ORLANDO SENTINEL
TRlB., Nov. 25, 1992, at AlO. "Congress outlawed hazing in 1874." /d.
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support to help the morale of African-American cadets dealing with the
tensions of a predominantly white organization. 427
The court distinguished the race issue, however, and stated that gender
was the sole danger to maintaining an egalitarian learning environment. 428
First, the court stated that the esprit de corps would be damaged because
male cadets would be distracted by the presence of female cadets and by
dating pressures. 429 This assertion, however, flies in the face of the
exceptional level of self-discipline expected of VMI cadets.43o The
successful integration of women into various state and federal service
academies undermines this assertion as well, a fact recognized by the court
but ignored in its decision. 431 Furthermore, VMI cadets will need to be
prepared to face these pressures when working with women in the genderintegrated military branches. 432 VMI, like other service academies, such
as West Point, could easily implement appropriate regulations regarding
relationships between male and female cadets. 433
Second, the district court stated that accommodations for personal
privacy would have to be made, such as locked doors and covered
windows. 434 However, in its findings of fact, the court noted that VMI
admitted that its barracks could accommodate female cadets. In addition,
the court recognized that male and female cadets at other service academies
live side by side in identical rooms without any gender designations on the
doors and use separate but identical shower and toilet facilities. 435

427. 766 F. Supp. at 1436-37. See Saferstein, supra note 182, at 661.
428. 766 F. Supp. at 1439-40.
429. Id. at 1412, 1440.
430. See Saferstein, supra note 182, at 662.
431. 766 F. Supp. at 1428-29. The district court noted that in 1983 the VMI Board of
Visitors created a Mission Study Committee to review the legality and appropriateness of
VMI's single-sex policy. The seven-member Mission Study committee included three VMI
alumni and only one female, Dr. Virginia Lester, then president of Mary Baldwin College
which is now the home of the all-female Virginia Military Leadership Institute. Id. at 142728. The committee received positive support and encouragement for coeducation from
representatives from West Point, the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, and nonmilitary educational institutions. Id. at 1428-30. Despite this input, the
committee found that there was no evidence to warrant any change in VMI's single-sex
policy. Id. at 1429-30. The district court noted that "[t]he report provided very little
indication of how this conclusion was reached." Id. at 1429. See Saferstein, supra note
182, at 663-64.
432. 766 F. Supp. at 1428. See Saferstein, supra note 182, at 663.
433. At West Point, dating is permitted between cadets, except that fourth year cadets may
only date members of their class and all cadets are prohibited from dating those in their
direct chain of command. 766 F. Supp. at 1441. The West Point regulations also require
cadets to knock before entering another's room and do not allow cadets of different genders
alone behind closed doors. Id. See Saferstein, supra note 182, at 662.
434. 766 F. Supp. at 1412, 1438.
435. !d. at 1442-43. See Saferstein, supra note 182, at 661-62.
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Third, the court concluded that physical education mandates would
have to be revised to take into account physiological differences between
men and women. 436 However, the court acknowledged that some women
could meet all of VMI's physical requirements,437 despite the court's
claim, so no changes in physical standards would automatically have to be
made. Also, now integrated federal service academies have not abandoned
physical education requirements, but instead call for comparable training
of male and female cadets. 438 In the court's own findings of fact,
representatives of the service academies indicated that these modifications
did not significantly alter their missions. 439
Lastly, although recognizing that some women would thrive under this
adversative model,440 the district court contended that most women could
not succeed developmentally. The court found that female cadets would
need a more supportive and nurturing learning environment.44I This
determination amounted to sexual stereotyping and reveals the court's belief
that the pedagogical underpinnings of military training are based on
biological determinism. 442 Clearly, the concept of different developmental approaches for males and females is not universally accepted, but is the
subject of vigorous debate and disagreement among educational experts. 443 The argument that favors different developmental approaches
presupposes that women would not benefit from the adversative model
because it involves more aggressive behavior that is considered socially
acceptable only for males. This argument also suggests that most women
benefit from educational approaches that emphasize maternal, nurturing
characteristics in line with socially acceptable views of subordinate female
behavior. 444

436. 766 F. Supp. at 1413, 1432-34, 1438.
437. Id. at 1412-13. See Saferstein, supra note 182, at 660.
438. 766 F. Supp. at 1439.
439. Id. at 1428-29. See Saferstein, supra note 182, at 660-61.
440. 766 F. Supp. at 1413. The court noted that one expert, Dr. Conrad, testified that
some women would succeed under the adversative method with no major changes needed
in a coeducational environment. Id.
441. Id. at 14l3, 1434-35. See Margaret Talbot, The Gender Trap: Are Women's
Colleges Bad/or Women?, WASH. POST MAG., Nov. 20, 1994, at 19,30.
442. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
443. See supra note 406 and accompanying text. See generally Talbot, supra note 441,
at 12-19, 30-35 (questioning whether separate educational approaches to male and female
learning simply reinforces traditional sexual stereotyping in society).
444. Talbot, supra note 441, at 19, 30-32. The author states that:
Some [feminist scholars] are frankly suspicious of any approach to learning
that seems to saddle women with the same nicey-nicey traits that robbed
[women] of power in the past. The picture drawn by a book like Women's
Ways 0/ Knowing may be descriptive, they argue-that is, it may accurately
reflect the ways women have been raised-but it shouldn't necessarily be
prescriptive, a blueprint for educating women now and in the future ....
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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S WEAK REVERSAL

Despite the clear inconsistencies in the district court's decision, the
appeals court only weakly reversed the lower court's decision. In doing so,
the appellate court set the stage for VMI to exclude women while
continuing to accept state funding. After embracing the district court's
view that the state may support single-gender educational options,
particularly based on VMI's pedagogical approach and institutional mission,
the appeals court undertook a tortured application of the test set forth in
Hogan. To justify its single-gender policy, VMI advanced educational
diversity as its goal. However, VMI was unable to support its asserted
objective as being in line with state goals promoting diversity based on
equal opportunity in admissions and not diversity in pedagogical approaches. Thus, VMI's argument contradicted the Commonwealth of Virginia's
diversity policy of equal opportunity in education without regard to gender,
race, or national origin. 445 In carrying out the goal of diversity, the
appeals court found that the state had been moving consistently towards
coeducation, including the integration of four formerly all-female
colleges. 446 Although, VMI showed that its goal of promoting diversity
was an exceedingly persuasive justification for the all-male admission
policy, it failed the first prong of the Hogan intermediate scrutiny test
because women lacked equal opportunity. Recognizing that the state's
educational policy emphasized diversity and equal access, the appeals court
held that the VMI program violated equal protection. 447
At this juncture of the application of the intermediate scrutiny test in
Hogan, the failure of the state's objective resulted in the Court mandating

Spreading the message that traits like cooperativeness and competitiveness
are gender-coded, pink and blue, is risky business. It threatens to revive old
stereotypes of women as gentle, intuitive caretakers and men as toughminded aggressors, even to endorse some kind of biological essentialism

Id. at 19, 30. See Hacker, supra note 5, at 61-62, 67-68.
445. U.S. v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 898-99 (4th Cir. 1992). The Virginia legislature had
established the Commission on the University of the 21st Century, which in its 1990 report
espoused broadening access to higher education in the state. "Because colleges and
universities provide opportunities for students to deVelop values and learn from role models,
it is extremely important that they deal with faculty, staff, and students without regard to
sex, race, or ethnic origin." Id. at 899. (emphasis added).
In addition, the Governor and Attorney General of Virginia were both reluctant to
participate in the lawsuit because of their view that Virginia favored equal access to state
supported education. Id. at 894, 899. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
446. 976 F.2d at 899.
447. !d. at 899-900. See Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir. 1995) (Hall, 1.,
dissenting) ("South Carolina's proffered justification for denying its daughters an
educational opportunity that it provides for its sons is of no more substance than Virginia's
policy of exclusion under the perverse guise of 'diversity. "').
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the integration of MUW's nursing school. Yet in VMI I, the appeals court
was unwilling to require integration or, at a minimum, divest VMI of
public funding. On the contrary, out of deference to the preservation of
VMI's controversial, adversative pedagogy, the court did not follow
through on its conclusion that VMI's educational system was at odds with
the state's educational goals. 448 The appeals court accepted the district
court's factual determinations449 that coeducation would substantially
change VMI's "egalitarian ethos,,450 due to alterations in physical training
requirements, privacy issues, and cross-sexual relationships.45I Therefore,
the appeals court agreed with the lower court that women seeking a VMI
education would be denied that opportunity because their admission would
destroy that desired experience. 452
However, the appeals court did not accept the district court's stereotypical view that the adversative model was only beneficial for men. 453
Recounting the benefits of single-gender education, the appeals court
contended that it is the homogeneity of gender, not its maleness, that
justified the adversative mode1. 454 The appeals court recognized that this
model would also benefit the development of women in an all-female
educational environment. 455
Having rejected the diversity claim, the appeals court looked to a new
state objective, the pedagogical need for homogeneity in gender, as
justifying VMI's exclusionary policy:
While VMI's institutional mission justifies a single-sex program,
the Commonwealth of Virginia has not revealed a policy that
explains why it offers the unique benefit of VMI's type of
education and training to men and not to women. Although it is
readily apparent from the evidence that the rigor of the physical
training at VMI is tailored to males, in the context of a single-sex
female institution, it could not be adjusted without detrimental
effect. No other aspect of the program has been shown to depend
upon maleness rather than single-gendemess. 456

448. See supra note 438 and accompanying text; see infra notes 475-91 and accompanying
text.
449. The appeals court stated that "[tJhe district court's conclusions that VMI's mission
can be accomplished only in a single-gender environment and that changes necessary to
accommodate coeducation would tear at the fabric of VMI's unique methodology are
adequately supported." 976 F.2d at 897.
450. Id. at 896-97.
451. Id. at 892, 896-97.
452. Id. at 897.
453. Id. at 897, 899.
454. Id. at 897.
455. Id. at 897, 899.
456. !d. at 898.
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In deference to the newly-proffered objective of homogeneity of
gender, the appeals court refused to mandate a specific course of action to
remedy the equal protection violation. The decision allowed the state to
select from three choices: I) the integration of VMI, 2) the abandonment
of VMI's state funding, or 3) allowing the state to establish parallel
institutions or programs. 457
In a throwback to pre-Brown case law, the appeals court inappropriately revived the reviled concept of separate but equal by suggesting the third
option of a distinct, parallel program for women. As in Brown, the appeals
court should have adhered to the principle that separate is inherently
unequal in public education whether race or gender is at issue. If the court
was anxious to maintain VMI's adversative model, it should have mandated
that VMI no longer accept public funding for its discriminatory practices,
rather than invoking the damaging concept of separate but equal.
Even if one accepted the dubious claim that Brown can be distinguished
because it involved race rather than gender, VMI I is clearly analogous to
the pre-Craig decision in Kirstein. In that case, the Kirstein appeals court
looked at the Commonwealth of Virginia's provision of a unique and
valuable single-gender educational option available only to men at the
University of Virginia. Based on tangible and intangible factors, particularly prestige, the Kirstein court determined that the University of Virginia
must admit women because no other comparable state institution existed or
could be created within the state system. 458 The same approach should
have been applied in this case. Recognizing the unique tangible and
intangible benefits of VMI, the appeals court should have called for the
integration of that prestigious program in order to remedy the constitutional
violation.
Unfortunately, the Kirstein court, like the VMI I appeals court, declined
to mandate gender integration statewide because of the stereotypical views
about the proper roles of women in the military and military training. 459
This same stereotypical approach underlying the appeals court's failure to
mandate coeducation at VMI also drove VMI's decision to propose the
substantially inferior program for women at Mary Baldwin College. 460
457. !d. at 899-900. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
458. Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184, 187
(E.D. Va. 1970).
459. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
460. Initially, VMI sought to challenge the appellate court's decision that its program
violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. VMI requested a rehearing en
banc which was denied. Virginia v. United States, No. 91-1690, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
30490 (4th Cir. Nov. 19,1992). VMI then sought a review of the decision by the Supreme
Court which was also denied. Virginia v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993). See Scott
Jaschik, High Court Deals Blow to Va. Military Institute by Declining to Hear Its Appeal
to Stay All-Male, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 2, 1993, at A21.

Winter 1996]

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

69

IV. VMI II-Upholding the Separate and Unequal ProgramVirginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) Under
Substantive Comparability
The VMI II decision involved the reevaluation of the concept of
"separate but equal" in gender-based educational programs. In Gaines,
McLaurin, and Sweatt, working within the limits of Plessy, the Supreme
Court required that any separate but equal arrangements must be equal as
to both tangible and intangible factors such as facilities, course quality,
teaching faculty, and academic standing, with particular focus on the
importance of intellectual exchange, history, prestige, and tradition.
Although separate but equal for race was clearly defeated in
Brown,46 I the concept persisted in the pre-Craig case of Williams and the
modified rational basis test of Vorchheimer. 462 In these earlier cases, the
courts sought to hedge the issue of separate but equal by suggesting that it
was only invalid in instances of race because race is a suspect classification.463 Yet even in the Williams and Vorchheimer cases, the courts
indicated that gender-segregated programs are justified provided that one
gender is not provided with better educational advantages than the other.
Borrowing from Gaines, Sweatt, and McLaurin, Vorchheimer and the
Newberg retrial fleshed out this comparison of benefits by requiring that
gender-segregated programs must be functionally comparable based upon
an examination of both tangible and intangible factors.
In VMI II, it became quickly apparent that the proposed Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) program was grossly unequal as
to both tangible and intangible benefits, with men receiving far superior
educational advantages. The proposed VWIL program failed to meet even
the meager requirements of the pre-Craig decision of Williams or to
undertake the detailed analysis of tangible and intangible benefits called for
in Vorchheimer, Newberg or the pre-Brown race-based cases. Instead the
VMI II courts created a new "special intermediate scrutiny" test of
substantive comparability. This approach places claims of comparable
educational results above the need for equality as to faculty, facilities,
funding, pedagogy, academic offerings, alumni support and prestige.
The VMI II courts clearly failed to consider the all-male admissions
policy in light of the historical discrimination against women in the military
of which VMI's policy is an enduring example. The persistence of the

461. See supra notes 189-222 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 284-340 and accompanying text. In Hogan, the Supreme Court
sidestepped the issue by asserting that Mississippi did not maintain any other single-sex
public educational institutions. Mississippi University for Woman v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
720 n.l (1982).
463. See supra notes 284-340 and accompanying text.
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courts in keeping women out of VMI illustrated not the derogation of
earlier educational precedent, but the continued embrace of stereotypical
thinking about the proper role of women in society, in general, and the
military, in particular. If VMI were not a military school, it is unlikely that
the courts would have ignored substantial precedent and created the new
test of substantive comparability which uses questionable ends to justify the
gender-segregated means.
A.

DISTRICT COURT ApPROVAL OF THE SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL
PROGRAM

VWIL

VMI's response to the appeals court decision was a predictable one:
the development of a separate program, VWIL, to be housed at Mary
Baldwin College (MBC), a private all-female institution. 464 A task force,
headed and largely staffed by Mary Baldwin College faculty and administrators, was commissioned to create a leadership program appropriate for
an all-female four-year college. 465 Although the VMI II district court
acknowledged that Mary Baldwin College had no experience training
military leaders,466 the district court swallowed whole the task force's
inchoate and untested view of how to train women for military leadership
roles. 467 The lower court's approval of VWIL once again raised the
specter of separate but equal in the context of gender-based education.
Even though VWIL's mission statement calls for the development of
female-citizen soldiers, the proposed VWIL plan is profoundly different
from that offered at VMI. The task force did not use as an infrastructure
either a military environmene68 or the adversative method found at

464. See Jaschik, supra note 460, at A28-29; John F. Harris, Wilder Eyes a VMI for
Women; Funding Proposedfor Separate School, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1993, at B1. The
proposed program set off a fire storm of debate among educators, politicians and social
commentators. For articles supporting a coeducational VMI, see Get Ready Boys, Here
Come the Girls, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Aug. 28, 1993, at A20; Robert N. Weiner &
Mark Eckenwiler, Arms and the Woman: The Case for Equal Access to Military Colleges,
LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at 25; Cheh, supra note 4. For articles against a coeducational
VMI, see Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Save the Males: The Citadel Case, NAT'L REV., Aug.
1, 1994; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Feminism and Educational Opportunity, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 3,
1994, at 45; Down with Women's Colleges?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 22,1994, at A20.
465. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476 (W.D. Va. 1994). The task force
only met six times, with Dean Lott of MBC spending most of his working hours on the
creation of VWIL. Id. at 492.
466. Id. at 50 l.
467. !d. at 484-85. Expert witnesses testified that it was too difficult to assess the real
value of the VWIL program and its ability to achieve its anticipated outcomes until it was
actually made operational. !d. at 478-79. The court itself recognized that "VWIL is a new
venture and no one can predict with certainty its outcome .... No doubt the program will
need further adjustment as experience dictates ...." Id. at 484. As of June 1995, there
were 42 women enrolled in the VWIL program. Linda L. Meggett, Judge Tours Women's
Program in Virginia, POST AND COURIER (Charleston, S.C.) June 29, 1995, at AI.
468. 852 F. Supp. at 476.
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VMI,469 but fell back on the stereotypical view of women as needing a
more nurturing, nonmilitary environment. 47o Exhibiting little concern for
the formation of an esprit de corps among female students,47I VWIL
organizers decided that students would not be required to wear uniforms,472 not be housed in barracks,473 and not yet be subject to strict
military discipline codes. 474
The military training at VWIL is limited primarily to participation in
a standard four-year ROTC program475 that the government described as
a "pale image of the military lifestyle at VMI,,476 Although, this same
court in VMJ J had previously indicated that ROTC programs were not
equivalent to the VMI experience,477 they now determined that ROTC
training was sufficient for VWIL's female students. 478 Incredibly, the
district court asserted that a VWIL student need not wear a uniform round
the clock, participate in a rat line, nor live in a barracks comparable to
VMI to be a successful military leader.479 These bold pronouncements
blatantly contradict the same court's earlier insistence that the holistic,
adversative model was key to the successful development of citizen soldiers

469. Id. The Task Force rejected VMI's adversative model, claiming that it would not
produce the same results in VWIL participants, in direct contravention of the appeals court
decision in VMI 1. See i'?fra notes 490-91 and accompanying text. Hearkening back to
biological determinism, the task force determined that a more cooperative method, rather
than the leveling process of the rat line, was appropriate for women. 852 F. Supp. at 476,
480-81. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
470. 852 F. Supp. at 476. See supra note 455 and accompanying text.
471. Heavy reliance is placed on upper class students to maintain an esprit de corps.
These students are expected to play major roles in mentoring incoming cadets, redesigning
freshmen activities, enforcing rules and regulations and leading drills. 852 F. Supp. at 49697. However, the initial classes will lack this upper class support and it is unclear how
these early VWIL students will gamer the mentoring skills they need to take on these
projected roles.
472. Uniforms would only be worn during ROTC activities or Virginia Corps of Cadets
activities. !d. at 495.
473. Id. at 477-78. VWIL students will also not be required to eat meals together. Id. at
495.
474. Military rules or regulations have yet to be adopted as a VWIL code of conduct. Id.
at 497-98.
475. !d. at 478, 494-95, 497-98. At times, ROTC activities will be held at VMI because
of the lack of proper facilities at MBC, such as a firing range. Id. at 497. To supplement
ROTC activities, VWIL students will participate in an undefined leadership externship and
Saturday seminars three times per semester. Id. at 477. The current ROTC program at
MBC has only one participant, and no MBC student has been commissioned as a military
officer in the past three years. Id. at 501.
476. Id. at 498.
477. 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421, 1424, 1441-42 (W.D. Va. 1991).
478. U.S. v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 478. It is interesting to note that students at ROTC
programs at coeducational institutions often perform better than VMI cadets, again
undermining the allegation that the adversative model is the key to the proper development
of citizen soldiers. Id.
479. !d. at 498.
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at VMI and the basis for excluding women from the program. 480 Clearly,
under Williams and Vorchheimer, males would be receiving an educational
advantage over females because the VMI I court had already recognized
that ROTC programs were not equivalent to training under an adversative
model.
Aside from pedagogy, the VWIL plan is also fatally defective under
Vorchheimer and Newberg because of substantive differences in both the
quality and quantity of tangible and intangible benefits provided by VMI
and VWIL. As to tangible aspects, the VWIL program is marked by a
significantly smaller endowment,481 severely limited state financial
support,482 poorer quality faculty,483 inferior physical training facili-

480. See supra notes 419-33 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Virginia,
52 F.3d 90, 93 (4th Cir. 1995) (Motz, J., dissenting) (denying request for rehearing en banc
of VMI II).
In her dissent, Judge Motz questioned the need for the adversative method based on
the different pedagogical approaches used at the federal military academies. !d. at 92. See
supra note 425 and accompanying text. In addition, she asserted that without the
adversative model, VWIL is not "substantively comparable" to VMI, and therefore, VMI
should become coeducational. 52 F.3d at 93. The dissent asserted:
If 'adversative' training is so critical to the VMI program that it virtually
defines it, then a program without 'adversative' training can never be
'substantively comparable' to the VMI program, then 'adversative' training
must not be critical to the VMI program, and so there is nothing to prevent
the abolition of 'adversative' training and admission of women to VMI.
Id.
481. The facts clearly show that MBC has a total endowment of $19 million, with
commitments for $35 million more. This endowment covers all of MBC, not just VWIL.
852 F. Supp. at 503. VMI is currently withholding the endowment until legal proceedings
are completed and will only release the endowment if the ruling is favorable. MBC is
presently using the interest from these funds to support VWIL' s operational expenses.
Meggett, supra note 467, at A 1.
In VMI II, the appeals court indicated that VWIL would be provided with a permanent
endowment of $5.46 million. On the other hand, VMI boasts a $131 million endowment
with commitments for $220 million more. VMI has the highest per student endowment of
any institution in the nation. 852 F. Supp. at 503. In addition, a large number of private
scholarships are available to VMI cadets that are not open to VWIL students. 766 F. Supp.
1407, 1420 (W.O. Va. 1991).
482. The government had criticized the lack of sufficient funding for VWIL. 852 F. Supp.
at 482. Although based on untested assumptions, the court determined that witness assertions of adequate funding were reasonable. Id. at 483. However, the General Assembly has
only appropriated funds based on the difference in tuition between MBC and VMI for two
years for 25 students. Allison Blake, Student Requirements at Women's Leadership
Institute, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Nov. 28, 1994, at AS. MBC has already
recognized that there is no guaranteed funding for VWIL beyond the initial two years and
that VWIL' s future lobbying efforts for funds will reflect the realities of deep cuts in
Virginia's public system. Id.
483. The court found that MBC faculty hold "significantly fewer Ph.D.s" than VMI's, with
86% of VMI's faculty possessing Ph.D.s compared to only 68% of MBC faculty. 852 F.
Supp. at 502.
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ties,484 and fewer academic programs. 485 As demonstrated in earlier
substantial equality cases, separate institutions for women are once again
proven inferior alternatives to all-male options.
With respect to intangible factors, viewed as so important in Kirstein,
Sweatt, and McLaurin, VWIL clearly will not provide the prestige,
reputation, or alumni network that will open the doors to positions of
leadership for its graduates that VMI has provided for its graduates for
decades. 486 The district court stated flatly that the VWIL program was
not equal to VMI, in part, because of the lack of these very factors. 487
After recognizing these deficiencies, the district court nevertheless approved
the VWIL proposal, claiming that its conclusion was grounded in a solid
rejection of "separate but equal" in gender-based education: 488
Thus, if 'separate but equal' is the standard by which the
Commonwealth's plan must be measured, then it surely must fail
because, as the United States pointed out time and time again
during the trial, even if all else were equal between VMI and the
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) , the VWIL
program cannot supply those intangible qualities of history,
reputation, tradition, and prestige that VMI has amassed over the
years. One must assume that the Fourth Circuit did not assign the
Commonwealth an impossible task when it suggested that the
Commonwealth was free to establish 'parallel programs' or to
devise 'creative options or combinations' that would comply with

484. VMI has physical training facilities far superior to those of MBC, including an
NCAA competition indoor track and field facility, a football stadium with track and field
facilities, numerous mUlti-purpose sporting fields, an obstacle course, indoor and outdoor
rifle ranges, more tennis courts, a more extensive weight room, and a gymnasium with ten
times the seating capacity as that of MBC with television hookup capabilities and four
basketball courts. ld. at 503.
485. VMI offers a full array of liberal arts, sciences and engineering degrees. MBC, and
therefore VWIL, does not offer any bachelor of science degrees and does not offer an
engineering degree. MBC students interested in an engineering degree must travel to
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri to obtain that degree and as a result, would
not receive the tuition discount of a publicly-supported engineering degree that VMI
students enjoy. ld. It is important to note that Gaines clearly rejected shifting responsibility
for providing a separate but equal program to another state as violative of equal protection.
See supra notes 192-203 and accompanying text. The district court weakly asserted that
demand would not justify an engineering degree at MBC. 852 F. Supp. at 477. But since
MBC does not offer an engineering degree, it is difficult to determine how this lack of
demand can be shown.
486. ld. at 475. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995)
(Phillips, 1., dissenting); United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 91 (Motz, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 534-35 and accompanying text.
487. 852 F. Supp. at 475.
488. ld.
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the court's decision. It would be unrealistic to think that the
Fourth Circuit was requiring an exercise in futility.489
After acknowledging these serious inequalities, the district court simply
skipped over Vorchheimer, Newberg, and analogous race-based cases,
determining that VMI I could not have intended a call for equality as to
tangibles and intangibles since such a mandate could not be achieved
through separate programs at VMI and VWIL.490 The district court
ignored the fact that the appeals court could have been demanding a
creative co-curricular program that more closely intertwines the facilities,
faculty, endowment, and pedagogy of VMI with another all-female school.
At a minimum, any parallel program should provide equality as to tangible
factors such as faculty, facilities, endowment, and academic programs.
Also, the district court would not be undertaking "an exercise in futility"
if it accepted one of the other options outlined in VMI I: requiring VMI to
seek solely private funding or to integrate its corps of cadets.
Having brushed aside existing precedent, the district court introduced
a new concept of separate and unequal education when educational
programs seek to obtain the same basic goal of training citizen soldiers. 491
As a throwback to pre-Craig substantial equality thinking, the district court
contended that the programs need not be equal or identical as to tangible
and intangible factors in order to meet the demands of equal protection. 492
The district court claimed that its view was grounded in the Fourth
Circuit's 1993 decision in Faulkner v. Jones,493 which stated that gendersegregated programs need not be identical in order to be equal. 494 The
Faulkner appeals court sought to clarify VMI I and identify those situations
in which separate but equal might indeed be invalid within the genderbased educational context. Referring to VMI I, the Faulkner court indicated
that a state may choose to provide parallel programs that were not identical,
provided that the differences reflect recognized differences between men
and women and were not based on gender stereotypes or generalized
perceptions:
In a circumstance where a gender classification is not justified by
an acknowledged difference between men and women, the equality
of treatment cannot be satisfied by 'separate but equal' facili-

489. Id. (citation omitted).
490. Id.
491. Id. In an unfortunate closing statement, the district court blithely asserts that "[iJf
VMI marches to the beat of a drum, then Mary Baldwin marches to the melody of a fife
and when the march is over, both will have arrived at the same destination." !d. at 484.
492. !d. at 477.
493. Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993). See supra notes 117-19 and
accompanying text.
494. 852 F. Supp. at 476.
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ties . . . . 'Separate but equal' does not amount to equal. Thus, in
the context of a racial classification which was not justified by the
regulation's purpose, the requirement of equal treatment could not
be satisfied by 'separate but equal' treatment . . . . When, however,
a gender classification is justified by acknowledged differences,
identical facilities are not necessarily mandated. Rather, the nature
of the difference dictates the type of facility permissible for each
gender. 495
Under this standard, in order to satisfY equal protection, the decision
to set up separate facilities for males and females must consider the type
of difference, the relevant benefits and needs of each gender, the demand
both in quality and quantity,496 and other relevant factors. 497 Under
Faulkner, the real inquiry becomes whether recognized gender differences
between males and females support differing military training methods at
VMI and VWIL as well as inequalities regarding the tangible and
intangible aspects of each program.
Yet the district court used Faulkner mainly for the purpose of asserting
that equality can result without the provision of identical programs.
However, the district court erred because it failed to recognize the
concomitant factor of this standard, that any differences between the VMI
and VWIL programs must be linked to actual differences between men and
women. 498
The VMII appeals court specifically recognized that the adversative
model could work in both an all-male and an all-female environment. The
appeals court did not accept the notion that females could not benefit from
the adversative model, suggesting instead that homogeneity of gender, not
its maleness, was key to the model's success. Therefore, based on VMII,
there is no recognized difference between the genders upon which to base
different training methods in these separate, single-gender environments. 499

495. 10 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted).
496. It is important to note that in race-based precedent, demand was not considered an
appropriate factor since equal protection is an individual, rather than a group, right. See
supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
497. 10 F.3d at 232. "In the end, distinctions in any separate facilities provided for males
and females may be based on real differences between the sexes, both in quality and
quantity, so long as the distinctions are not based on stereotyped or generalized perceptions
of difference." Id. The appeals court looked to public rest rooms as an example that justify
different facilities for men and women based on privacy concerns. Id.
498. See United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90,92-93 (4th Cir. 1995) (Motz, J., dissenting)
(denying request for rehearing of VMI II en banc).
499. This determination is at odds with the appellate court's earlier claim that the
adversative model was distinguished by a need for homogeneity of gender rather than its
maleness or femaleness. See supra notes 453-55 and accompanying text. Dr. Astin, whose
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The district court also tried to support different training methods by
asserting that there was little or no demand on the part of women for the
adversative style of training. 5°O The court relied largely upon speculative
testimony and unscientific interviews to assert the lack of female interest
in a VMI-style experience. 501 The court conveniently dismissed its own
finding in VMI I that there was a lack of evidence regarding demand from
women, since VMI only aimed its recruitment efforts at men. 502 Despite
a lack of VMI recruitment of females, the district court did detennine that
about 347 women had inquired about admission to VMI between 1988 and
1990. VMI simply ignored these requests and later stopped counting
female inquiries, thereby blocking the compilation of data that illustrated
clear female interest in this type of education. 503
The district court never addressed how gender differences are linked to
unequal faculty, facilities, resources, and prestige between the programs at
issue, as mandated in Faulkner. Clearly, these tangible and intangible
factors are equally important to men and women seeking a quality
education. 504
Without establishing a link between gender and program differences as
required under the Faulkner standard, the district court approved a separate
and unequal program for women at VWIL. The court ordered the VWIL
program to be implemented by Fall 1995, with the court retaining
jurisdiction in order to supervise its implementation. 505

single-gender educational research was heavily relied upon in VMI I, argued that he did not
support single-gender options in public education. 852 F. SUpp. 471,479 (W.D. Va. 1994).
The district court ultimately accepted the view of VMI's experts that women need a more
cooperative learning environment. Id. at 478-81. Also, although much is made of the
adversative model as justifying separate programs, Faulkner allowed the option of a separate
program without any claim that the Citadel utilized a pedagogical method that required
homogeneity of gender. 10 F.3d at 232-33.
500. 852 F. SUpp. at 480. Again, the court improperly considered the demand when equal
protection is an individual, rather than a group, right. See supra notes 189-222 and
accompanying text.
501. 852 F. Supp. at 481. The court looked to the testimony of Dr. Richardson who
claimed that after examining demand at West Point and Virginia Tech, female interest in
an all-women's VMI would be too small and therefore, not feasible. Id. at 481 n.12. Dr.
Richardson also interviewed 20 female students participating in an ROTC program and
found that only one expressed an interest in a VMI-style experience. !d. Based on these
limited efforts, Dr. Richardson extrapolated that only 25-30 women would wish for an allfemale mirror-image of VMI. Id.
502. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1436 (W.O. Va. 1991). VMI did not
actively recruit women and told interested females at high school recruitment drives that
VMI did not accept women. VMI did not keep any records or tallies of women who
stopped by their booth for information. Id.
503. Id.
504. See United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 93 (4th Cir. 1995) (Motz, 1., dissenting).
505. 852 F. Supp. at 485. The court also required status reports every six months to help
review the progress of the VWIL program. Id.
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ApPEALS COURT AFFIRMS SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL PROGRAM UNDER
NEW SUBSTANTIVE COMPARABILITY REVIEW

The U.S. government appealed the district court's ruling arguing that
the separate VWIL program denies women a competitive military education
and reinforces negative stereotypes about women. 506 Revising the Hogan
standards, the appeals court created a new "special intermediate scrutiny
test" to justify its approval of the separate and unequal VWIL program.
Under Hogan's first prong, the state has the burden of showing an
"exceedingly persuasive" justification for a discriminatory classification.
The classification must serve a legitimate and important objective. Hogan
further indicated that the court must ascertain that the stated objectives are
not ad hoc rationalizations that reflect archaic or stereotypical notions of
gender roles. 507 The Hogan Court found that the state's claim of educational affirmative action was unpersuasive and was based upon stereotypical
views of women. 508
However, in VMI 11, the appeals court took a very different view of
Hogan's mandates. Initially, the court downplayed its responsibility to
rigorously review the purported objectives, stating that courts should give
substantial deference to a state's asserted objective, with greater focus on
the means selected to accomplish the state's objective. 509 However,
Hogan emphasized that purported objectives should not be taken at face
value. Rather, a searching analysis should be undertaken even when
benign, compensatory purposes are claimed. 510
In VMI 11, the court inquired first whether the facially-benign goal of
offering single-gender educational options was a legitimate and important
governmental objective. 5 )) Although recognizing disagreement among
educational experts, the court determined that the state's provision of

506. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1235, reh 'g denied, 52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir.
1995). Because three judges recused themselves, a 6-4 majority of the nonrecused judges
voted in favor of a rehearing, but did not achieve the procedurally-required majority of all
the circuit's judges. 52 F.3d. at 91. The government argued that the district court decision
provided no remedy for women seeking a rigorous VMI-style challenge. In addition, the
government asserted that the separate VWIL program perpetuated the stereotypical view
"that women are not tough enough to succeed in VMI's rigorous military-style program."
44 F.3d at 1235.
507. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25, 728 (1982).
508. Jd. at 727-29.
509. 44 F.3d at 1236. In addition, the court stated that since education is not a constitutional right, states should be given great latitude in expending their limited resources and
need not provide all types of education, pedagogical methods, disciplines or courses. Jd.
at 1237.
510. 458 U.S. at 728.
511. 44 F.3d at 1236-37. In VMJ 11, the court made the same mistake as the district court
in VMJ J in making single-gender education an end rather than a means. See supra notes
405-08 and accompanying text.
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single-sex education provided benefits for both genders and was therefore
a legitimate, important government end. 512
Yet this approach was flawed from the outset for several reasons. The
VMII appeals court had previously considered the government's objective
to be educational diversity (not single-gender education), which was found
to be constitutionally defective. Judge Phillips questioned this unexplained
switch in proffered state objectives in his dissent. Judge Phillips noted that
the Commonwealth had posited a number of alternative objectives to try to
support its discriminatory policy, including the intrinsic value of singlegender education, the need for alternatives to system-wide diversity or
choice, and the importance of gender-adapted leadership training. 513
Citing Hogan, Judge Phillips' dissent asserted that the importance of
the goal can only be analyzed after it has been determined to be the "actual
purpose. ,,514 His dissent argued that these various Commonwealth
objectives were merely ad hoc rationalizations for its overriding concern,
the retention of the all-male admissions policy at VMI. 515 Judge Phillips
warned the majority that this exclusionary policy was not based on
concerns about pedagogy or expanding educational opportunities, but on
512. 44 F.3d at 1238-39.
513. Id. at 1246-47 (Phillips, 1., dissenting). Judge Phillips stated that:
Though usually the government objectives relied upon to justify gender (and
other) classifications are plainly enough articulated by their state defenders,
that is not so true here. There is a real problem of identification in this
case, for the Commonwealth seems uncertainly to advance a number as
alternative or cumulative free-standing possibilities. . .. We are entitled
at the outset to inquire as to whether they are the 'actual purposes,' and to
reject them if the record draws their reality as the true motivations for the
policy sufficiently in doubt.
Id. at 1246.
514. Id. at 1246-47. See Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 1995) (Hall, 1.,
concurring). Judge Hall stated that "we promoted a means to an end--single-gender
education--to the status of an end in itself and avoided ascertaining, let alone analyzing,
the true purpose behind the state's decision to keep women out of VMI." Id.
515. Judge Phillips wrote that VMI's stated objectives
demonstrably are rationalizations compelled by the exigencies of this
litigation rather than the actual overriding purpose of the proposed separatebut-equal arrangement. Such an inquiry-looking realistically to the
historical record, taking judicial notice of much of relevance that is known
to the whole world and of which we are not compelled to feign ignorance .... Specifically, I think it would support a confident and fair conclusion that the primary, overriding purpose is not to create a new type of
educational opportunity for women, nor to broaden the Commonwealth's
educational base for producing a special kind of citizen-soldier leadership,
nor to further diversify the Commonwealth's higher education system--though all of these might result serendipitously from the arrangement--but is simply by this means to allow VMI to continue to exclude
women ....
Id. at 1247. See 51 F.3d at 451 (Hall, 1., concurring); United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d
90, 92-93 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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reinforcing stereotypical views about the roles of women in society and in
the military:516
When the Virginia Military Institute was founded in 1839 as a
state-supported military school for men only, it simply reflected the
unquestioned general understanding of the time about the distinctively different roles in society of men and women. See Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 n.lO (1982) (noting
numerous examples from that era of' legislative attempts to exclude
women from particular areas simply because legislators believed
women were less able than men to perform a particular function').
Since that time and until this litigation (so far as anything before
us reveals) no conscious governmental choice had ever been made
by the Commonwealth of Virginia to reexamine that original
policy. So far as can be told, the gender-role premises for its
origins were those that continued over time to sustain it as official
state policy.517
The dissent properly criticized the majority for condoning this shift in
asserted objectives and for failing to recognize this series of purported
objectives as a mere pretext for unconstitutional gender discrimination. 518
As has occurred in other military cases involving gender discrimination,
the VMI II court attempted to neutralize gender by looking to homogeneity
of gender and the benefits of single-gender education to justifY the
admission of men only to VMI. Clearly, the VWIL program would never
have been proposed were it not for the legal challenge to VMI's discriminatory admissions policy. The actual purpose of the Commonwealth's
actions was to retain the all-male military tradition of VMI, as exemplified
by the handling of the litigation by VMI alumni and not state officials.
Obviously, the all-male policy was not instituted to meet the various
proffered Commonwealth objectives. Instead, it reflects stereotypical
thinking about the proper roles of women in society and in the military.

S16. 44 F.3d at 1243. Judge Hall's Faulkner dissent is consistent with Judge Phillips'
viewpoint. His dissent indicated:
In fact, though VMI, and the Citadel, and their advocates have ceaselessly
insisted that education is at the heart of this debate, I suspect that these
cases have very little to do with education. They instead have very much
to do with wealth, power, and the ability of those who have it now to
determine who will have it later. The daughters of Virginia and South
Carolina have every right to insist that their tax dollars no longer be spent
to support what amount to fraternal organizations whose initiates emerge as
full-fledged members of an all-male aristocracy.
SI F.3d at 4S1 (Hall, J., concurring). See S2 F.3d at 93 (Motz, J., dissenting).
S17. 44 F.3d at 1243 (Phillips, J., dissenting). See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
S18. 44 F.3d at 1244 (Phillips, 1., dissenting).
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Also, the appeals court has erroneously converted the chosen
means--single-gender education-to an end. 519 The Commonwealth's
true purpose is to maintain VMI's all-male admissions policy while
enjoying the use of public funds. The disingenuous end of educational
diversity should not now be supplanted by the chosen means of singlegender education. It is this initial mis-step that leads the appeals court to
erroneously conclude that a new intennediate standard must be created to
review equal protection concerns.
Nevertheless, the court moved onto the second prong of the Hogan test
and evaluated whether homogeneity of gender is substantially related to the
goal of providing single-gender education. Under a flawed analysis, since
single-gender education is viewed as an acceptable purpose, homogeneity
of gender is not only substantially related, but automatically required to
preserve the benefits of single-gender education. 520 Thus, the court
concluded that homogeneity of gender presents a unique problem requiring
a new standard of review, which includes an examination of the "substantive comparability" of the gender-segregated programs: 521
Application of this traditional test, however, to a case where
the classification is not directed per se at men or women, but at
homogeneity of gender, presents a unique problem, because once
the state's objective is found to be an important one, the classification by gender is by definition necessary for accomplishing the
objective and might thereby bypass any equal protection scrutiny.
The second prong of the test thus would provide little or no
scrutiny of the effect of a classification directed at homogeneity of
gender . . . . To achieve the equality of treatment demanded by the
Equal Protection Clause, the alternatives left available to each
gender by a classification based on a homogeneity of gender need
not be the same, but they must be substantively comparable so that,
in the end we cannot conclude that the value of the benefits
provided by the state to one gender tends, by comparison to the
benefits provided to the other, to lessen the dignity, respect, or
societal regard of the other gender. 522
However, this new approach is unnecessary because it is the misinterpretation of the Commonwealth's objectives which leads to the court's
erroneous conclusion that the second prong of the test will not provide
sufficient equal protection review. More appropriately, the court should

519.
520.
521.
522.

51 F.3d at 451 (Hall, 1., concurring). See Saferstein, supra note 182, at 657.
44 F.3d at 1239.
Id. at 1237.
Id.

Winter 1996]

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

81

have determined whether homogeneity of gender is necessary for the
development of citizen soldiers, an issue already addressed through the
gender integration of federal military academies. 523
Yet even if one was to accept this notion of substantive comparability,
the court has too narrowly applied this standard to the comparison of the
VMI and VWIL programs. Instead of following Vorchheimer, Newberg,
and earlier race-based precedent requiring a comparison of the tangible and
intangible benefits of each program, the court only considered whether the
programs sought to achieve comparable results through similar missions
and goals. 524 Also, the VMI 11 appeals court never reconciled its focus
on results with Faulkner's requirement that any programmatic differences
be based upon established gender differences. The court merely recited that
providing identical programs for men and women may actually be more
discriminatory than providing different programs which seek comparable
results. 525
Ultimately, under the majority's view, the importance of comparable
facilities, faculty, funding, and prestige gave way to a mere recitation of the
goal of providing a military education within the traditional mold. 526
Rather than look to tangible and intangible factors that are susceptible to
objective measurement, the court opted for the more amorphous standard
of whether VWIL strived to achieve comparable results for females. 527
Thus, despite a flawed analysis which led to the dismissal of a more
appropriate legal standard, the VMI II court found that the VWIL and VMI
programs were comparable and should be considered in the context of the
diverse educational choices available in the Virginia educational system. 528 Although acknowledging that the VWIL program lacked the
critical components of history and prestige that the VMI program

523. See United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 93 (4th Cir. 1995) (Motz, J., dissenting).
See supra note 480 and accompanying text.
524. 44 F.3d at 1240-41. The court does not undertake a detailed analysis of funding,
faculty, facilities, course offerings, alumni influence, prestige, reputation or historic traditions. The court only took a quick glimpse at the issue of pedagogy, suggesting that the
debate over the benefits of the much-vaunted adversative training for women was a healthy
one which the court need not resolve. Id. at 1241.
525. Id. The court claimed that since men and women were not similarly situated, the
Commonwealth need only provide a program that is "comparable in substance, but not in
fonn and detail." Id.
526. Id.
527. Judge Phillips noted that any effort to monitor actual results would become "an
absolute quagmire of conflicting contentions about achievement of the objective." Id. at
1251 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
528. Id. at 1241. The court notes that Virginia students may select the all-male military
environment of VMI, the all-female leadership environment of VWIL or the coeducational
military environment of VPI. Id.
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possessed,529 the court stated that it was satisfied that continued commitment to VWIL's development would insure that both genders would receive
comparable opportunities. 530
The appeals court's approach was a direct throwback to the pre-Craig
substantial equality cases of Bristol, Allred and Williams in which these
courts failed to undertake a detailed comparison of sex-segregated facilities,
looking only for diverse educational opportunities within a state's entire
educational system and not for equal choices. As with those earlier cases,
a direct comparison would show that all-female institutions were consistently inferior to all-male programs in terms of both tangible and intangible
factors. Following a disheartening pattern, VWIL students are again
excluded from the best and most prestigious school based on stereotypical
thinking about gender roles. 531
Hearkening back to the stigmatic implications of Brown, the VMI II
court did acknowledge that an open question remained as to whether the
Commonwealth would implement the VWIL program with the vigor and
perseverance needed to build a comparably reputable program to VMI's.
The appeals court delayed its examination of the stigmatic implications of
the VWIL program since it was only a proposal, preferring to leave
monitoring of the implemented program to the district court. 532 The
appeals court suggested that the district court's supervision during the
VWIL's early development would help insure continuing the
Commonwealth's commitment to the success of the VWIL program. 533
However, borrowing from Brown, Judge Phillip's dissent made it clear
that the proposed VWIL program stigmatized its female graduates, a
circumstance court supervision cannot remedy:534
[T]he contrast between the two on all the relevant tangible and
intangible criteria is so palpable as not to require detailed recitation. If every good thing projected for the VWIL program is
realized in reasonably foreseeable time, it will necessarily be then
but a pale shadow of VMI in terms of the great bulk, if not all
those criteria .... The student and eventual graduate of VWIL
will not be able to call on the prestigious name of 'VMI' in
529. The majority states that "[i]t is true that VWIL is at its incipiency, and the VWIL
degree from Mary Baldwin College lacks the historical benefit and prestige of a degree from
VMI. But such intangible benefits can never be created on command-they must be the
byproduct of a longer-term effort." !d. In Brown and other race-based cases, the Court
determined that intangibles, such as prestige, were often more important than tangible
issues, such as faculty and facilities. See supra notes 197, 210, 216 and accompanying text.
530. 44 F.3d at 1241.
531. See supra notes 183-305 and accompanying text.
532. 44 F.3d at 1241-42.
533. Id. at 1242.
534. Id. at 1244 (Phillips, 1., dissenting).
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seeking employment or preference in her various endeavors; the
powerful political and economic ties of the VMI alumni network
cannot be expected to be open for her; the prestige and tradition of
her own fledgling institution cannot possibly ever achieve even
rough parity with those of VMI. The catch-up game is an
impossible one, as any honest reflection upon the matter must
reveal. 535
Clearly, the VWIL program is substantially inferior, not substantially
comparable, to VMI. As in Sweatt, any student considering the "choice"
between VMI and VWIL would recognize that the decision is hardly a
close one. 536 It seems inevitable that once the program is implemented,
it will be subject to future legal challenges as to whether it has achieved its
purported goals without stigmatic implications for women. 537

Conclusion
For decades, social, political, and legal forces have barred women from
fuII participation in society, particularly within the military. As women
have taken on more challenging societal roles, women in the military have
been prevented from keeping pace with women in other sectors because of
continuing stereotypical views about the proper role of women in the
military. VMI's attempt to keep women out of its publicly-funded military
training program is merely a continuation of a discriminatory history.
Originally, VMI attempted to cloak its stereotypical thinking about
women by asserting notions of educational diversity and choice. Its
arguments manipulated these terms to mean choices only for men, not
women. Using the intermediate standard of scrutiny and legal precedent,
the VMI I appeals court should have ordered VMI to either integrate its
program or forego public funding. Unfortunately, that court succumbed to
stereotypical thinking about the proper roles of women in military training,
reviving the concept of separate but equal for gender-segregated public
education.
In defiance of earlier gender and race-based precedent, the VMI II
courts approved a proposed VWIL program that provided separate and
wholly unequal tangible and intangible benefits for women cadets. The
VMI II courts recognized inequalities, but refused to take the actions
required to preserve the equal protection rights of women. Instead, the
VMI II courts created a new test of substantive comparability that puts
similar ends above similarities in facilities, curriculum, funding, faculty,

535. Id. at 1250.
536. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
537. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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alumni support, and prestige. Finding a creative justification for maintaining the status quo, the VMI II courts further entrenched the inferior
educational offerings available to women as compared to those available to
men.
This spring, the Supreme Court will decide the VMI case and,
consequently, has the opportunity to recognize the historic discrimination
against military women. The Court can halt the revival of the. separate but
equal concept it put to rest in the Brown decision forty-two years ago. In
denying legitimacy to VMI's arguments for gender segregated military
education, the Court will be abolishing a lingering obstacle to full female
integration into the armed services--namely, that women do not belong in
the military or at these elite military institutions. 538 In the interest of
equal protection, the Court should order that VMI lose its public funding
if it refuses to integrate. To do any less, the Court will be handing down
yet another setback in the struggle of women to be treated as equals, not
only in the military environment, but in society at large.
Postscript:
On June 26th, the Supreme Court struck down VMl's all-male admissions policy. United
States v. Virginia, No. 94-1941, 1996 WL 345786 (U.S. June 26, 1996). The Supreme Court
decision addressed many of the points raised in Prof. Ponte's article, including, the substantial
tangible and intangible differences between the VMI and VWIL programs, and the lower
courts' erroneous application of the intermediate standard. The Hastings Women's Law
Journal regrets that its production delays postponed the timely publication of this article.

538. HOLM, supra note 9, at 311-12; John Diamond, GAO Finds Rampant Harassment at
Military Academies, Associated Press, Feb. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURNWS file. A survey of the 1993 classes of the academies showed that 80% of female
cadets observed or experienced sexist comments in the past year. Id. A 1992 survey
determined that 78% of the women and 52% of the men at the Air Force Academy heard
sexist or demeaning remarks about females daily. Id. Many female cadets reported
egregious acts of harassment, including attempts by male cadets and faculty to fondle or kiss
them, videotaping of women in showers, and prank phone calls. !d.
Male cadets continued to challenge the presence of women at the academies. As one
West Point cadet stated that he wished he had attended the institution "before females
destroyed this place. The West Point I attend is nothing like that I read about that produced
MEN like Lee, Eisenhower and the many other brave SOLDIERS. What makes them want
to be men?" !d. See Honor Code & Sexual Harassment, 1994: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Force Requirements and Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Comm.,
103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994) (statement of Lieutenant General Howard D. Graves, U.S.
Army Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy), reprinted in Federal Document Clearing
House, Congressional Testimony, LEXIS (efforts of West Point to avoid sexual harassment
and to respect diversity in cadet corps).
Despite these obstacles, for the first time in West Point's 193-year history, the number
one student in the academy's 1995 graduating class was a woman, Rebecca Marier. Marier
lead her class of 987 cadets in academic, military and physical training programs. Marier
intends to complete her graduate studies in medicine at Harvard University. Tops at West
Point, WASH. POST, June 4, 1995, at AIO.

